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Attorney-Client Privilege.  North Kingstown School Committee 
v. Wagner, 176 A.3d 1097 (R.I. 2018).  When a party asserts 
attorney-client privilege as to the entire testimony of its attorney, 
the privilege should be applied on a question-by-question basis to 
ensure that the privilege is confined to its narrow scope. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
James Viner, the Respondent, was a chemistry teacher at 
North Kingstown High School.1  Following the 2014–15 school year, 
a former student of Viner’s complained to her mother, who in turn 
informed school administrators, that Viner had allegedly engaged 
in inappropriate behavior.2  At the behest of the school committee, 
two attorneys investigated the claim by interviewing students and 
created a final report of their findings which was submitted to the 
school’s superintendent.3  Viner received a letter from the 
Chairperson of the school committee on August 27, 2015, informing 
Viner that, at an executive session on August 25, 2015, the 
superintendent recommended to the school committee that Viner 
be suspended without pay for the 2015–16 school year, after which 
Viner should be fired for cause; the school committee accepted the 
recommendation.4  Viner requested a full evidentiary hearing 
which took place on December 7, 2015.5  At the hearing’s 
conclusion, the school committee again voted to suspend Viner for 
the 2015–16 school year and terminate his employment thereafter.6 
Viner appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Department 
of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE).7  Pursuant to 
 
 1.  N. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Wagner, 176 A.3d 1097, 1098 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  This “pre-suspension hearing” on August 25, 2015, was preceded 
by a “pre-depr[i]vation hearing” on August 24, 2015, which was attended by 
Viner, a teachers’ union representative, the superintendent, the school 
principal, and the school committee’s legal counsel.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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Viner’s request, the RIDE hearing officer issued witness subpoenas 
directed to the two investigating attorneys to compel their 
attendance at the RIDE proceeding.8  In response, the school 
committee filed a motion to quash the subpoenas on the basis of 
attorney-client privilege in Rhode Island Superior Court, which the 
hearing justice granted.9  The hearing justice entered final 
judgment for the school committee on May 23, 2016.10  Viner 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.11  While that appeal 
was pending, the RIDE hearing officer made a final decision to 
uphold the school committee’s decision on May 9, 2017.12  On June 
1, 2017, Viner appealed the RIDE officer’s decision to the council on 
elementary and secondary education (the council) and that appeal 
was still pending at the time of this decision.13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The court determined that the issue on appeal was not the 
hearing justice’s application of attorney-client privilege to the 
particular facts but, rather, his construction of the privilege’s scope, 
making it an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.14  The court 
found that, to serve the interest of uncovering the truth, the trial 
justice should construe the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
narrowly, thus precluding the possibility of blanket applications.15  
The court held that the hearing justice ruled too broadly when he 
determined that all testimony from the attorneys was privileged.16 
To rectify this error, the court remanded the case back to 
Superior Court, where the attorneys could be deposed or testify at 
trial.17  There, the hearing justice could make a question-by-
question determination as to the application of the attorney-client 
 
 8.  See id.  These subpoenas were issued under the authority of section 
16-39-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 1099. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 1100. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  Part of the hearing justice’s reasoning for so ruling was that the 
information which Viner wanted to obtain by compelling the attorneys to 
testify could be adduced in other ways.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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privilege.18  Finally, the court noted that the RIDE officer should 
reopen the evidence to allow any non-privileged testimony obtained 
from the attorneys and, if the proceeding resulted in a final 
judgment under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA), then the aggrieved party may avail itself of the hearing 
justice’s decision as a claim of error for later appeal.19 
COMMENTARY 
The court is almost certainly correct in holding that the 
Superior Court hearing justice was too broad in ruling that all 
testimony which might be obtained from the attorneys was 
privileged.20  While the specific holding seems uncontroversial, the 
fact that the court heard this case at all is a different story; as 
Justice Robinson opined in his dissent, the issue does not seem ripe 
for the court to be making any such determination given that 
Viner’s appeal to the council was still pending.21  While the APA 
authorizes immediate judicial review of an intermediate agency act, 
it does so only when “review of the final agency order would not 
provide an adequate remedy.”22  The problem is thus twofold: first, 
it is unclear how Viner would be deprived of an adequate remedy if 
the council affirmed the decision of the school committee; second, 
Viner might ultimately win his appeal with the council, which 
would render this attorney-client privilege issue utterly moot.23  
The court acknowledged the latter of these issues but proceeded to 
decide the case, seemingly motivated by the RIDE hearing officer’s 
hastiness in rendering a decision without a final ruling on the 
subpoenas.24  Although there is a valid concern in ensuring that 
Viner gets a fair shake on his appeal to the council, Justice 
Robinson’s advice that the majority should refrain from “opining 
with respect to issues about which [it] need not opine” is worth 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  The Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act is codified at 
section 42-35-16 of the Rhode Island General Laws.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Id. at 1099 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-
15(a)(2011)). 
 23.  Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 24.  See id. at 1099 n.3.  The court also perhaps had an eye towards making 
this entire process slightly more expedient by foreclosing the possibility of 
Viner appealing once more following an unfavorable decision by the council. 
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noting.25 
CONCLUSION 
The court held that a trial justice should determine whether 
there is a valid claim of attorney-client privilege on a question-by-
question basis rather than apply the privilege to an entire 
attorney’s testimony without further inquiry.  As a result, the court 
remanded the case back to the Superior Court to make new 
determinations as to the scope of the attorney-client privilege’s 
application with regard to the relevant testimony. 
Troy Lange 
 
 
 25.  Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Grady v. Narragansett 
Elec. Co., 962 A.2d 34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 2009)). 
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Civil Procedure.  Clifford v. Raimondo, 184 A.3d 673 (R.I. 2018). 
A trial justice enjoys a considerable range of discretion in the 
approval or denial of a class action settlement.  The decision of the 
trial justice, with regard to a class action settlement, will only be 
reversed upon a finding of abuse of discretion. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In an attempt to address the state retirement system’s funding 
deficit, the Rhode Island General Assembly amended the statutes 
governing the state pension system in 2009 and 2010.1  Unable to 
resolve the fiscal issues with these initial amendments, the General 
Assembly passed the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011 
(RIRSA).2  In order to reduce the state’s unfunded liabilities, 
RIRSA established a minimum retirement age for specific employee 
groups and reduced cost of living adjustments (COLAs).3  
Additionally, RIRSA terminated annual COLA payments 
indefinitely.4 
In 2010, unions representing state employees filed a lawsuit 
“alleging that the 2009 and 2010 amendments violated the 
Contract, Takings, and Due Processes Clauses of the Rhode Island 
Constitution.”5  In 2012, five additional lawsuits were filed 
asserting the same constitutional claims.6  All parties were ordered 
to participate in mediation and, in 2014, a proposed settlement was 
reached, but the parties were unable to secure the unanimous 
approval of all union members that was required to finalize the 
settlement.7  As the litigation continued, three additional cases 
were filed, all alleging similar claims, and these lawsuits were 
 
 1.  Clifford v. Raimondo, 184 A.3d 673, 677–78 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. at 679. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  “RIRSA stopped paying annual COLAs ‘until the state’s pension 
plans [were] 80% funded overall[,]’ which, as expressed by both sets of plaintiffs 
at oral argument in this appeal, is indefinite.”  Id. (alterations in original). 
 5.  Id. at 680. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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consolidated.8 
In preparation for trial, “[D]efendants produced more than 700 
gigabytes of electronic documents and over four million pages of 
documents.”9  In March 2015, a special master was assigned to 
oversee the remaining discovery.10  Shortly thereafter, the special 
master announced that all parties, except for one group of plaintiffs, 
had reached a settlement agreement.11 
The parties then “filed a class-action lawsuit to implement the 
settlement, move for class certification, and appoint class 
representatives and class counsel.”12  In accordance with Rule 
23(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial 
justice granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, designated 
the class representatives, and appointed class counsel for both 
Plaintiffs and Defendants.13  Additionally, the trial justice granted 
the parties’ joint motion for preliminary approval of the class 
settlement14 and approved the proposed method of notifying class 
members.15 
In response to the class notification, class members submitted 
approximately 400 objections to the settlement agreement and 
sixty-nine class members requested to be heard during the fairness 
hearing scheduled on May 20, 2015.16  At the fairness hearing, only 
thirty-five of these class members appeared before the court.17  The 
 
 8.  Id.  The “Clifford plaintiffs” are a group of retired state and municipal 
employees not associated with the other retiree associations involved in this 
appeal.  Id. at 678 n.3. 
 9.  Id. at 680. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 681.  The Cranston police and firefighters were the one group of 
plaintiffs not willing to settle.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  “The parties also sought initial approval of the settlement terms 
and approval of notice procedures of the settlement to all members of the class 
action.”  Id. 
 13.  Id.  The trial justice also certified several plaintiff subclasses.  Id. at 
680. 
 14.  Id. at 682.  “The trial justice found that the class settlement 
agreement warranted ‘an initial presumption of fairness,’ and concluded that 
it was ‘within the range of reasonableness.’”  Id. 
 15.  Id.  Under the proposed method, class members would be notified “by 
mail, newspaper publication, and posting the settlement information on the 
[Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island] website.”  Id. 
 16.  Id.  The “Clifford plaintiffs” objected to the settlement on the basis 
that “the state failed to explicitly define the amount of compensation retirees 
would lose under the settlement.”  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 683–84. 
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hearing spanned five days, and the trial justice heard testimony 
from counsel for both parties and six witnesses.18 
On June 9, 2015, the trial justice issued a written decision in 
which she reaffirmed her certification of the class, determined that 
the members of the class had received adequate notice, and 
concluded that the settlement was substantively and procedurally 
fair.19  Following this decision, the legislature amended RIRSA to 
reflect the terms of the settlement agreement.20 
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged “whether the trial justice’s 
certification of the class was appropriate” and “whether the 
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.”21 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision to approve the class 
action settlement, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether the trial justice abused her discretion.22  The 
court explained that the trial justice holds ample discretion in 
framing the issues and defining the facts and legal arguments that 
are most important to the requirements of Rule 23 of the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.23  Further, the court articulated 
that it will give deference to a trial justice’s decision to certify a 
class ‘“unless the trial court misconceived material evidence, 
substantially abused its discretion or was otherwise clearly 
wrong.’”24 
The court began its analysis by reviewing the trial justice’s 
application of Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure.25  Presuming that the numerosity requirement was 
satisfied,26 the court moved to the second prerequisite: that the 
class share a common question of law or fact.27  Given that all 
Plaintiffs’ claims raised the question of whether the enactment of 
 
 18.  Id. at 682. 
 19.  Id. at 684. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. (quoting DeCesare v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 852 A.2d 474, 487–
88 (R.I. 2004)). 
 25.  Id. at 685. 
 26.  Id. at 688.  The proposed class contained more than 60,000 individuals 
and defendants included 113 municipal entities.  Id. at 686. 
 27.  Id. at 688. 
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RIRSA violated their rights under the Rhode Island Constitution, 
the court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in 
determining that the entire class shared common questions of law 
and fact.28  Further, the court explained that variations in 
Plaintiffs’ claims for damages did not undermine the 
appropriateness of class action certification where common 
questions of law or fact predominate.29 
Next, the court reviewed the trial justice’s assessment of the 
third prerequisite: that the class representatives’ claims be typical 
of the entire class.30  The court found that the same conduct affected 
the named class representatives and the entire class; therefore, the 
requirement of typicality was satisfied.31  Further, the court 
explained the trial justice had appointed representatives to each 
subclass, which assured that all Plaintiffs were represented by an 
individual with a similar claim.32 
Turning to the fourth and final prerequisite of Rule 23(a), the 
court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in 
concluding that “[t]he representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”33  As the court 
explained, adequate representation requires that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are experienced and qualified to conduct the proposed 
litigation, and that the interests of plaintiffs do not conflict with the 
interests of the class.34  First, the court considered that the trial 
justice had engaged in an extensive inquiry into the attorneys’ 
ability to represent the class and properly determined that 
Plaintiffs were adequately represented.35  Second, the court 
emphasized that all class members and class representatives 
shared the common goal of preserving their pension plans and, 
therefore, the trial justice properly determined that the selected 
class representatives presented no conflict of interest.36 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the trial justice did not 
abuse her discretion in finding all prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 685, 688. 
 34.  Id. at 688–89. 
 35.  Id. at 689. 
 36.  Id. 
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satisfied.37  In response to Plaintiffs’ contention that their 
dissatisfaction with the settlement was evidence that they were not 
adequately represented, the court explained that adequate 
representation does not require that all plaintiffs be completely 
satisfied with the settlement, as such a standard would result in 
decertification of a class each time an objection is raised.38  
Additionally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that they 
should not have been included in the class because they did not 
participate in the underlying litigation, explaining that Rule 23 
does not require that all class members participate in the litigation 
and, by their nature, class action lawsuits contemplate absent 
plaintiffs.39 
Next, the court sought to determine whether the trial justice 
abused her discretion in approving the settlement.40  The court 
began this inquiry by considering the procedural fairness of the 
settlement and determined that the trial justice had not abused her 
discretion.41  The court determined that the trial justice had 
properly presumed that the settlement was fair given that the 
parties had engaged in sufficient discovery and the settlement was 
a result of earlier negotiations.42 Additionally, the court considered 
that the trial justice had conducted a five-day fairness hearing 
where class members were given adequate opportunity to be 
heard.43 
The court then turned to the substantive fairness of the 
settlement and determined that the trial justice did not abuse her 
discretion in determining that the settlement was substantively 
fair.44 The court agreed with the trial justice’s finding that the 
duration of the controversy, the complexity of the consolidated 
cases, and the substantial costs of litigation weighed in favor of 
settlement.45 Additionally, the court found that the trial justice did 
not abuse her discretion when she determined that the settlement 
was fair despite the fact that settlement objectors presented 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 691. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 692. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 692–95. 
 45.  Id. at 692–93. 
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arguments that had some merit.46  Given that discovery had 
produced an enormous number of documents, the court agreed with 
the trial justice’s conclusion that the extent of discovery weighed in 
favor of a reasonable settlement.47  Further, the court found that 
the trial justice properly considered that Plaintiffs would have to 
overcome numerous dispositive motions before reaching trial and 
would have to surmount a high burden of proof to succeed on their 
claims, weighing both factors in favor of settlement.48 
Finally, the court analyzed the trial justice’s evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the settlement.49  The court explained that 
Plaintiffs faced a higher burden at trial because they were required 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that RIRSA violated their rights 
under the Rhode Island Constitution, while Defendants merely had 
to demonstrate that RIRSA was ‘reasonable and necessary to carry 
out a legitimate public purpose.”50  Acknowledging the uncertainty 
involved in predicting the likely outcome of the trial, the court 
concluded that the settlement offered Plaintiffs immediate benefits 
that weighed in favor of a determination that the settlement was 
reasonable and fair.51 
For the forgoing reasons, the court held that the trial justice 
did not abuse her discretion in approving the class action 
settlement.52  Accordingly, the court denied and dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial justice.53 
COMMENTARY 
The court clearly acknowledged that a trial justice can exercise 
considerable discretion in allowing or denying a class action 
settlement.54  The court explained that the trial justice is well 
positioned to identify the facts and legal arguments that are most 
important to the requirements of Rule 23 of the Superior Court 
Rules of Civil Procedure.55 
 
 46.  Id. at 693.  There were only 400 settlement objectors out of 60,000 
individuals included in the class.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 694. 
 50.  Id. (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 638 (R.I. 1987)). 
 51.  Id. at 695. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 684. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
2019] SURVEY SECTION 435 
Here, the court properly affirmed the trial justice’s approval of 
the class settlement because the trial justice engaged in a thorough 
analysis in order to determine that all requirements of Rule 23(a) 
were satisfied,56 and she properly determined that the settlement 
was fair, reasonable, and adequate.57  The trial justice addressed 
each requirement of Rule 23(a) individually and did not abuse her 
discretion in determining that all requirements for class 
certification were satisfied.58  Following the established framework 
for class certification, the trial justice properly certified the class 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) based on Plaintiffs’ prayer for equitable 
relief.59  Further, the trial justice properly considered the factors 
necessary to determine whether the settlement was fair and 
engaged in the required balancing of the benefits and 
disadvantages of the settlement.60 
Additionally, the court recognized that it is within the trial 
justice’s discretion to divide a class into subclasses under Rule 
24(c)(4)(b).61  Here, the trial justice recognized that retirees had 
different interests than active employees and divided the groups 
into subclasses that would each have their own representatives.62  
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their status as retirees 
differentiated them from other Plaintiffs because the trial justice 
properly considered this fact when she established subclasses.63  
Further, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their 
dissatisfaction with the settlement was evidence that class counsel 
did not adequately represent their subclass.64  The court posited 
that an objection to a settlement is not sufficient to demonstrate 
that counsel did not provide adequate representation because such 
a standard would result in a finding of inadequate representation 
every time an objection is raised by a class.65  Therefore, even when 
plaintiffs are dissatisfied with a class action settlement agreement, 
the requirement of adequate representation will be satisfied as long 
 
 56.  See id. at 687–88. 
 57.  Id. at 695. 
 58.  Id. at 688–90. 
 59.  Id. at 691. 
 60.  Id. at 691–95. 
 61.  Id. at 680–82, 688. 
 62.  Id. at 688. 
 63.  Id. at 689–90. 
 64.  Id. at 689. 
 65.  See id. 
436 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:429 
as the plaintiffs’ attorneys are “qualified, experienced, and 
generally able to conduct the proposed litigation” and the plaintiffs 
do “not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.”66 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did 
not abuse her discretion in determining that the class action 
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The trial justice 
gave appropriate consideration to the objections to the settlement, 
properly weighed the benefits and disadvantages of the settlement, 
and reviewed all factors necessary to determine that the settlement 
was fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
Caitlyn Horbert 
 
 
 66.  See id. at 688. 
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Civil Procedure.  Nugent v. State Public Defender’s Office, 184 
A.3d 703 (R.I. 2018). A determination on the matter of standing in 
an appeal of an arbitrator’s decision does not constitute a final 
judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In July 2013, Dolores Nugent, an employee of the Rhode Island 
Public Defender’s Office (PD’s Office), attended the arraignment of 
an individual accused of murdering Nugent’s nephew.1  Nugent’s 
employer, the PD’s Office, represented the accused individual and, 
following the arraignment, Nugent asked a coworker to see 
documentation relating to the case.2  Shortly after this request was 
denied, the coworker observed Nugent on the phone, assuring an 
unknown third party that she would be able to gain access to the 
denied documentation by the following day.3 
On August 29, 2013, the PD’s Office terminated Nugent by 
letter, and the Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council, on behalf of 
Local Union 800 LIUNA (LIUNA), responded by filing a grievance 
on Nugent’s behalf, alleging termination without just cause.4  After 
hearing the testimony of several employees and Nugent, an 
arbitrator determined that the PD’s Office had just cause to 
terminate Nugent’s employment based on the “egregiousness of 
[Nugent’s] misconduct . . . and considering as well her prior record 
of discipline.”5 
On June 27, 2014, Nugent filed dual actions: the first (Nugent 
I) in Rhode Island Superior Court, appealing the arbitration 
decision, and the second (Nugent II) with the Rhode Island 
Commission for Human Rights, alleging employment 
discrimination.6  In Nugent I, Nugent sought reversal of the 
 
 1.  Nugent v. State Pub. Defender’s Office, 184 A.3d 703, 705 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 705–06. 
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arbitration decision and reinstatement to her position, alleging that 
the arbitrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious given the 
facts presented, thereby constituting a clear error of law based on 
the evidence.7  The PD’s Office moved for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of 
Civil Procedure, successfully arguing that Nugent lacked standing 
to seek judicial review because she had not proved LIUNA breached 
its duty of representation.8  The court issued a bench decision 
agreeing with the PD’s Office on December 9, 2014.9 
Simultaneous to Nugent I’s proceedings ending, Nugent II 
advanced.  On December 2, 2014, the Rhode Island Commission for 
Human Rights issued Nugent a “right-to-sue” letter and, on March 
2, 2015, Nugent filed a new complaint in Superior Court, advancing 
Nugent II.10  In her complaint, Nugent sought multiple forms of 
relief and compensatory damages—including reinstatement to her 
former position—for alleged unlawful employment discrimination 
and retaliation.11  Notably, reinstatement would have constituted 
a reversal of Nugent’s termination as upheld by the arbitrator in 
her original action and the court in Nugent I.12 
On March 3, 2016, the PD’s Office argued that Nugent II was 
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel on the basis that both 
the claims and parties to the action were the same as those heard 
and decided by the court in Nugent I.13  On June 17, 2016, the court 
 
 7.  Id. at 705.  The Court noted that Nugent alleged “the [a]rbitrator[ ] 
was arbitrary and capricious, based on facts, constituting clear error of law, 
against a greater weight of evidence presented, and the intent of the mandates 
and guidelines, protecting the confidentiality of Public Defender records, and 
conflicts of interest.”  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 705–06.  The PD’s Office based its argument on the court’s 
holding in DiGuilio v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 819 
A.2d 1271, 1273 (R.I. 2003), that under the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreements, unless there is evidence that the union breached its duty of fair 
representation, only the parties to the agreement can appeal, in this case the 
PD’s Office and LIUNA.  Nugent, 184 A.3d at 706. 
 9.  Id. at 706. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  Nugent sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief, 
reinstatement to her former position, back pay, and compensatory damages, 
alleging “unlawful employment discrimination based on race and disability, 
and retaliation based on her prior complaints of race discrimination, disability 
discrimination, religious discrimination, and sexual harassment.”  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  This argument was made before the same judge that had heard 
Nugent I.  Id. 
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granted the PD’s Office’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
entering final judgment in favor of the PD’s Office based on its res 
judicata argument.14 
On July 7, 2015, Nugent appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, contending that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar her 
discrimination claims in Nugent II because they were different from 
the claims in her Nugent I action, which simply sought to vacate 
the arbitrator’s decision.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In its review of the lower court’s application of res judicata, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the lower court’s judgement 
based on standing in Nugent I constituted an actual adjudication 
on the matters raised in Nugent II.16  This determination hinged on 
whether the hearing justice’s Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings 
in Nugent I constituted a final judgment on the merits, thereby 
appropriately forming the prior determination necessary for the 
Superior Court’s application of res judicata in Nugent II.17  The 
Supreme Court found that the determination of standing in Nugent 
I fell short of being a judgment on the merits, despite being an 
appropriate final decision.18  The Supreme Court explained that in 
order for a decision to be “on the merits,” a party must have been 
provided the opportunity “to be heard.”19 
The Supreme Court found that the lower court’s determination 
of standing in Nugent I did not form a final judgment on the merits 
for the purposes of res judicata because it did not allow Nugent to 
be heard on the merits of her case.20  Grounding its decision in the 
importance of protecting an individual’s right to due process, the 
Supreme Court held that the lower court should not have barred 
Nugent from seeking redress for her claims raised in Nugent II 
 
 14.  Id.  The PD’s Office argued that the underlying accusations raised and 
dismissed in Nugent I were substantively the same as those Nugent alleged in 
Nugent II.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 707. 
 17.  Id.  The Supreme Court used a Rule 12(b)(6) standard of “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief under any set of 
conceivable facts that could be proven in support of the claim.”  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 708 (finding that the Superior Court correctly ruled on the 
matter of standing in Nugent I). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
440 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:437 
purely based on the standing determination in Nugent I.21 
COMMENTARY 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nugent II provides unionized 
employees with a clear path for dual litigation tracks following 
termination—the arbitration process and a separate action on the 
underlying employment allegations—by removing the bar of res 
judicata posed by an arbitration appeal dismissed for lack of 
standing.22  This alternative avenue reclaims union employees’ 
right of redress curtailed by the Supreme Court in DiGuilio v. 
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, which requires 
a litigant to prove that her union breached its duty to represent her 
in order to establish the requisite standing needed to appeal an 
arbitration ruling in Superior Court.23 
The dissent does not take issue with whether a decision based 
on standing is a ruling on the merits, but instead focuses on the fact 
that the majority stopped short in its application of res judicata.24  
As the dissent notes, the Supreme Court’s previous interpretation 
of the doctrine of res judicata consistently limited the relitigation of 
issues that “were tried or might have been tried in an earlier 
action.”25  To this end, there was no procedural prohibition 
preventing Nugent from including her allegation of discrimination 
raised in Nugent II as part of her Nugent I appeal of the arbitration 
decision.26  Instead, the majority looked simply to issues that “were 
tried,” ignoring the “or might have been tried” plain-language 
analysis mandated under its prior applications of res judicata.27  By 
not requiring Nugent to comprehensively plead her entire case in 
one action, the Supreme Court effectively allowed her to try her 
case “on an installment plan,” thereby getting more than “one bite 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id. at 709 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 23.  DiGuilio v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1271, 1273 (R.I. 2003). 
 24.  See Nugent, 184 A.3d at 709–10 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 25.  Id. (citing Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 531 (R.I. 2013)) (emphasis in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bossian v. Anderson, 991 
A.2d 1025, 1027 (R.I. 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Carrozza v. Voccola, 962 A.2d 73, 78 (R.I. 2009) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1138 
(R.I. 2001). 
 26.  Nugent, 184 A.3d at 709 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 27.  Id. This is the dissent’s most compelling argument. 
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at the apple.”28 
Given this absent analysis, the majority’s decision reads as a 
statement of the Supreme Court’s resolve to protect the due process 
rights of individual union litigants.29 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held that a final judgment denying an 
appeal of an arbitration award, when rendered on the basis of 
standing, does not constitute a final judgment on the merits for the 
purposes of res judicata.30  The Supreme Court determined that the 
opportunity to be heard is a key determinant of whether res 
judicata should apply.31 
Xaykham Khamsyvoravong 
 
 28.  Id. at 711 (citing U.S. v. Cal. & Or. Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 358 (1904); 
Perez v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 302 A.2d 785, 791 (1973)). 
 29.  Id. at 709, 711. 
 30.  Id. at 708. 
 31.  Id. 
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Civil Procedure.  Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661 (R.I. 2018).  
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
an order by a Utah state court finding a “prima facie showing of 
sufficient facts to establish . . . personal jurisdiction”1 does not 
require full faith and credit in Rhode Island when the issue of 
personal jurisdiction has not been either fully and fairly litigated or 
decided with finality. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
InnerLight Holdings, Inc. is a company with its principal place 
of business in Utah.2  InnerLight hired William Reilly3 to be its 
corporate counsel while it worked to get authorization from the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to trade 
the company’s shares publicly.4  InnerLight filed a complaint in 
Utah District Court, stating it agreed to pay William 650,000 
shares for his services, with William holding 600,000 more shares 
to be transferred to him once the company went public.5  InnerLight 
claimed William transferred, without permission, 700,000 
InnerLight shares through various corporate entities: Ashworth 
Development, LLC; Doylestown Partners, Inc.; Shamrock Equities, 
Inc.; and Beachview Associates, Inc.6  Defendant Daniel P. Reilly, 
William’s son, was a minority shareholder and officer in 
Doylestown, Shamrock, and Beachview.7  Plaintiff George T. 
Hawes purchased InnerLight warrants and stock that William 
purportedly transferred into the aforementioned corporate 
entities.8  InnerLight eventually rescinded the stock offerings, and 
 
 1.  Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661, 666 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. at 663. 
 3.  William Reilly, Daniel Reilly, and Shannon Reilly will be referred to 
by their first names, as the court did in its Opinion, to avoid confusion. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 663–64. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  A warrant is “[a]n option to buy a stock at a specified price from 
an issuing company.”  Warrant, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1953 (5th ed. 2011). 
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Hawes never received a refund.9 
On March 16, 2010, InnerLight filed its previous federal 
complaint in a Utah state court against William, Daniel, Shannon 
Reilly (Daniel’s sister), the corporate entities, Hawes, and other 
purchasers of InnerLight stock.10  Hawes answered the complaint 
and filed a cross-claim against William, Daniel, Shannon, and 
others.11  On June 29, 2010, Daniel, Shannon, and the corporate 
entities filed a motion to dismiss InnerLight’s complaint in Utah 
state court on grounds that Utah did not have personal jurisdiction 
over them.12  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, neither 
Daniel nor his counsel were present.13  The state proceeding was 
removed to federal court, where the Utah District Court denied the 
motion to dismiss in an order which stated, in its entirety, 
“InnerLight made a prima facie showing by pleading sufficient facts 
to establish that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
each of the non-resident Defendants.”14  On May 11, 2012, the Utah 
state court entered a default judgment on Hawes’ cross-claim 
against Daniel, William, Shannon, and the corporate entities.15 
On April 21, 2014, Hawes filed a “Petition to Enforce a Foreign 
Judgment” in Rhode Island Superior Court, requesting 
enforcement of the default judgment entered against Daniel in 
Utah state court.16 On June 20, 2014, the Superior Court issued an 
execution in the amount of $971,351.78.17  On October 30, 2014, 
Daniel filed a motion to quash the execution and dismiss Hawes’s 
petition for lack of personal jurisdiction in the Utah state court 
action.18 
On April 27, 2015, after considering the briefs and hearing 
arguments from both parties, the hearing justice issued a written 
decision on Daniel’s motions.19  In that decision, the hearing justice 
 
 9.  Hawes, 184 A.3d at 664. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  This case focuses on the events in Utah state court as they relate 
to Daniel and Hawes.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  The default judgment was for $775,000, plus “reasonable 
expenses, including attorney’s fees.”  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 665. 
 19.  Id. 
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addressed whether he needed to give full faith and credit to the 
Utah state court’s order denying Daniel’s motion to dismiss.20  The 
hearing justice determined he did not need to give full faith and 
credit to the Utah state court’s order because the order was “vague,” 
it did not include any “underlying reasoning,” and it appeared that 
a “final determination of personal jurisdiction had [not been] 
reached.”21  Instead, he noted, “the order only states a prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction had been made.”22  The hearing 
justice then reviewed Daniel’s contacts with Utah and the 
applicable Utah law and concluded Utah did not have personal 
jurisdiction over Daniel.23  Accordingly, he dismissed Hawes’ 
petition and quashed the execution.24  Hawes timely appealed to 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.25 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The court initially sought to determine whether the Utah state 
court’s order finding a prima facie showing that the Utah state 
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Daniel should be 
granted full faith and credit.26  In doing so, the court applied de 
novo review because the appeal dealt with a question of law that 
implicated a constitutional right.27  The court noted that if Daniel 
had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Utah for the limited 
purpose of challenging jurisdiction, he would have been agreeing to 
abide by that court’s determination on the issue of jurisdiction.28  
Accordingly, the court said that determination would have been 
binding on any further proceedings related to the question of 
jurisdiction.29  Here, the court found that Daniel had submitted 
himself to the limited jurisdiction of Utah for the purpose of 
determining personal jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss for 
 
 20.  Id.  “Full faith and credit” refers to the duty states have to respect the 
“public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state[,]” pursuant 
to the United States Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 21.  Hawes, 184 A.3d at 665. 
 22.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 666. 
 29.  Id. 
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lack of personal jurisdiction.30  In order to grant the order full faith 
and credit, however, the court had to decide whether the issue had 
been “fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court 
which rendered the original judgment.”31  The court found that the 
issue was not fully and fairly litigated because (1) neither Daniel 
nor his counsel was present at oral arguments in Utah when the 
motion was decided, and (2) the Utah state court’s order did not 
include any insight into the arguments of the parties or the court’s 
reasoning.32  The court also highlighted that, prior to the entry of 
default judgment, the Utah state court’s order had found only a 
prima facie showing of sufficient facts to establish the Utah court’s 
personal jurisdiction over Daniel, which is not a “final decision” on 
the issue.33  As a result, the court found that the Utah court’s order 
against Daniel was not entitled to full faith and credit in Rhode 
Island.34 
The court then sought to determine whether, under Utah law, 
Utah had personal jurisdiction over Daniel.35  The court, following 
Utah law, began a two-pronged inquiry to determine (1) whether 
the requirements of Utah’s long-arm statute were satisfied, and (2) 
whether the assertion of jurisdiction violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  The court began its 
analysis by deciding whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
violated due process and deciding whether the Utah state court was 
asserting specific or general jurisdiction over Daniel.37  The court 
found that the assertion must have been specific jurisdiction given 
that the factual basis for the case was based upon Daniel’s 
involvement as a minority shareholder in various corporate 
entities, with none of those corporate entities (nor Daniel) 
conducting substantial and continuous activity in Utah.38  The 
court then found that Daniel had no clear contacts with Utah other 
than being a shareholder and officer in the corporate entities being 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 667 (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963)) 
(emphasis in original). 
 32.  Id. at 668–69. 
 33.  Id. at 668. 
 34.  Id. at 669. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. (citing Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth, 201 P.3d 944, 950 (Utah 
2008)). 
 37.  Id. at 669–70. 
 38.  Id. at 671. 
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sued by Hawes—entities which, according to an affidavit filed with 
the Rhode Island Superior Court by Daniel, were incorporated in, 
and had their principal place of business in, Florida.39  The affidavit 
also stated Daniel was a resident of Rhode Island, that he had only 
been physically present in Utah once (on a 2007 ski trip), and that 
Daniel did not participate in William’s work for InnerLight.40  
Accordingly, the court concluded that Daniel did not have the 
sufficient “minimum contacts” envisioned by the United States 
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.41  
Thus, the court found that Utah did not have specific personal 
jurisdiction over Daniel.42 
Lastly, the court considered whether Daniel forfeited the 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction under the court’s precedent 
in Pullar v. Cappelli.43  The court found that neither filing a motion 
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, nor 
attempting to remove the case to federal court, gave Hawes a 
reasonable expectation that the suit would be defended on the 
merits.44  Accordingly, the court found Daniel had not forfeited the 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction as the defendant had in 
Pullar.45 
COMMENTARY 
The court found that Daniel and his counsel not being present 
at the Utah state court’s hearing on Daniel’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction was evidence that the issue was not 
“fairly and fully litigated.”46  In doing so, however, the court seemed 
to directly contradict its argument against Daniel forfeiting his 
ability to contest Utah’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 42.  Id. at 672. 
 43.  Id. (citing Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551, 553 (R.I. 2016)).  
[A] defense of lack of personal jurisdiction [can] be forfeited when the 
defendant, through delay or conduct, give[s] a plaintiff a reasonable 
expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or cause[s] the 
court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction 
is later found lacking. 
Id. (citing Pullar, 148 A.3d at 558) (internal quotations omitted). 
 44.  Id. at 673. 
 45.  Id. (citing Pullar, 148 A.3d at 553). 
 46.  Id. at 668. 
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under the rule laid out in Pullar.47  The court, in deciding Daniel 
had not forfeited his ability to contest Utah’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over him, distinguished the facts in the instant case 
from those in Pullar.48  Here, Daniel had not given Hawes a 
reasonable expectation that he would defend the suit on the merits, 
as the defendant had in Pullar, but Daniel had given the Utah state 
court a reasonable expectation that he would defend his motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.49  In not defending his 
motion, Daniel never appeared in Utah again, forcing the Utah 
court to issue a default judgment against him.50  Despite this, 
Daniel benefited by not appearing to defend his motion.51  This 
benefit stands in stark contrast to the principle of a defendant not 
being allowed to “pull[ ] personal jurisdiction out of the hat like a 
rabbit in the face of an inhospitable sea,” which is how the court 
decided that the defendant in Pullar had forfeited his defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction because he had wasted the court’s 
time.52  Here, despite Daniel wasting the Utah state court’s time by 
not defending his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and never showing up for trial, Daniel benefited from his absence 
when he then pulled the lack of personal jurisdiction argument out 
again in the face of Hawes’ attempt to enforce a default judgment 
against him in Rhode Island.53 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an order by a 
Utah state court finding a prima facie showing of sufficient facts to 
establish personal jurisdiction did not require full faith and credit 
in Rhode Island, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had not been 
fully and fairly litigated or decided with finality, and the Defendant 
did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Utah. 
Luis A. Vargas 
 
 
 47.  See Pullar, 148 A.3d at 558. 
 48.  See Hawes, 184 A.3d at 673. 
 49.  See id. at 664. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 669. 
 52.  Id. at 672. 
 53.  Id. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510 (R.I. 2018).  A 
prosecutor’s comment to a jury does not violate a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, so long as a jury would not 
“naturally and necessarily construe” the comment as going to the 
defendant’s failure to testify.  In such an event, a cautionary 
instruction must be immediately provided to inform the jury that 
the defendant has a constitutional right to be free from compulsion 
of any kind to testify in his own defense.  Further, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court will not overturn a trial justice’s evidentiary ruling 
allowing a “mug shot” into trial absent a clear showing that he or 
she abused her discretion, which resulted in prejudicial error. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On February 14, 2014, a grand jury indicted Andre Marizan on 
two counts of first-degree sexual assault.1  The events that led to 
Marizan’s indictment were recalled through testimony by multiple 
witnesses at trial.2  On August 17, 2012, the complaining witness, 
Alicia, and her sister, Lauren, spent a few hours at a South County 
beach.3  Alicia and Lauren were both drinking Hennessy liquor and 
when the beach closed, they drove to Lauren’s ex-boyfriend’s house 
(the Providence residence) and continued to drink alcohol with 
Lauren’s friends.4  The “party” eventually moved from the living 
room to the bedroom where, after smoking marijuana and drinking 
alcohol, Alicia vomited and later “passed out” on a bed.5  Alicia 
recalled waking up around 7:00 a.m., not wearing pants or 
underwear, and feeling a wet substance on her leg.6  Alicia then 
noticed Marizan at the corner of the bed and began “flipping out” 
 
 1.  State v. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510, 513 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id.  The court used pseudonyms when referencing the complaining 
witness and her sister.  Id. at 513 n.2. 
 4.  Id.  One of Lauren’s friends was the defendant, Andre Marizan.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  Sometime after 11:00 p.m., but before 3:00 a.m., the group left the 
house to purchase alcohol.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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on him.7  Alicia testified that Marizan told her she was “bugging,” 
that “nothing happened,” and that the wet substance she felt was 
urine.8  Marizan told her that she removed her clothing because she 
urinated on herself.9 
During that same night, Lauren recalled playing a prank on 
Alicia and Marizan around 3:00 a.m. while they were asleep.10  
After the prank, Lauren and her friends returned to the living room 
and approximately fifteen minutes later, one of Lauren’s friends 
attempted to open the bedroom door but it was locked.11  When one 
of Lauren’s friends finally unlocked the door, Lauren  remembered 
seeing Alicia asleep without her pants and Marizan wearing only 
boxer shorts.12  Lauren also recalled  that, after waking Alicia, 
Alicia began to attack Marizan.13  After Marizan left the scene, 
Lauren drove Alicia to the hospital.14 
At the hospital, the emergency room nurse performed a routine 
sexual-assault examination on Alicia and notified the police when 
the exam was complete.15  The police responded to the Providence 
residence and conducted an investigation into the alleged sexual 
assault.16  The police showed Alicia a “mug shot,” and she positivity 
identified Marizan as her assailant.17  The police later obtained 
Marizan’s consent to take a buccal swab of his mouth and after 
further investigation, the police obtained an arrest warrant for 
Marizan.18 
 
 7.  Id. at 513–14. 
 8.  Id. at 514. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  The prank was recorded on Lauren’s phone and presented to the 
jury.  Id. at 513 n.5. 
 11.  Id. at 514. 
 12.  Id.  Lauren stated that, even though she was concerned, she returned 
to the living room and, around 6:00 a.m., left to get breakfast and woke Alicia 
when she returned thirty minutes to an hour later.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  Lauren drove Alicia to Women & Infants’ Hospital in Providence.  
Id. 
 15.  Id.  The nurse, Amy Corrado, testified at trial that Alicia told her she 
had showered prior to the examination, but was wearing the same clothes from 
when the incident occurred.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  Detective Joseph Villella testified that he collected the bedding 
from the scene for testing at the Rhode Island Department of Health, and 
Detective William Corrigan testified that he took formal statements from both 
Alicia and Lauren.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 514–15.  Detective Corrigan testified that he did not take 
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Cara Lupino, the supervisor for the Rhode Island Department 
of Health Forensic DNA Laboratory, performed the testing on 
Alicia’s sexual-assault examination.19  She explained that Alicia’s 
sexual-assault examination tested positive for seminal fluid but did 
not contain sperm cells.20  Ms. Lupino explained that she used a 
standard DNA test on both Marizan’s buccal swab and Alicia’s 
vaginal swab and could not determine whether the small amount of 
seminal fluid on the vaginal swab was consistent with Marizan’s 
DNA profile.21  At that time, however, the laboratory acquired the 
ability to perform Y–STR testing, which showed that Alicia’s 
vaginal swab and Marizan’s buccal swab were consistent with 
Marizan’s Y–STR DNA profile.22  Ms. Lupino considered Y–STR 
testing effective in this case given the lack of sperm in the seminal 
fluid and overwhelming amount of female cells on the vaginal 
swab.23 
At trial, after the prosecutor’s closing argument, Marizan 
moved for a mistrial, arguing “that one of the prosecutor’s 
comments violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.”24  The 
trial justice reserved his decision on this motion.25  The trial justice 
gave the jury its instructions, and, after deliberation, it returned a 
guilty verdict.26  The trial justice immediately denied Marizan’s 
motion for a mistrial.27  Marizan then moved for a new trial, which 
 
witness statements from the other men at the Providence residence because 
Alicia warned him that the men were Marizan’s friends and they would not 
cooperate.  Id. at 515. 
 19.  Id. at 515.  Cara Lupino testified for the State.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  Ms. Lupino further testified that the test performed on the 
bedding contained a bloodstain that came from a male donor.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  Y–STRs are found only in the male’s Y chromosome and, thus, Y–
STR testing ignores the female DNA that often overwhelms the male DNA, as 
it did here.  Id. at 515 n.7.  However, Y–STR testing does not identify a 
particular individual because “a male inherits the DNA type from his father 
and shares that type with siblings, uncles, and cousins.”  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 515. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  When the court rules on a motion for a mistrial, it affords the trial 
justice’s decision “great weight” and only reverses “if it was clearly wrong.”  Id. 
at 516 (quoting State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 828 (R.I. 2016)).  When the trial 
justice rules on a motion for mistrial, he or she “must determine whether the 
evidence would cause the jurors to be so inflamed as to make them unable to 
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented.”  Id.  (quoting State v. 
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the trial justice also denied before sentencing him to forty years at 
the Adult Correctional Institution with twenty-five years to serve 
and fifteen years suspended with probation.28  Marizan filed a 
timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.29 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Marizan’s Constitutional Right to Remain Silent 
The first issue on appeal was whether the prosecutor’s 
comment during her closing argument violated Marizan’s Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent.30  Because this allegation 
concerned Marizan’s constitutional rights, the court conducted a de 
novo review.31  In determining whether a prosecutor’s statement 
violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right, the court looks to 
whether “the language used in the [prosecutor’s] comment was 
manifestly intended or was of such a character that a jury would 
naturally and necessarily construe it to amount to a comment on 
the failure of the accused to testify.”32  In its assessment, the court 
reviewed the context of the statement and in light of the 
circumstances, to determine how a “jury composed of ordinary, 
intelligent lay persons would have understood it during closing 
arguments.”33  The court noted that in the event that such a 
comment violated this standard, a cautionary instruction must 
immediately be given to cure the error and prevent undue 
prejudice.34 
 
Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 332 (R.I. 2011)). 
 28.  Id. at 515.  Marizan also must register as a sex offender and obtain 
counseling.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  A motion for a new trial was also discussed in the Opinion but will 
not be of focus in this survey. 
 30.  Id. at 516.  The prosecutor began her closing argument with the 
following: “Lets clear up one thing.  There’s not a shred of evidence in this case, 
not a shred before you, to suggest that this was consensual sex.  Not from 
[Alicia].  Certainly not from [Lauren].  And certainly not from him.”  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Fontaine, 323 A.2d 571, 574 (R.I. 1974)).  
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the Fifth Amendment forbids 
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by 
the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”  Id. at 516 (citing Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)). 
 33.  Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Andrews, 390 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1978)). 
 34.  Id.  “[T]he cautionary instruction must be . . . in language 
understandable by the ordinary, reasonable man that the defendant has a 
constitutional right to be free from compulsion of any kind, physical or mental 
2019] SURVEY SECTION 453 
When Marizan moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s 
comment, the State argued that the prosecutor was not referencing 
Marizan’s decision not to testify; rather, the State was responding 
to his contention that the sex was consensual.35  Although Marizan 
agreed that a prosecutor is permitted to rebut a consent argument, 
he contended that the statement crossed the line.36  As noted, the 
court examined this remark in the context in which it was made, 
highlighting the fact that the prosecutor did not directly comment 
on Marizan’s failure to take the stand, but commented on the lack 
of evidence before the jury showing the sex was consensual, 
including from Marizan himself.37  The court gives “[a] 
prosecutor . . . considerable latitude in closing argument, as long as 
the statements pertain only to the evidence presented and 
represent reasonable inferences from the record.”38 
Ultimately, the court found that the prosecutor’s comment did 
not violate Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.39  
Further, the fact that the trial justice provided a general 
instruction immediately after the prosecutor completed her closing 
argument comforted the court, which presumes that such 
instructions are followed by the jury.40  Accordingly, the court found 
the prosecutor’s statement was not “of such a character that a jury 
would . . . construe it to amount to a comment on the failure of the 
accused to testify,”41 and therefore the trial justice did not clearly 
err in denying Marizan’s motion for a mistrial.42 
 
to testify in his own defense.”  Id. (quoting State v. Sherman, 317 A.2d 445, 
448 (R.I. 1974)); see State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I. 1992)  (holding 
that in a trial with three defendants, where one elected not to testify, the trial 
justice’s failure to instruct the jury at the close of evidence as to the defendant’s 
right not to testify was prejudicial error); but see State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 
333 (R.I. 2011) (holding that the trial justice’s curative instruction to the jury 
sufficed to extinguish “any prejudice that may have arisen”). 
 35.  Id. at 518.  A hearing on Marizan’s motion for a mistrial took place in 
the absence of the jury.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 518–19. 
 38.  Id. at 519 (citing State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 278 (R.I. 2017)). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  The instruction pertained to the defendant’s right not to testify 
and that he had every right to remain silent, and that right could not be held 
against him.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 520 (citing Fontaine, 323 A.2d at 574). 
 42.  Id. 
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B. Admissibility of Marizan’s “Mug Shot” 
The second issue on appeal was whether the trial justice 
properly admitted Marizan’s “mug shot” into evidence.43  In Rhode 
Island, to determine whether a “mug shot” should be admitted into 
evidence, courts employ a three-prong test known as “the Lemon 
test”: 
(1) the prosecution must have a demonstrable need to 
introduce the photographs; (2) the photographs must not 
imply that the defendant had a prior criminal record; and 
(3) the manner of introduction at trial must be such that it 
does not draw particular attention to the source of 
implications of the photographs.44 
Here, the court found that the first two prongs of the Lemon 
test were not satisfied.45  The court explained that the State failed 
to satisfy the first prong because the prosecutor acknowledged 
Marizan’s identity was not at issue, and his photograph was used 
solely for the police to get an identification from Alicia.46  Moreover, 
the court found that the State did not satisfy the second prong of 
the Lemon test because the State did not separate Marizan’s 
double-shot photograph, suggesting to the jury that he had a 
criminal record.47 
After finding that the State failed to meet the Lemon test, the 
court then had to determine if the introduction of the “mug shot” 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. (quoting State v. Long, 488 A.2d 427, 431 (R.I. 1985)). The test was 
first outlined in State v. Lemon, 456 A.2d 261 (R.I. 1983).  Id.  The court did 
not analyze the third prong in its opinion and, thus, it will not be addressed in 
this survey. 
 45.  Id. at 521. 
 46.  Id.; see Long, 488 A.2d at 432–33 (listing reasons why the introduction 
of a “mug shot” at trial is necessary, such as hesitation or doubt with the in-
court identification, or a defendant looks physically different from the time of 
arrest). 
 47.  Marizan, 185 A.3d 510 at 521; see State v. Dinnagen, 639 A.2d 1353, 
1357 (R.I. 1994) (holding that the State failed to satisfy the Lemon test when 
they cut out the middle of a photograph that contained the identification 
plaque the defendant was holding but left two stamps of the police department 
visible on the back of the photograph).  But see State v. Delarosa, 59 A.3d 1185, 
1189 (R.I. 2013) (deeming the Lemon test irrelevant even though the 
photograph was taken when the defendant was incarcerated but contained no 
suggestion that he was in prison at the time). 
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constituted reversible error.48  The court acknowledged that if the 
State provides “competent evidence from which the jury could 
convict the defendant aside from the improperly admitted 
photograph, the introduction of such a picture ‘is not prejudicial.’”49 
Moreover, if it is not reasonably possible for the objectionable 
evidence to “influence an average jury on the ultimate issue of guilt 
or innocence,” then the inclusion of such evidence may be 
harmless.50 
Here, the court found that the admission of the photograph was 
not reversible error.51  It noted that the trial justice gave a 
cautionary instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor’s 
introduction of the photograph.52  Furthermore, the DNA evidence 
demonstrated the presence of Marizan’s seminal fluid in the 
vaginal swab samples taken from Alicia, and two witnesses for the 
State corroborated each other’s testimony.53  Therefore, the court 
held that, because the trial justice gave a timely cautionary 
instruction regarding Marizan’s photograph and provided other 
evidence of guilt, admission of the photograph was not reversible 
error.54 
COMMENTARY 
In this case, the majority opinion focused much of its analysis 
on whether the prosecutor’s comment violated Marizan’s Fifth 
Amendment right not to testify.55  The court determined that, when 
looking at the statement in context, the prosecutor’s comment did 
not violate Marizan’s constitutional right because the prosecutor 
provided the trial justice with a detailed explanation as to how the 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  (quoting Dinnagen, 639 A.2d at 1357). 
 50.  Id.  (quoting Dinnagen, 639 A.2d at 1357).  The court in Dinnagen held 
that the admission of the defendant’s picture was not reversible error because 
the jury heard evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 522. 
 52.  Id. at 521.  In summation, the cautionary instruction to the jury 
provided that the relevance of the evidence was simply a picture shown to 
Alicia to identify the defendant and no other conclusions should be drawn from 
the photograph.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 521–22.  The testimony was also supported by video footage 
evidence showing Alicia unconscious.  Id. at 522. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  The dissent focused its analysis on whether Marizan’s Fifth 
Amendment right was violated and, thus, that issue will be the sole focus of 
this Commentary. 
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comment related to Marizan’s statement to Alicia that she urinated 
on herself.56 Additionally, the majority acknowledged that the trial 
justice provided the jury with a general instruction immediately 
after the prosecutor completed her closing argument.57  The 
instruction informed the jury that Marizan has a right to remain 
silent and that his choice to invoke that right could not be held 
against him.58  Thus, the majority was satisfied with the ruling of 
the trial justice.59 
However, Justice Robinson, in his dissenting opinion, 
conducted the same analysis and found that the prosecutor’s 
argument did in fact violate Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right.60  
The dissent’s analysis provided a more generalized view of the 
context of the prosecutor’s statement, analyzing how a reasonable 
jury might have perceived the comment in light of all the testimony 
at trial rather than just the prosecutor’s closing argument.61  The 
dissent noted that both Alicia and Lauren testified at length during 
the trial, whereas Marizan did not testify at all.62  In the dissent’s 
more expansive view of the statement’s context, it found that a jury 
composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons could reasonably 
understand the prosecutor’s comment to be “a comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify.”63 
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the jury never heard the 
prosecutor’s explanation as to why her comment did not violate 
Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right.64  The dissent reasoned that 
because the prosecutor had to explain the intended meaning of the 
statement to the court, that indicates that the comment was 
ambiguous and needed a curative instruction.65  In the dissent’s 
view, because no curative instruction was immediately given to the 
jury, the trial justice’s later given general instruction regarding 
Marizan’s right not to testify was insufficient to cure the potential 
 
 56.  Id. at 518–19.  The trial justice explained that when he heard the 
prosecutor’s explanation, he said, “it certainly made sense to me, and I believe 
it was fair comment because that was testimony in the case.”  Id. at 519. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 513 n.1 (majority opinion). 
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prejudice.66  The record revealed that the prosecutor’s comment 
was separated from the trial justice’s general instruction by thirty-
two transcript pages, and though it is difficult to determine how 
much time actually elapsed, certainly a substantial amount of time 
passed between the comment and the jury instruction.67  Thus, 
under the dissent’s more generalized view of context, it is more 
likely that a reasonable juror would have found the prosecutor’s 
comment to be about Marizan’s constitutional right not to testify.68 
The dissent’s argument is persuasive because it illustrates that 
reasonable minds could form different conclusions when looking at 
something in context.  Here, the majority and dissenting opinions 
looked at the prosecutor’s statement in different contexts.  When 
determining if the prosecutor’s statement violated Marizan’s Fifth 
Amendment right, the majority examined the comment only in the 
context of the prosecutor’s closing argument.  This examination 
limits the scope of a juror’s perception of the statement to that one 
aspect of the trial.  Using the dissent’s broader view of context, the 
trial justice should have considered not only how a juror might have 
perceived the statement during the prosecutor’s closing arguments, 
but also how a juror would perceive the comment in light of all the 
testimony or lack thereof.  By using the broad context of a 
statement, a trial justice would be more apt to provide an 
immediate cautionary instruction to a jury out of fear that it would 
be tainted by undue prejudice.  The dissent’s argument provides a 
new lens for judges to examine whether a comment made during 
trial violates a defendant’s constitutional right.  Using the dissent’s 
approach, a court should analyze the statement itself, how it could 
be viewed given the statements surrounding the comment, and how 
the comment could be viewed given all the testimony presented at 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s 
closing argument did not impermissibly comment on Marizan’s 
constitutional right not to testify.  The court also determined that 
 
 66.  Id. at 525 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 67.  Id.  “[A] cautionary instruction [must] be given immediately in order 
that the seed planted by the remark will not be given time to germinate.”  Id. 
at 517 (citing State v. Andrews, 390 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1978)). 
 68.  Id. 
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the trial court erred in admitting the “mug shot” into evidence 
because the State failed to establish a demonstrable need for the 
photograph’s introduction and failed to separate the “mug shot” so 
the jury would not know of Marizan’s criminal record.  However, 
the erroneous admission of Marizan’s “mug shot” did not constitute 
reversible error on appeal. 
Shane Gallant 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Minior, 175 A.3d 1202 (R.I. 2018).  A final 
judgment for a defendant on a civil violation heard in the Traffic 
Tribunal does not preclude the State from bringing criminal 
charges for the same transaction or occurrence against the same 
defendant. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In February 2014, the Town of Bristol (the Town) Police 
Department cited Defendant Benjamin Minior with a “civil 
violation of reasonable and prudent speeds” following a vehicle 
collision with a telephone pole and tree.1  Two people were in the 
vehicle at the time of the collision, though who was driving the 
vehicle remains an unresolved question.2  Both Minior and the 
other person in the vehicle were taken to Rhode Island Hospital 
with injuries.3  Because the police suspected Minior was under the 
influence, Minior was administered a blood test which revealed a 
blood-alcohol content of 0.153 mg/dl.4  Subsequently, Minior was 
issued a summons to appear at an arraignment for driving under 
the influence (DUI), serious bodily injury resulting.5 
In April 2014, Minior appeared in front of the Traffic Tribunal 
(Tribunal) to contest the civil citation.6  When the Tribunal 
magistrate saw that Minior was also being charged criminally with 
a DUI by the State of Rhode Island, she advised the Town to alert 
the State of the civil violation proceedings, which the Town did.7 
Two Bristol police officers testified at the Tribunal as to what 
they saw when they arrived on the scene of the accident, but the 
Town presented no evidence as to what occurred just before or 
during the accident.8  Accordingly, the Tribunal magistrate held 
 
 1.  State v. Minior, 175 A.3d 1202, 1204 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 1209 n.3. 
 8.  Id. at 1204–05. 
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that the Town offered insufficient evidence to show Minior was the 
person operating the vehicle, and thus she could not sustain a 
violation for reasonable and prudent speeds.9  The civil charges 
were dismissed.10 
In December 2014, the State filed a criminal information in 
Rhode Island Superior Court charging Minior with DUI, serious 
bodily injury resulting, and reckless driving.11  Minior filed a 
motion to dismiss the criminal charges based on the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.12  Pursuant to his motion, Minior argued that 
the Tribunal had already issued a final judgment determining that 
there was insufficient evidence to show that Minior had been 
driving the vehicle or was exceeding the speed limit.  Given this 
finding, Minior asserted that the criminal charges were collaterally 
estopped from proceeding.13 
The Superior Court magistrate granted Minior’s motion to 
dismiss.14  The State appealed the magistrate’s ruling to a Superior 
Court justice; the justice reversed the magistrate’s decision, 
reinstating the criminal charges against Minior.15  Minior appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, where the Court reviewed 
the issue of collateral estoppel de novo.16 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The court held that the State was not estopped from bringing 
DUI and reckless driving criminal charges against Minior, despite 
the Tribunal ruling that the Town did not present sufficient 
evidence to show that Minior was the driver.17  The court reasoned 
that the Tribunal was bound by different rules and regulations than 
 
 9.  Id. at 1205. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See id.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when there is 
“(1) an identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted must be the same or in privity with a party in the previous 
proceeding.”  Id. at 1206. 
 13.  See id. at 1205. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See id. at 1209.  The court noted the issue “left hanging” in State v. 
Pacheco—whether a decision in a Tribunal hearing could estop criminal 
charges on the same occurrence—could now be resolved given the nature of 
Minior’s case.  161 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2017); Minior, 175 A.3d at 1207. 
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the criminal court.18  Namely, in the Tribunal there was no right to 
counsel, less “latitude” in discovery, a lower burden of proof, and 
less formal hearings.19  The court determined that precluding the 
criminal charges would yield inequitable results for the State, and 
thus it should not be estopped from bringing those criminal charges 
based on the Tribunal’s decision.20  Accordingly, the court classified 
Tribunal decisions on traffic violations as final and valid, but in this 
case, “only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal 
investigation.”21 
In explaining its decision, the court focused on what it viewed 
to be the major differences between the Tribunal and the criminal 
court, specifically discovery expectations, burdens of proof, and 
inequitable results.22  First, a defendant in the Tribunal “is not 
guaranteed the right to counsel,” as he would be in criminal court.23  
Second, in the Tribunal, the town or state must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a defendant committed the infraction at 
issue, whereas in a criminal proceeding, the town or state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
charged crime.24  Third, due to the different burdens of proof, the 
Tribunal and the criminal court have different discovery 
expectations.25  At the Tribunal, the state or the town are not 
“statutorily or constitutionally obligated to put forward all its 
evidence,” as they would be in a criminal case.26  Finally, the court 
posited that if the State was estopped from bringing criminal 
charges emanating from traffic citations following a negative 
Tribunal decision, it would “hinder [the State’s] ability to carefully 
strategize the prosecution of criminal suspects” because the State 
would be compelled to present its case at a much earlier period in 
 
 18.  Minior, 175 A.3d at 1207. 
 19.  Id. at 1207–08. 
 20.  Id. at 1207.  Additionally, the court suggested that estopping the State 
from bringing criminal charges based on a Tribunal decision was a risk to 
public safety and would “be an inequity to the community.”  Id. at 1208. 
 21.  Id. at 1209. 
 22.  See id. at 1208. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. The burden of proof required in a Tribunal hearing—clear and 
convincing evidence—is contrasted with that of the burden of proof in a 
criminal proceed—beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (quoting State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347 (R.I. 2005)) (comparing 
Tribunals to probation-revocation hearings). 
462 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:459 
the investigation process.27  Because of these concerns, the court 
held that collateral estoppel is not applicable to criminal charges 
brought from traffic violations already heard and decided in the 
Tribunal.28  Justice Flaherty dissented, arguing that all the 
elements of collateral estoppel were met, and thus collateral 
estoppel should apply to the case at issue.29 
COMMENTARY 
The court noted that it was closing an issue “left hanging” in 
State v. Pacheco,30 offering a clear determination that collateral 
estoppel does not apply when the State files criminal charges 
emanating from a traffic citation that was heard and decided in the 
Tribunal in favor of a defendant.31  However, the rationale offered 
by the court, as Justice Flaherty argued in his dissent, seemed to 
gloss over the elements of collateral estoppel in an effort to close 
that “hanging” issue. 32  The dissenting opinion convincingly 
argued that the purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent the 
inequity of a defendant having to defend himself twice for the same, 
or nearly the same, conduct.33 
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty argued that the majority 
opinion misplaced the concern of inequitable results, and instead 
should be concerned that the “balance of equities tilt[ed] decidedly 
in the defendant’s favor.”34  Here, the State had notice of the 
Tribunal hearing for Minior’s case and could have intervened to 
present evidence demonstrating that Minior was, in fact, the driver 
of the vehicle.35  Because the State had adequate notice and chose 
not to engage on the issue, the dissent concluded that he could 
“reach no other conclusion than . . . that the defendant was not 
 
 27.  Id.  Here, the court made a brief observation that the application of 
collateral estoppel would create a higher burden of proof and then force 
defendants to have to more zealously defend themselves without the benefit of 
a jury trial or an appointed attorney.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 1208–09. 
 29.  Id. at 1209 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 30.  See id. at 1207 (majority opinion); see also supra note 17. 
 31.  Id. at 1209. 
 32.  Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  Collateral estoppel is defined supra note 
12. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1209–10. 
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driving” at the time of the incident.36  The dissent posited that the 
burden should sit with the Town and the State, not with the 
defendant.37 
To prove collateral estoppel, the defendant had to show that 
there was: “(1) an identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the 
same or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding.”38  In 
front of the Tribunal, the Town had to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that Minior was driving the vehicle at the time of the 
accident—the key element in each of the three criminal charges 
brought against Minior by the State—and the Town was unable to 
produce such evidence.39  The State had notice of Minior’s hearing 
in front of the Tribunal and did not provide any supporting 
evidence.40  The Tribunal then rendered a valid and final judgment, 
stating that there was insufficient evidence to show that Minior had 
been driving the vehicle at the time of the infraction.41  Finally, as 
Justice Flaherty noted, the State and Town had a “sufficient 
mutuality of interest” to create privity because “the town 
prosecuted [the] defendant for exceeding reasonable and prudent 
speeds, a violation of a state statute.”42  In consideration of each of 
these facts, and as held in the dissenting opinion, all of the elements 
of collateral estoppel are met.43 
In precluding the application of collateral estoppel in this case, 
the court is arguably providing the State with two bites at the 
apple, causing the defendant to defend himself twice for the same 
conduct.44  When read literally, the elements of collateral estoppel 
require that a “valid and final judgment” be rendered.45  The 
dissent concluded that given all the points above, collateral estoppel 
should apply to criminal charges brought from traffic violations 
that have been adjudged in the Traffic Tribunal.  The decision not 
 
 36.  Id. at 1210. 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  Id. at 1206 (majority opinion). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 1209 n.3 (Flaherty, J. dissenting). 
 41.  Id. at 1210. 
 42.  Id. at 1209 n.1. 
 43.  Id. at 1209. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
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to apply collateral estoppel to these facts was not inequitable to the 
state, but rather to the defendant when “the balance of equities 
[should] tilt[ ] in the defendant’s favor.”46 
CONCLUSION 
The court held that the Tribunal’s judgment in favor of Minior 
did not collaterally estop the State from bringing criminal charges 
against Minior for the same incident due to the fundamental 
differences between Tribunal and criminal proceedings. 
Amy Greer 
 
 
 46.  Id. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018).  The 
Registration Act repealed and replaced the prior statute and now 
governs a convicted sex offender’s duty to register as a sex offender 
in the town or city in which he or she resides, and the duration of 
that duty.  The duty to register is a civil, nonpunitive regulatory 
scheme, such that legislative changes to the duration of a sex 
offender’s obligation to register as a sex offender do not violate the 
ex post facto clauses of the United States and Rhode Island 
Constitutions. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 1992, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted Rhode 
Island General Law section 11-37-16 (1992 Statute), requiring 
convicted sex offenders to register with the town or city in which 
they reside.1  However, the 1992 Statute did not specify the 
duration of a sex offender’s duty to register, and the charge for 
failing to register was only a misdemeanor.2 
The Registration Act of 1996 (Registration Act) repealed and 
replaced the 1992 Statute, but expressly preserved a sex offender’s 
duty to register.3  Under the Registration Act, a sex offender’s duty 
to register lasted “for a period of ten (10) years subsequent to the 
date of conviction,” and the failure to register became a felony.4 
Two subsequent amendments to the Registration Act changed 
the duration of an offender’s duty to register.5  First, in 1997, the 
duration changed from “ten (10) years subsequent to the date of 
 
 1.  State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 544 & n.4 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. at 551.  Under the 1992 Statute, failure to register was a 
misdemeanor and those convicted were “sentenced to serve a term of ninety 
(90) days in jail and thereafter service one (1) year probation.”  Id. (citing 11 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1992) (repealed 1996)). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-4(a) (1996)).  Under the 1996 
Act, failure to register became a felony and conviction imposed punishment of 
jail time for “not more than two (2) years or fines not more than two thousand 
($2,000) or both.”  Id. (citing § 11-37.1-10(a)). 
 5.  See id. at 551–52. 
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conviction” to “ten (10) years subsequent to the date of release from 
confinement or placement on parole, supervised release or 
probation.”6  Then in 2003, the General Assembly amended the 
duration to “ten (10) years from the expiration of sentence for the 
offense.”7  The 2003 Amendment also increased the punishment for 
failing to register to “imprison[ment] not more than ten (10) years, 
or fines not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.”8 
In November 1994, Frederick Gibson was convicted of second-
degree child molestation sexual assault and sentenced to fifteen 
years, with four and a half years to serve and the remaining time 
suspended with probation.9  At the time of his conviction, Gibson’s 
duty to register as a sex offender was governed by the 1992 
Statute.10 
Gibson was convicted on three separate occasions, in 2007, 
2009, and 2010, for failing to register in violation of the Registration 
Act.11  In 2012, Gibson was charged with failure to notify for the 
fourth time.12 Gibson moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that 
his duty to register expired in 2004.13  The Rhode Island Superior 
Court magistrate denied Gibson’s motion, finding that Gibson had 
a “lifetime duty to register.”14 
Subsequently, Gibson filed a petition for writ of certiorari, 
seeking review of the magistrate’s decision, and later filed for post-
 
 6.  Id. (citing the 1997 Amendment to § 11-37.1-4(a)). 
 7.  Id. (citing the 2003 Amendment to § 11-37.1-4(a)).  This was the latest 
version of the statute at the time of the decision.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 552. 
 9.  Id. at 544.  Gibson was convicted under § 11-37-8.3.  Id. at 544 n.3 
(citing § 11-37-8.3) (“[A] person is guilty of a second degree child molestation 
sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person 
fourteen (14) years of age or under.”). 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  Id. at 545.  Gibson pled nolo contendere to each of these three failure-
to-register charges.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  Gibson made this claim under the duration requirement as set 
forth in the 1996 Act.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 546.  The magistrate found that Gibson’s duty to register was 
governed by the statute and “registration requirements in effect at the time he 
was charged.”  Id. (quoting State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581 (R.I. 1998)).  Relying 
on the language of the 1992 Statute, which was silent on the duration of a sex 
offender’s duty to register, the magistrate interpreted the absence of a time 
constraint in the statute to mean that Gibson had a lifetime duty.  Id. at 546–
47. 
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conviction relief for his three prior failure-to-register convictions.15  
In his application for post-conviction relief, Gibson argued that the 
duration of his duty to register was limited to ten years because his 
convictions occurred after the passage of the 1996 version of the 
Registration Act.16  Gibson also argued that the 1997 and 2003 
Amendments to the Registration Act violated the ex post facto 
clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions, 
because those amendments extend the duration of his duty to 
register as a sex offender and increase the punishment for failing 
to comply with the duty to register from a misdemeanor to a 
felony.17 
In response to Gibson’s application for post-conviction relief 
from the three failure-to-register convictions, the hearing justice 
found that Gibson had a lifetime duty to register, and, since Gibson 
had a lifetime duty, the amendments did not extend his duty.18  The 
hearing justice also addressed whether the amendments to the 
Registration Act unlawfully increased Gibson’s punishment, and 
found that because Gibson committed the failure-to-notify offenses 
after the Registration Act and subsequent amendments were 
passed, there were no ex post facto violations.19  Gibson appealed, 
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated the appeal and 
writ of certiorari.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the court addressed three primary issues: (1) 
whether Gibson’s obligation to register as a sex offender was 
governed by the 1992 Statute or the Registration Act; if the latter, 
then whether Gibson’s three failure-to-notify convictions were in 
 
 15.  Id. at 545. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  The ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment of laws that 
“retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for 
criminal acts.”  Id. at 553 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 
504 (1995)).  “[T]here are four categories of laws that the ex post facto clause 
prohibits”; the category at issue in this case is a “law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the 
crime, when committed.”  Id. at 553 n.17. 
 18.  Id. at 545, 550.  The hearing justice found Gibson’s duty was governed 
by the 1992 Statute, which did not specify a duration.  See id. at 545. 
 19.  Id. at 550.  The “penalty . . . did not change after [Gibson] was 
charged,” which would have violated the ex post facto clause.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 543 n.1, 545. 
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violation of the ex post facto clause by (2) extending Gibson’s duty 
to register and (3) changing the charge for failure to notify from a 
misdemeanor to a felony with the possibility of a longer sentence.21  
The court held that the Registration Act governed Gibson’s duty to 
register as a sex offender and that the three failure-to-notify 
convictions did not violate the ex post facto clause.22  The court 
reviewed all the issues de novo.23 
To determine whether the 1992 Statute or the Registration Act 
governed Gibson’s duty to register, and thus whether he had a 
lifetime duty or a ten-year duty, the court turned to statutory 
interpretation.24  By analyzing the language of the Registration 
Act, the court determined that Gibson’s duty to register under the 
1992 Statute was preserved by the Registration Act.25  The 
Registration Act did not, however, preserve the lifetime duration 
requirement in the 1992 Statute.26  According to the Registration 
Act, Gibson had a “duty to register in accordance with” the 
Registration Act alone, including the 2003 durational 
Amendment.27 
 
 21.  See id. at 546.  The 1996 Amendment obligated a sex offender to 
register for ten years after conviction, meaning Gibson’s obligation to register 
would end in 2004.  See id. at 547.  The 2003 Amendment obligates a sex 
offender to register until ten years after the expiration of a sentence, meaning 
Gibson’s obligation to register would end in 2019.  See id.  As a collateral 
matter, the court addressed the State’s argument that Gibson was not entitled 
to collaterally attack his convictions by seeking post-conviction relief because 
he waived his right to challenge his conviction when he pled nolo contendere; 
however, the court found that an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute 
is one of the exceptions to this rule.  Id. at 552–53. 
 22.  Id. at 544. 
 23.  Id. at 547, 553. 
 24.  See id. at 547.  The court found the language clear and unambiguous 
and therefore “g[a]ve the words of the statute their plain and ordinary 
meanings.”  Id. (quoting Accent Store Designs, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 
674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)). 
 25.  Id. at 548 (“Any person who . . . had a duty to register under [the 1992 
Statute] . . . shall have the duty to register in accordance with the provisions 
of [the Registration Act].”) (quoting 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-18 (1996)). 
 26.  Id.  To further support its statutory interpretation, the court pointed 
to the “savings clause” in the Registration Act that reads, “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to abrogate any duty to register which exists or 
existed under the provisions of former § 11-37-16.”  Id. (emphasis in original) 
(citing § 11-37.1-18).  The court emphasized that this provision clearly 
preserved the duty to register alone and did not include the duration of the 
duty to register, which was clearly specified in a duration provision of the 
Registration Act in § 11-37.1-4(a).  See id. at 548–49. 
 27.  Id. at 548 (quoting § 11-37.1-18).  The court noted that the magistrate 
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Next, to determine whether the amendments to the 
Registration Act “unconstitutionally extended [Gibson’s] duty to 
register” in violation of the ex post facto clause, the court turned to 
case law, applying the judicially created “intent-effects” test.28  The 
ex post facto clauses in the United States and Rhode Island 
Constitutions prohibit “every law that changes the punishment, 
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the 
crime, when committed.”29  However, the court determined that the 
duty to register as a sex offender is a “civil, nonpunitive regulatory 
measure,” as distinguished from the criminal offense for failing to 
register.30 
The court then applied the “intent-effects” test to determine 
whether the extension of the registration requirement under the 
Registration Act “implicates the ex post facto clause,” even though 
the duty to register is a “civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure.”31  
The court found that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting 
the registration requirement was to enact a regulatory scheme that 
is civil and nonpunitive.32  Rather than to impose punishment on 
the offender, the intent was to establish a regulatory scheme “to 
protect[ ] the safety and general welfare of the public.”33 
The court then decided that the effect or purpose of this 
regulatory scheme was not punitive so “as to negate the intention 
to deem it civil.”34  The court reviewed seven factors in concluding 
that the extension of the duty to register was “not excessive” when 
weighed against the legislative purpose of protecting the public.35 
 
was correct to deny the motion to dismiss, but not correct to conclude that 
Gibson had a lifetime duty to register since the Registration Act “preserved 
[the 1992 Statute’s] duty to register, not its duration.”  Id. at 549. 
 28.  Id. at 555. 
 29.  Id. at 553, 553 n.17 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, 
§ 12).  Gibson argued that the extension in his duty to register beyond the ten 
years provided by the 1996 Act violated this clause because the 2003 
Amendment extended his duty to 2019.  See id. at 554. 
 30.  Id. at 555 (citing State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)).  
The “conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory 
consequences,” that are not in violation of ex post facto.  See id. (quoting Smith 
v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 103–04 (2003)). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 556. 
 33.  Id. (quoting Germane, 971 A.2d at 593). 
 34.  Id. (citing Doe I, 538 U.S at 92) (stating that there was no punitive 
effect and the amendments were not in furtherance of a punitive purpose). 
 35.  Id. at 557 (citing Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015)) (“[W]e 
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Finally, the court determined that the change in classification 
for failure to register from a misdemeanor, under the 1992 Statute, 
to a felony, under the Registration Act, was not in violation of the 
ex post facto clause.36  When Gibson was initially convicted of 
sexual molestation child abuse in 1994, the 1992 Statute governed 
that violation and conviction.37  However, when Gibson committed 
his three failure-to-notify charges in 2007, 2009, and 2010, the 
Registration Act, including the 2003 Amendment, governed 
Gibson’s violations of law.38  Therefore, there was no retroactive 
punishment for Gibson’s failure-to-register convictions.39  Failure 
to register was its own offense under the 2003 Amendment to the 
Registration Act, which was “already in full force and effect” when 
Gibson committed the offenses.40 
COMMENTARY 
Through Gibson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
straightened out some blatant issues in statutory construction that 
led to confusion among Rhode Island trial courts and sex offenders 
statewide.  If courts were unsure which statute governed whose 
conduct and convictions, undoubtedly a reasonable person could 
also be confused. 
The 1992 Statute clearly defined a duty to register, but placed 
no duration or time constraint on that duty to register.41  Thus, 
because there was no duration or time restraint, it was reasonable 
for the lower courts in this case to rule that there was no time 
 
do not believe that the extension of Gibson’s duty to register is excessive in 
relation to the nonpunitive purpose underlying the 1997 and 2003 
Amendments.”).  The court looked to seven factors to balance the punitive effect 
against the intent of the registration requirement: 
whether the law (1) “has been regarded in our history and traditions 
as a punishment”; (2) “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint’; 
(3) ‘promotes the traditional aims of punishment”; (4) “has a rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose”; (5) “is excessive with respect to 
the purpose”; (6) “comes into play on a finding of scienter”; (7) 
“whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime[.]” 
Id. at 556 (quoting Doe I, 538 U.S. at 92)). 
 36.  Id. at 558. 
 37.  Id. at 544. 
 38.  Id. at 558. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See id. at 551. 
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limitation on a sex offender’s duty to register.42  The General 
Assembly seemed to recognize this confusion and the need for a 
definite durational provision when it enacted the Registration Act 
in 1996, which placed a definitive limitation on a sex offender’s duty 
to register.43  The subsequent 1997 and 2003 Amendments also 
seemed to reflect the legislature’s battle to find a fair balance 
between public safety and the incentive for an offender to register 
and rehabilitate.44 
First, the Registration Act of 1996 made the duration of the 
duty to register ten years from conviction.45  Under that version of 
the Act, Gibson’s duty to register would end in 2004, which was five 
years prior to the end of his sentence.46  The 1997 Amendment 
made the duration ten years subsequent to the “date of release from 
confinement or placement on parole, supervised release, or 
probation.”47  Under that version of the Act, Gibson’s duty to 
register would end around in 2009.48  Finally, the 2003 Amendment 
made the duration “ten years from the date of expiration of the 
sentence” for the offense.49  Under this version of the Act, Gibson’s 
duty to register will expire in 2019.50 
The court was correct to hold that the extension of a sex 
offender’s duty to register was civil and nonpunitive such that it 
was not a violation of the ex post facto clause.51  The purpose behind 
instituting sex offender registration is not to publicly shame the sex 
offender, but rather to ensure public safety and welfare.52  The 
court also distinguished this case from a New Hampshire case, 
 
 42.  See id. at 545. 
 43.  See id. at 548. 
 44.  See id. at 551–52 (explaining the history of the Registration Act). 
 45.  Id. at 551. 
 46.  See id.  Gibson was convicted in 1994 to a fifteen-year sentence so that, 
under the 1996 version of the Registration Act, his obligation to register would 
end ten years after conviction, which was in 2004.  See id. at 544, 551. 
 47.  Id. at 551. 
 48.  See id.  Gibson served four and half years of his sentence, which means 
he was released around 1998–1999; his duty would end ten years after his 
release under the 1997 Amendment, which would be 2008–2009.  See id. at 
544, 551. 
 49.  Id. at 551–52. 
 50.  See id. at 552.  Gibson’s sentence, if he served a full fifteen-year 
sentence, would have ended in 2009 and his obligation to register as a sex 
offender under the 2003 Amendment would end in 2019.  See id. at 544, 551. 
 51.  See id. at 544. 
 52.  See id. at 556. 
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where the registration requirement was found to be punitive in 
effect and purpose, because the statute imposed a lifetime duty to 
register and a requirement to register in person four times per 
year.53 
After four legislative enactments within nearly a decade, to 
fine-tune the duration of a sex offender’s duty to register, the 2003 
Amendment struck a reasonable balance between public safety and 
incentive for an offender to rehabilitate.54  Foremost, under the 
Registration Act, the public remains informed for ten years after 
the expiration of a sex offender’s sentence.55  This serves to protect 
the safety and general welfare of the public.56  Also, a sex offender 
has incentive to rehabilitate because their duty to register will 
expire if they do not reoffend; however, the sentence associated with 
a failure-to-register conviction is harsh enough to deter sex 
offenders from failing in their duty to register.57  Finally, the court 
has discretion to sentence an offender who fails to register to “not 
more than ten (10) years in jail,” or to no jail time at all, which 
allows the court to balance the equities under the circumstances.58 
CONCLUSION 
The Registration Act now governs a sex offender’s obligation to 
register with the town or city in which he or she resides for a period 
of ten years after the expiration of their sentence.  The duty to 
register is merely a regulatory obligation imposed on a sex offender, 
as opposed to a punishment.  As a civil, regulatory obligation, the 
 
 53.  See id. at 557 (distinguishing Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 2015)). 
 54.  See id. at 551–52. 
 55.  See id. at 552. 
 56.  See id. at 555. 
 57.  See id.  The court has discretion under the statute to sentence an 
offender who fails to register to “up to ten years in jail.”  Id. 
 58.  See id. at 552 (emphasis added).  The 1992 Statute spelled out the 
sentencing requirements so that the court did not have discretion in 
sentencing.  See id. at 551 (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16(g) (1992) 
(repealed 1996)) (“Any person . . . shall be sentenced to serve a term of ninety 
(90) days in jail and thereafter serve one (1) year probation.”).  On the other 
hand, the Registration Act and the subsequent amendments presented 
maximum sentencing guidelines, sentencing requirements, which granted the 
court discretion in sentencing.  See id. at 552 (citing the 2003 Amendment to 
§ 11-37.1-4(a)) (“Any person who is required to register or verify his or her 
address, who knowingly fails to do so, shall be guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or fined not more than 
ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.”) (emphasis added). 
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registration requirements may change as long as the public safety 
and welfare purpose outweighs the punitive effect. 
Mary Poirier 
 
  
474 
 
Criminal Law.  State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330 (R.I. 2018).  The 
authority to add criminalizing language to a criminal statute that 
lacks a connection between the stated conduct and the penalty is 
properly vested in the legislature, not the courts. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Emily,1 at the age of sixteen, was the victim of sexual assault 
and sex trafficking.2  Emily’s childhood was unstable, full of abuse 
and neglect, and as a result, she would often run away from home.3  
In April 2014, Emily ran away from home and, with nowhere else 
to go, she went to her friend’s mother’s home in Providence.4  There, 
her friend’s twenty-two-year-old brother, Marquis Melia, convinced 
her to go “smoke with [a] friend.”5  That friend turned out to be 
Curtis Maxie, the Defendant.6  The Defendant was approximately 
sixty years old, and Melia referred to him as “Pimp.”7  Once the 
Defendant learned about Emily, Melia and the Defendant conspired 
to put Emily to work having sex with men for money.8 
The Defendant pressured Melia to bring Emily over to the 
Defendant’s home, which Melia did.9  When Emily and Melia 
arrived, the Defendant sent Melia out on an errand.10  Once he had 
her alone, the Defendant sexually assaulted Emily by penetrating 
her orally and vaginally without her consent.11  Afterward, the 
Defendant took pictures of Emily posing in high heels and other 
intimate apparel, uploaded the pictures onto his computer, and 
 
 1.  The complaining witness in this case was a minor and, thus, is 
referred to by a pseudonym, as the Supreme Court did in its Opinion.  
 2.  State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330, 333–34 (R.I. 2018). 
 3.  Id. at 332. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 332–33. 
 10.  Id. at 333. 
 11.  Id.  These acts formed the basis for two counts of first-degree sexual 
assault against the Defendant.  Id. at 333 nn.3–4.  
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posted them in an advertisement on a website called “Backpage.”12  
Minutes after the Defendant posted the advertisement, he received 
responses from “men looking for sex,” and the Defendant had Emily 
speak to them using a script that detailed what she would do to 
them.13  When these men came to the Defendant’s apartment, 
Emily was forced to perform sexual acts on them in exchange for 
money.14  The Defendant sexually assaulted Emily repeatedly and 
continued to make her work for his “pimp operation.”15  
Additionally, he prevented her from leaving his home, and it was 
not until Emily met Jeremy, a nineteen-year-old first-time 
customer, that she was able to escape from the Defendant’s home.16  
Jeremy, however, did not help her, but instead forced her to do the 
same things as the Defendant because “he wanted [her] to make 
him some money.”17  Because Emily refused to work for Jeremy, he 
drove her back to the Defendant’s apartment where things picked 
up right where they left off.18 
On April 24, 2014, much to Emily’s surprise, the police arrived 
at the Defendant’s home and took her into custody based on an 
outstanding Family Court bench warrant.19  At the police station, 
a detective interviewed Emily, and she identified a photograph of 
the Defendant as the man who sexually assaulted her and forced 
her to prostitute herself.20  After the interview, the police returned 
to the Defendant’s apartment and arrested him.21  On June 18, 
2014, a grand jury indicted the Defendant for first-degree sexual 
assault, sex trafficking of a minor, and conspiracy to commit the 
crime of sex trafficking of a minor.22 
The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the sex trafficking of a 
minor and conspiracy charges, arguing that the statute under 
 
 12.  Id.  “Backpage” is a website where people can post advertisements 
anonymously concerning illicit activity.  See id. 
 13.  Id. at 333–34.  
 14.  Id. at 334.  All the acts beginning with the text accompanying footnote 
twelve contributed to the sex trafficking of a minor count, although this count 
was dismissed by the Supreme Court.  Id. at 341. 
 15.  See id. at 334, 343. 
 16.  Id. at 334. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 335.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
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which he was charged failed to state a crime.23  The trial justice 
denied the Defendant’s motion, and the case proceeded to trial.24  
At trial, Melia testified that Defendant “ran a prostitution sting 
right out of this apartment” and that the Defendant had a “long 
history” with prostitution.25  The Defendant moved for a mistrial 
and, in the alternative, to strike Melia’s statements. 26  The trial 
court denied the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, but granted the 
motion to strike and issued a cautionary instruction.27  Moreover, 
the prosecution introduced evidence showing that the Defendant 
continued his illegal money-making endeavors while 
incarcerated.28  The Defendant made several telephone calls while 
at the Adult Correctional Institutions, asking “how the newest 
‘fresh catch’ was standing up,” and boasted that if he was not 
incarcerated, he would “be moving b****es like crazy.”29  The 
Defendant objected to the admission of this evidence, but the 
objection was overruled.30 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Defendant was convicted on 
all counts and sentenced to prison.31  The Defendant then appealed 
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court on three grounds: (1) the trial 
judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss count four, sex 
trafficking of a minor, and count six, conspiracy to commit the crime 
of sex trafficking of a minor, based on the statute’s failure to state 
a crime, and that count four was duplicitous32 and denied him 
adequate notice of the criminal act he committed; (2) the trial 
justice erred in denying the motion to pass after Melia made 
remarks relating the Defendant to prostitution; and (3) the trial 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 342. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 336. 
 29.  Id. at 335–36.  
 30.  Id. at 343. 
 31.  Id. at 336.  The Defendant was sentenced to forty-five years on each 
of the three counts of first-degree sexual assault, all to run concurrently; the 
maximum forty years’ imprisonment on the sex trafficking of a minor count, to 
run consecutive to the sentences for the sexual-assault counts; ten years in 
prison for the conspiracy count, concurrent to the sentence for sex trafficking 
of a minor; and an additional fifteen-year sentence as a habitual offender, 
consecutive to the sentences imposed on all counts.  Id.  
 32. “The term ‘duplicity’ refers to the joining of two or more offenses . . . in 
a single count.”  Id. at 336 n.7 (quoting State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1253 
(R.I. 1998)). 
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judge erred in admitting evidence of the telephone call records 
while he was confined.33 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s 
ruling in part, but vacated the judgment of conviction for sex 
trafficking of a minor and conspiracy.34 
The court reviewed the first issue on appeal: whether the trial 
justice erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss de 
novo.35  The Defendant argued that the statute failed to state a 
crime and provide fair notice of prohibited conduct, and that the 
count was of a duplicitous nature.36  According to the Court, the 
statute, Rhode Island General Laws section 11-67-6—which was 
repealed after the Defendant was indicted—contained a gap that 
failed to describe the conduct described in subsection (b) as a 
crime.37  After subsection (b), which described the conduct that the 
Defendant was charged with, subsection (c) jumped to establishing 
a penalty.38  Ultimately, the court looked to whether it could 
interpret the statute using canons of statutory construction, or 
whether additional language was necessary in order for the statute 
to state a crime.39 
The court disagreed with the trial justice’s determination that, 
notwithstanding the lack of explicit language, the statute was valid 
because the legislature clearly intended to criminalize sex 
trafficking of a minor.40  The court reasoned that the statute was 
not ambiguous—it was not “susceptible of more than one 
reasonable meaning”—but was missing language making the 
conduct a crime, and therefore needed to be repaired.41  The court 
 
 33.  Id. at 336. 
 34.  Id. at 344. 
 35.  Whether a statute encompasses a crime is a question of law because 
it requires statutory interpretation.  See id. at 338 (citing State ex rel. Town of 
Tiverton v. Pelletier, 174 A.3d 713, 718 (R.I. 2017)).  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 339.  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See id. at 337–41. 
 41.  Id. at 339 (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood 
Health Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011)).  The Supreme Court 
compared this statute to section 11-67-3 (repealed in 2017), which generally 
criminalized sex trafficking of all persons, and determined that the statute did 
not contain a gap because there was language criminalizing the conduct (“is 
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also showed deference to the legislature, determining that it did not 
have authority to remedy the legislature’s drafting error regardless 
of its clear legislative intent.42  The court explained that the 
legislature must define the acts it intends to punish as crimes 
because the courts do not have the authority to “supplement or 
amend statutes enacted by the General Assembly.”43  Since the 
statute at issue here was missing an essential component to an 
effective criminal statute––language stating that the described 
conduct actually amounts to the crime of sex trafficking a minor––
it did not state a crime or provide fair notice of prohibited conduct.44  
As a result, the court concluded that the Defendant could not be 
indicted under the statute for sex trafficking of a minor, or for 
conspiracy to do so, because it could not exist without the crime 
itself.45 
Justice Robinson disagreed with the majority on this issue.46  
In his dissent, Justice Robinson argued that the missing language 
identified by the majority was not necessary for the purpose of 
giving fair notice of prohibited conduct under the statute, and that 
 
guilty of a felony”).  Id. at 337 n.8.  Section 11-67-3 provided that: 
Whoever knowingly: 
(a) Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any 
means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport[,] provide, or 
obtain by any means, another person, intending or knowing that the 
person will be subjected to forced labor in order to commit a 
commercial sexual activity; or 
(b) Benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from 
knowing participation in a venture which has engaged in an act 
described in violation of § 11-67-2, or 11-67-3, is guilty of a felony and 
subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment or a fine of 
not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both; provided, 
however, that this subsection shall not apply to a “victim” as defined 
in this chapter. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-3 (2014) (repealed 2017) (emphasis added). 
 42.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 339–40 (citing Creditors’ Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 
190 A.2d 10 (1937)). 
 43.  Id. at 341 (quoting State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 644 (R.I. 2003)). 
 44.  Id. at 347.  “A crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a 
prescribed penalty.”  Id. at 340 (quoting  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d) 18 (3d ed. 2018)).  The language the Defendant 
suggested to eliminate the gap was “shall be guilty of the felony of sex 
trafficking of a minor.”  Id. at 339. 
 45.  Id. at 341. 
 46.  See id. at 344 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
Justice Robinson only dissents on this portion of the analysis and concurs with 
the rest of the majority opinion.  
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the statute did not fail to set forth a crime.47  According to the 
dissent, although the drafting of the statute was incomplete, the 
legislature’s negligence did not undermine the statute’s 
enforcement against sex trafficking of a minor.48  Justice Robinson 
supported his opinion by citing to precedent on statutory 
interpretation.49  In his view, by looking at the context of the 
statute, it was an “unavoidable inference,” when read in its 
entirety, that the described conduct was legislatively deemed to be 
criminal, considering that it was part of a criminal code, it described 
a number of prohibited acts, and provided a range of punishment 
for one who committed one of those acts.50  The dissent also noted 
that the statute’s title––“[s]ex trafficking of a minor”––clearly 
denoted its focus, and that subsection (b) stated the prohibited 
conduct, and subsection (c) set forth a penalty for engaging in such 
conduct.51  Therefore, the statute clearly provided fair notice of 
prohibited conduct and the penalties for that conduct.52 
Regarding the Defendant’s motion to pass based on Melia’s 
statement at the trial that the Defendant had a “long history” with 
prostitution, the court applied a “clearly erroneous” standard of 
review.53  The trial justice explained that the evidence was 
admissible to show the Defendant’s state of mind.54  The court 
reasoned that because a trial justice’s ruling on a motion to pass the 
case “will be disturbed only [ ] if the judge was clearly wrong”55 and 
the trial court is entitled to “great weight,”56 there was no error and 
the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed.57 
Moving to the Defendant’s final issue on appeal, the court held 
 
 47.  Id. at 344.  
 48.  See id.  
 49.  Id. at 344–45; Dunne Leases Cars & Trucks, Inc. v. Kenworth Truck 
Co., 466 A.2d 1153, 1156 (R.I. 1983) (stating that the Supreme Court’s duty in 
construing a statute is to “ascertain the intent behind its enactment”). 
 50.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 345–46 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
 51.  Id. at 346. 
 52.  Id. at 346–47.  Justice Robinson quotes former United States Supreme 
Court Justice Holmes to support his common-sense guideline: “[w]e agree to 
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but 
there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying 
what they obviously mean.”  Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929). 
 53.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 342 (majority opinion).  
 54.  See id. 
 55.  Id. (quoting State v. Grant, 946 A.2d 818, 827 (R.I. 2008)). 
 56.  Id. (quoting State v. Rosario, 14 A.3d 206, 214 (R.I. 2011)). 
 57.  See id. at 342–43. 
480 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:474 
that the Defendant waived the admissibility of the Defendant’s 
telephone conversations while incarcerated.58  The court followed 
Rhode Island’s long-standing “raise-or-waive” rule,59 and sought to 
determine whether the Defendant’s objection to this evidence at 
trial was “sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice’s 
attention to the basis for said objection.”60  The Supreme Court 
determined that the Defendant did not present an objection specific 
enough to meet the requisite standard.61  The court supported its 
holding by citing to Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of 
Evidence, which indicates “that a specific ground for an objection 
must be stated unless the reason for the objection is clear from the 
context in which it was made.”62  In the Defendant’s first objection, 
he argued that the evidence was irrelevant, unless the street 
language that the Defendant used in the phone conversations could 
be interpreted.63  The Defendant also objected based on Rule 404(b) 
of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, but nothing was concretely 
noted other than “I’m running into [Rule] 404(b) walls.”64  The 
Defendant objected one more time on the same grounds––without 
the requisite specificity––and the trial justice overruled the 
objection again.65  The court, therefore, concluded that because of 
the general nature of the objections, the content was insufficient to 
properly preserve the matter for appellate review.66 
In short, the Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the counts 
for sex trafficking of a minor and for conspiracy to commit sex 
trafficking of a minor based on the insufficient statute that failed 
to make such conduct a criminal offense.  As to the Defendant’s 
second and third arguments, the court affirmed the trial court 
decision, ruling that the trial justice did not err in denying the 
motion to pass, and that Defendant did not properly preserve the 
 
 58.  Id. at 344. 
 59.  Id. at 343 (citing State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I. 2011)).  
The “raise-or-waive” rule requires a specific enough objection to alert the trial 
justice as to the nature of the error. Barros, 148 A.3d at 174 (quoting Figuereo, 
31 A.3d at 1289). 
 60.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 343 (quoting State v. Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d 12, 30 
(R.I. 2009)). 
 61.  See id.  
 62.  Id. (citing R.I. R. Ev. 103(a)(1)). 
 63.  Id.  The Defendant used language such as, “how the ‘fresh catch’ was 
‘standing up.’”  Id. at 336. 
 64.  Id. at 343; R.I. R. Ev. 404(b). 
 65.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 343–44. 
 66.  See id. at 344. 
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issue of admissibility of the phone calls for appeal.67 
COMMENTARY 
On the first issue addressed by the Supreme Court, the 
majority opinion sought to establish a boundary between the role of 
the judiciary and that of the legislature.68  The court maintained 
that the language of a statute must explicitly state a crime, and 
where there is missing language to bridge the two essential 
components of a criminal statute, the court lacks the authority to 
implement such language on its own.69  On the other hand, Justice 
Robinson, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the application of 
common sense should be considered in this case.70  The dissent 
seems to make a more persuasive argument by citing to both Rhode 
Island and United States Supreme Court precedent on the issue of 
statutory construction.71  Justice Robinson opined that adding 
language into the statute that the conduct described amounted to 
the crime of sex trafficking of a minor was not necessary.72  Looking 
at the title of the statute and the different portions of it, it was clear 
that the legislature intended to prohibit sex trafficking of a minor 
and to punish such crime under the penalties set forth in subsection 
(c).73  The statute was not ambiguous, it simply required additional 
language, which was not necessary to give fair notice of the 
prohibited conduct described in the statute.  However, the majority 
opinion made a compelling comparison to Rhode Island General 
Laws section 11-67-3, which punishes sex trafficking of all persons, 
to the statute in question, where section 11-67-3 included language 
that linked the prohibited conduct and the penalty, describing the 
conduct as a crime.74 
 
 67.  Id. at 341–44.  
 68.  See id. at 339–41. 
 69.  “A crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed 
penalty.”  Id. at 340 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 1.2(d) 18 (3d ed. 2018)).  
 70.  Id. at 346–47 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 71.  Id. at 347.  Similarly, as Justice Robinson stated in another case, “our 
primary task in construing a statute is to attribute to the enactment the 
meaning most consistent with its policies and with the obvious purposes of the 
Legislature . . . .”  Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery 
Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994). 
 72.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 344. (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
 73.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-6. 
 74.  The court explained that, unlike in section 11-67-6, in section 11-67-3 
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Although the dissent’s opinion was persuasive, the majority 
opinion was cautious not to overstep its boundaries by drafting a 
statute.  Rather, it recognized that its role is solely to interpret 
statutes.75  Separation of powers is fundamental in the American 
justice system because it allows for the branches of government to 
check each other.  Furthermore, the court’s approach to enacting 
clear and explicit statutes reinforces the role of the legislature in 
effecting social order and safety. 
On the second matter presented on appeal, the court properly 
upheld that the trial justice’s ruling that Melia’s remarks on the 
stand were admissible.76  The trial justice granted the Defendant’s 
motion to strike for some of her testimony, and allowed other 
testimony into evidence with a cautionary instruction to ensure 
that the jury only considered the testimony as evidence of Melia’s 
state of mind.77  The court’s decision was guided by the well-settled 
deferential standard, which affords “great weight” to a trial justice’s 
ruling on a motion to pass and under these circumstances, there did 
not appear to be any error at the trial court level.78  Appellate 
courts generally give deference to findings of fact at the trial court 
level because trial judges observe and evaluate the facts and 
evidence of the case, and the court properly applied such deference 
in this case. 
On the last issue, the court properly concluded that the 
Defendant did not properly preserve his challenge to the 
admissibility of the telephone conversation records through a clear 
and specific objection at trial.79  Although the defense objected for 
a Rule 404(b) violation, the court concluded that the objection was 
not stated with enough specificity.80  While the Defendant could 
have explained the grounds for his objection in a more concrete and 
specific manner, it is generally known that an objection based on 
Rule 404(b) grounds means that there is character evidence at play 
that is highly prejudicial to a defendant.  Nonetheless, the court 
properly invoked the “raise-or-waive” rule because the objection 
 
there is a link between the prohibited conduct and the penalties for such 
conduct, making it clear that sex trafficking is a crime.  Id.; Maxie, 187 A.3d at 
347 n.8. (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 75.  Maxie, 187 A.3d at 341.  
 76.  Id. at 342. 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. (quoting State v. Grant, 946 A.2d 818, 826–27 (R.I. 2008)). 
 79.  Id. at 344. 
 80.  Id. 
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simply stated, “I’m running into 404(b) walls,” without explicitly 
stating on what basis it was highly prejudicial to the Defendant or 
irrelevant to the case.81 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court properly held that a trial court should 
dismiss a criminal count based on a statute that fails to state a 
crime and cannot be repaired without the addition of language 
criminalizing such conduct.  When such a statute requires 
additional language to bridge a gap between a conduct and a 
penalty, it is the responsibility of the legislature, and not the courts, 
to draft it in a clear and explicit manner.  Furthermore, the court 
applied a deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to the trial 
justice’s ruling on the admissibility of witness testimony and will 
not overturn a trial justice’s ruling absent clear error.  Lastly, the 
court correctly decided that pursuant to the “raise or waive” rule, a 
party’s objection to the admissibility of evidence is deemed waived 
if it fails to specifically state the grounds for his objection. 
Nathalie M. Vega Crespo 
 
 
 81.  Id.   
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Employment Law.  Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2018).  
An individual receiving an accidental disability pension pursuant 
to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode Island General Laws is required 
to undergo an annual independent medical examination, and his or 
her pension is subject to adjustment based on income, as set forth 
in sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On June 18, 2000, John Grasso, a member of the Cranston 
police force, suffered a “debilitating injury” while on the job.1  
Because the injury rendered him unable to return to work, Mr. 
Grasso applied for, and was granted, an accidental disability 
pension pursuant to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws on September 12, 2002.2  Ten years later, Mr. Grasso received 
a letter from the Retirement Board, which oversees the Employees’ 
Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI), notifying him that his 
pension would be suspended on September 30, 2012, because it had 
been “overpaid.”3  The Retirement Board also requested that Mr. 
Grasso provide copies of his tax returns and medical progress notes 
from his treating physician.4  In addition, the Retirement Board 
informed him that he might be required to submit to an 
independent medical examination (IME) pursuant to section 45-21-
23(a).5  Per the Retirement Board’s request, Mr. Grasso submitted 
“certain medical documentation” and was subsequently notified 
that he was to contact a particular physician to schedule an IME.6  
On May 9, 2013, Mr. Grasso’s counsel met with the Retirement 
 
 1.  Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 484 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 484–85.  R.I. Gen. Laws section 45-21-23(a) provides that an 
individual receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance may be 
required to undergo a medical examination performed by a physician or 
physicians engaged by the retirement board.  Id. at 488. 
 6.  Id. at 485. 
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Board’s counsel to convey Mr. Grasso’s belief that his pension was 
governed by neither section 45-21-23 nor section 45-21-24, which 
requires the Retirement Board to adjust the amount of a disability 
annuitant’s pension if the beneficiary is engaged in a “gainful 
occupation.”7 
Following that meeting, Mr. Grasso filed suit in Providence 
County Superior Court against Defendants Gina Raimondo, Frank 
Karpinski, the ERSRI, and the State of Rhode Island, seeking a 
declaratory judgement that he was not obligated to comply with the 
provisions of sections 45-21-23 or 45-21-24 in order to continue 
receiving his pension.8  He contended that those provisions do not 
apply to accidental disability pensions paid to former police officers 
and firefighters.9  Also following that May 9, 2013 meeting, the 
Executive Director of the ERSRI rendered an administrative 
decision rejecting Mr. Grasso’s argument that the ERSRI could not 
compel him to undergo an IME or reduce the amount of his pension 
benefit.10  Mr. Grasso requested a hearing before the Retirement 
Board and, on August 1, 2014, the hearing officer also rejected Mr. 
Grasso’s argument.11  On September 25, 2014, the Retirement 
Board upheld the hearing officer’s decision.12  Mr. Grasso 
subsequently appealed the ERSRI’s decision to the Superior 
Court.13 
The Superior Court consolidated Mr. Grasso’s two cases on 
December 1, 2014.14  Mr. Grasso moved for summary judgement in 
the declaratory judgement action, arguing that a 1980 amendment 
to section 45-21.2-10, which governs accidental disability pensions 
paid to police officers and firefighters, rendered the statutory 
provisions concerning IMEs and income reporting requirements 
 
 7.  Id.  Mr. Grasso began working as an attorney during the period that 
he was collecting an accidental disability pension.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  The defendants named in the complaint are as follows: Rhode 
Island Governor Gina Raimondo, individually and in her capacity as 
chairperson of the ERSRI; Frank Karpinski, individually and in his capacity 
as Executive Director of the ERSRI; the ERSRI; and the State of Rhode Island.  
Id. at 484 n.1.  The Superior Court dismissed the individual claims against 
Governor Raimondo and Mr. Karpinski and, as such, they remained 
defendants to the suit in their representative capacities only.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 485. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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inapplicable.15  The Defendants later filed a corresponding cross-
motion for summary judgement.16  The trial justice rendered a 
bench decision in Mr. Grasso’s favor in the consolidated cases on 
November 5, 2015, holding that his pension was not subject to 
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.17  Further, the trial justice found 
that the language of section 45-21.2-10 was “clear and 
unambiguous,” and that it addressed “only the amount of the 
[disability pension] benefit,” without reference to sections 45-21-23 
and 45-21-24.18 
The Defendants subsequently appealed the trial justice’s 
decision in the declaratory judgement action.19  They also filed a 
petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari concerning the appeal 
of the ERSRI’s administrative decision, which the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court granted.20  On appeal, the Defendants argued, inter 
alia, that the trial justice misinterpreted the meaning of section 45-
21.2-10, thus reaching an “absurd result.”21  Specifically, the 
Defendants contended that it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that a former police officer or firefighter collecting an accidental 
disability pension may continue to do so at the full benefit rate, 
regardless of his ability to secure gainful employment.22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the court conducted a de novo review to determine 
whether, under the post-1980 version of section 45-21.2-10, the 
ERSRI can require a police officer or firefighter receiving an 
accidental disability pension to submit to an annual IME pursuant 
to section 45-21-23, and whether the ERSRI can consider an 
individual’s other earnings in determining the amount of his 
pension, pursuant to section 45-21-24.23  Prior to 1980, section 45-
21.2-10 stated that “any member retiring and receiving a disability 
allowance shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 45-21-23 and 45-
 
 15.  Id. at 485, 488. 
 16.  Id. at 485. 
 17.  Id. at 485, 488. 
 18.  Id. at 488. 
 19.  Id. at 485. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 485–86, 489. 
 23.  Id. at 487–88. 
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21-24.”24  However, the 1980 revision omitted the reference to 
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.25  The current version of the 
statute sets forth that “the amount of retirement allowance for 
accidental disability is that as prescribed in § 45-21-22.”26  The trial 
justice opined that the General Assembly amended section 45-21.2-
10 precisely to remove the IME and pension reduction obligations 
that existed prior to 1980.27  The trial justice concluded that it is 
not absurd to find that the General Assembly intended to provide 
police officers and firefighters, who face a variety of very dangerous 
workplace risks, with a more attractive retirement plan “in the 
event that those risks materialize into actual harms.”28 
Upon detailed review of the relevant statutory sections, the 
court disagreed with the trial justice’s assertion that section 45-
21.2-10 was “clear and unambiguous.”29  When a statute is 
ambiguous, the court applies the rules of statutory construction and 
examines the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and 
purpose of the Rhode Island Legislature.30  Upon examination of 
chapter 21.2, the court pointed to several factors which rendered 
section 45-21.2-10 “substantially ambiguous.”31  First, the 1980 
revision replaced the references to sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 
with a cross-reference to section 45-21-22, which simply provides 
that individuals receiving an accidental disability pension are 
entitled to receive sixty-six and two-thirds percent of their 
compensation at the date of retirement.32  The court found that it 
was unclear whether that reference to section 45-21-22 was meant 
to also include other sections of chapter 21, as those sections would 
apply to any pension governed by section 45-21-22.33  Second, 
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 explicitly provide that they apply to 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 487. 
 26.  Id.  Section 45-21-22 provides that an individual receiving an 
accidental disability pension “receives a retirement allowance equal to sixty-
six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the rate of the member’s compensation 
at the date of the member’s retirement . . . .”  Id. at 487 n.4. 
 27.  Id. at 489. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 489–90. 
 30.  Id. at 489 (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)). 
 31.  Id. at 490. 
 32.  Id. at 487 n.4, 490. 
 33.  Id. at 490. 
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any disability annuity.34  Finally, section 45-21.2-4 states that the 
optional retirement system provided for in chapter 21.2 is to be 
“administered in the same manner provided in chapter 21,” but 
does not clarify the meaning of the term “administered.”35 
Upon finding that section 45-21.2-10 was “substantially 
ambiguous,” the court next attempted to determine the meaning of 
the statute as intended by the Legislature in light of the entire 
statutory scheme.36  The court noted that its ultimate goal in 
matters of statutory interpretation “is to give effect to the purpose 
of the act as intended by the Legislature.”37  The purpose of chapter 
21.2, titled “Optional Retirement for Members of Police Force and 
Fire Fighters,” is to provide an accidental disability pension for 
police officers and firefighters who were injured on the job and can 
no longer work due to disability resulting from that injury.38  In 
light of that purpose, the court concluded that the most “reasonable, 
fair, and harmonious” interpretation of the statutory scheme is that 
the “General Assembly intended for an accidental disability pension 
under § 45-21.2-10 to be subject to the IME and income reporting 
requirements of §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.”39  Any other 
interpretation would lead to the unlikely result that the Legislature 
intended to provide accidental disability benefits to police officers 
and firefighters for life, regardless of whether or not an individual 
is still disabled or is able to earn income from another source that 
is equal to, or greater than, the income he would have earned as a 
police officer or firefighter.40  To illustrate its point, the court posed 
a hypothetical in which a police officer, after retiring for accidental 
disability, has a full recovery and becomes a major league baseball 
pitcher with a multimillion-dollar annual contract.41  Should he be 
able to continue collecting an accidental disability pension?42  
Although the Legislature has the power to provide for that result, 
the court explained that statutory silence is not enough; the 
Legislature must explicitly convey its intent if “it should wish to do 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Court Condo., 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 
2012)). 
 38.  Id. at 487, 491. 
 39.  Id. at 491. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 492. 
 42.  Id. 
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something so extraordinary in such an important context.”43  As 
such, the court held that Mr. Grasso was subject to sections 45-21-
23 and 45-21-24 and, therefore, he may be required to undergo 
periodic IMEs at the request of the Retirement Board and to submit 
financial information as requested.44 
Chief Justice Suttell dissented, arguing that the language of 
section 45-21.2-10 is clear and unambiguous because it plainly 
prescribes the amount of accidental disability for police officers and 
firefighters and nothing more.45  He stated that he “might agree” 
with the majority that such accidental disability pensions, as a 
matter of policy, should be subject to the IME and income reporting 
requirements set forth in sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.46  He also 
acknowledged that the case at bar and the multimillion-dollar 
baseball pitcher scenario “approach the absurd.”47  Nevertheless, 
he stated that such policy decisions are best left to the 
Legislature.48  Chief Justice Suttell concluded that the court should 
not attempt to determine the legislative intent behind section 45-
21.2-10 “when [the General Assembly] [speaks] in such clear and 
comprehensible language.”49 
Justice Flaherty filed a separate dissenting opinion, also 
arguing that the language of section 45-21.2-10 is clear, 
unambiguous, and not susceptible to more than one reasonable 
meaning.50  In his dissent, he contended that a common-sense 
reading of the statute’s plain language, coupled with the fact that 
the General Assembly deleted all references to sections 45-21-23 
and 45-21-24 from the statute in 1980, can only lead to the 
conclusion that the General Assembly purposefully opted to exempt 
pensioners governed by chapter 21.2 from IME and income 
reporting requirements.51  He concluded that “[i]t may be 
unpalatable that plaintiff is not subject to a yearly IME or to 
income-reporting requirements, but that is for the General 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 493 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 493–94 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Id. at 493–96. 
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Assembly to determine, not this Court.”52 
COMMENTARY 
The court clearly recognized that when a statutory section is 
clear and unambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of a 
statute should be applied and no further interpretation is 
necessary.53  Upon review of the relevant statutory sections, the 
court found that section 45-21.2-10 is “substantially ambiguous” 
and, thus, applied the rules of statutory construction to determine 
the intent and purpose of the General Assembly.54  However, both 
Chief Justice Suttell and Justice Flaherty presented cogent 
arguments that section 45-21.2-10, which simply sets forth that 
“the amount of retirement allowance for accidental disability is that 
as prescribed in § 45-21-22,” is clear on its face.55  Justice Flaherty 
explained that ambiguity exists “only when a word or phrase in a 
statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning.”56  The 
plain language of section 45-21.2-10, however, is not susceptible to 
other reasonable, common-sense interpretation.57  The statute does 
not mention sections 45-21-23 or 45-21-24 and, as such, the IME 
and income reporting requirements under those statutes should not 
be attached to the terms of section 45-21.2-10 simply because they  
had been in the past.58 
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that it is within the 
purview of the Legislature to treat retired police officers and 
firefighters differently than other pensioners by providing them 
with an accidental disability pension that is free from the burden of 
periodic IMEs and income-reporting requirements.59  Nevertheless, 
the court concluded that while such a provision would not 
necessarily be absurd or unreasonable, it would be so extraordinary 
that statutory silence is simply insufficient to determine that this 
 
 52.  Id. at 496. 
 53.  Id. at 489 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 
548 (R.I. 2014)). 
 54.  Id. at 490. 
 55.  See id. at 493–94 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 56.  Id. at 494 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Drs. Pass & Betherman, 
Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011)). 
 57.  See id. (quoting In re Proposed Town of New Sherman, 10 A.3d 456, 
464 (R.I. 2011)). 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  Id. at 492 (majority opinion). 
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was the General Assembly’s desired result.60  In doing so, the 
majority veered from the long-held presumption “that the General 
Assembly knows the state of existing relevant law when it enacts 
or amends a statute.”61  Following this presumption, it appears that 
the General Assembly, in its legislative wisdom, intended that 
accidental disability pensions governed by section 45-21.2-10 
should not be subject to the requirements of sections 45-21-23 and 
45-21-24, as exemplified by the deliberate removal of any and all 
reference to these provisions when the statute was amended in 
1980.62  As such, the dissenters, once again, make a compelling 
argument that this matter involves a question of policy that is best 
left to the Legislature.63 
CONCLUSION 
The court held that an individual receiving an accidental 
disability pension pursuant to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode 
Island General Laws is subject to a requirement that he undergo 
an annual IME, and his pension is subject to adjustment based on 
his occupation.  The court determined this interpretation to be the 
intent of the Legislature, gleaned from the statutory language 
governing such pensions and the statute’s primary purpose of 
providing for an accidental disability pension for a police officer or 
firefighter who is injured on the job and cannot work due to his or 
her disability. 
Sarah D. Boucher 
 
 
 60.  Id. at 489. 
 61.  See id. at 494 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing Power Test Realty Co.  
Ltd. P’ship v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1222 (R.I. 2016)) (quoting Ret. Bd. of Emp. 
Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 287 (R.I. 2004)). 
 62.  See id. at 494–95. 
 63.  See id. at 493, 496 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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Employment Law.  State v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d 1090 
(R.I. 2018).  The Attorney General is vested with the authority to 
determine whether a state employee is entitled to legal 
representation when sued in his or her individual capacity, due to 
an act that occurred outside of the scope of employment.  The 
Attorney General’s determination of whether to provide defense to 
a state employee is not an arbitrable issue. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In February 2014, two members of the Rhode Island State 
Police, Trooper James Donnelly Taylor and Trooper Gregory 
Palmer, stopped a vehicle that they observed speeding in 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island.1  The vehicle was operated by Lionel 
Monsanto.2  Because Monsanto was driving on an expired license, 
he was “arrested and transported to the State Police Lincoln 
Barracks for processing.”3  At the conclusion of Monsanto’s 
processing and booking, he was escorted to a cellblock where Taylor 
allegedly “physically assaulted Monsanto multiple times.”4  Taylor 
was indicted on an assault charge, to which he pled nolo contendere, 
knowingly waived his constitutional rights, and admitted to the 
underlying facts of the indictment.5  A Sixth Division District Court 
judge accepted the plea, directed the case to be filed in accordance 
with section 12-10-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws, and 
ordered Taylor to perform twenty-five hours of community service 
work.6  Taylor’s criminal disposition was later expunged and, thus, 
no criminal record resulted.7 
On March 24, 2016, Monsanto filed suit against Taylor and 
several other defendants in the United States District Court for the 
 
 1.  State v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d 1090, 1093 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 1094. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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District of Rhode Island.8  On April 8, 2016, the Attorney General 
received a written request from Taylor for legal representation and 
indemnification with regard to Monsanto’s civil action.9  Taylor 
stated that his request was “in accordance with the RIGL, to include 
but not limited to, 42-28-20, and the Rhode Island State Police 
Troopers Association Collective Bargaining Agreement [(CBA)], 
section 29.17.”10  On May 15, 2016, the Department of the Attorney 
General responded that the State would not represent Taylor for 
any cause of action filed against him in his individual capacity.11  
The State based this determination on section 9-31-9,12 Taylor’s 
plea of nolo contendere, and the allegations of the intentional torts 
of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.13  Because Taylor’s actions fell “outside of the scope of his 
employment” and amounted to willful misconduct in accordance 
with the Governmental Tort Liability Act, the Attorney General 
refused to provide a defense to Taylor in his individual capacity.14 
Following the Attorney General’s decision, the Rhode Island 
Trooper’s Association (RITA) filed a grievance with the State Police 
on behalf of Taylor, alleging a violation of the CBA, specifically 
Article 29.17,15 and asserting that the State must provide Taylor 
 
 8.  Id.  Monsanto named as defendants in his suit the State of Rhode 
Island; Trooper Taylor, individually and in his official capacity; the Rhode 
Island State Police; and Colonel Steven G. O’Donnell, individually and in his 
official capacity.  Id.   
Mr. Monsanto alleged federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983; conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights; assault and battery; 
malicious prosecution; false imprisonment and false arrest; 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violations of G.L. 1956 
§ 9-1-35 and G.L. 1956 § 31-21.2-3, causes of action based on alleged 
racial harassment by racial profiling. 
Id.  Monsanto also sought punitive damages.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 1094–95. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 1095. 
 12.  9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-9 (2012).  In pertinent part, the statute 
provides that the Attorney General may refuse to defend an action against a 
state employee where “[t]he [employee’s] act or omission was not within the 
scope of employment” or “[t]he act or the failure to act was because of actual 
fraud, willful misconduct, or actual malice.”  Id. §§ 9-31-9(1)–(2) (emphasis 
added). 
 13.  R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d at 1095. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  According to Article 29.17 of the CBA, 
The State shall provide legal counsel for any legal action arising out 
of conduct of State Troopers acting within the scope of their 
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with “full legal defense of all claims asserted in Monsanto v. State 
of Rhode Island et al., and . . . full indemnification for all liabilities, 
expenses and damages of any nature resulting from that legal 
action.”16  The State subsequently denied RITA’s grievance.17  On 
June 30, 2016, RITA filed a “Demand for Arbitration” again, 
seeking that the State provide Taylor with a full legal defense and 
full indemnification for all liabilities in accordance with the State’s 
obligations contained in Article 29.17.18 
On February 27, 2017, the State filed a “Verified Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” in Providence Superior Court.19  
On July 6, 2017, the Superior Court trial justice “issued a 
judgement with eight declarations that generally mirror[ed] the 
state’s request.”20  Most importantly, the judgement declared that 
RITA’s grievance was not an arbitrable issue and that the Attorney 
General’s constitutional and common law authority includes the 
power to refuse to provide a state-paid defense and indemnification 
to state employees acting outside of the scope of employment.21 
RITA appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, where 
the court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant declaratory 
relief with great deference to her factual findings and “with an eye 
to whether the court abused its discretion, misinterpreted the 
applicable law, overlooked material facts, or otherwise exceeded its 
authority.”22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
As a preliminary matter, the court narrowed the issues raised 
on appeal to the following two questions:  
 
employment.  The State shall also provide full indemnification for any 
liability, expenses or damages of any nature incurred by State 
Troopers resulting from any legal action arising out of conduct 
performed within the scope of employment.  With respect to the 
provision of legal counsel in criminal matters, any legal action 
includes alleged criminal conduct arising out of conduct of the State 
Troopers acting within the scope of their employment. 
Id. at 1095 n.5. 
 16.  Id. at 1095–96. 
 17.  Id. at 1096. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 1097. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1098 (quoting Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997)). 
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(1) whether the Attorney General’s authority to refuse to 
provide a defense to a state employee is an arbitrable issue 
under a collective bargaining agreement; and (2) whether, 
in accordance with the Governmental Tort Liability Act, 
the Attorney General is vested with the statutory 
authority to determine whether a state employee is 
entitled to legal representation when sued in his or her 
individual capacity “on account of an act or omission that 
occurred within the scope of his or her employment with 
the state”; and whether that authority is delegable or 
transferable.23 
On the first issue, the court held that RITA’s challenge to the 
Attorney General’s authority to determine when to provide a state 
employee with legal representation was not an arbitrable issue.24  
The court reasoned that the Attorney General’s authority to refuse 
to defend an action was statutorily proscribed.25  Particularly, 
section  9-31-9 states that “[t]he attorney general may refuse to 
defend an action . . . if he or she determines that . . . [t]he act or 
omission was not within the scope of the employment.”26  
Accordingly, this question was not capable of resolution through 
arbitration given that “labor disputes and grievances that seek to 
modify applicable state law are not subject to arbitration because 
the arbitrator has no power to do so.”27  Therefore, the court upheld 
the trial justice’s decision to permanently enjoin the arbitration 
proceedings.28 
On the second issue, the court held that the Attorney General 
was vested with the statutory authority, pursuant to section 9-31-
9, to refuse to defend a state employee where the employee’s 
conduct was not within the scope of employment or the employee 
was engaged in willful misconduct or actual malice.29  First, the 
court recognized the “broad discretion”30 afforded to the Attorney 
 
 23.  Id. at 1098–99. 
 24.  Id. at 1101. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-9(1) (2012). 
 27.  R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d at 1101 (discussing State v. R.I. All. of 
Soc. Servs. Emps., Local 580 SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I. 2000)). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 1103. 
 30.  Id. at 1102 (discussing State v. Lead Paint Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 
428, 471, 473 (R.I. 2008)). 
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General in exercising his or her authority, and how “[i]t is not the 
province of this Court . . . to dictate how the Attorney General elects 
to carry out the statutory functions of his office.”31 The court then 
noted that the express language of the Governmental Tort Liability 
Act directly imparts the authority to the Attorney General to 
determine when to provide a defense for a state employee.32  
Finally, the court acknowledged that the Attorney General’s refusal 
to defend Taylor was appropriately supported by the fact that 
Taylor was indicted by a grand jury, pled nolo contendere to 
misdemeanor assault upon Monsanto, and that video footage 
existed that had captured the assault.33  Accordingly, Taylor’s 
conduct fell beyond the scope of his employment as a Rhode Island 
State Trooper, and the Attorney General’s refusal to provide Taylor 
with representation was appropriate pursuant to section 9-31-9.34 
Finally, the court addressed several ancillary arguments made 
by RITA.35  First, RITA contended that, according to section 9-31-
12(b), the judiciary, rather than the Attorney General, makes the 
final determination on whether a state will indemnify a state 
employee.36  The court determined that this argument was 
misplaced as section 9-31-12(b) does not apply to cases where the 
Attorney General has declined to provide legal representation and 
indemnification based on one of the “disqualifying factors” under 
section 9-31-9.37  Next, RITA argued that, according to section 9-
31-11, the Attorney General does not have the authority to dictate 
the financial obligations of the State, only to determine 
indemnification to his or her own office.38  The court found that 
section 9-31-11 did not apply: that section applies only where the 
Attorney General has a conflict of interest, and here, the decision 
not to represent Taylor was due to the determination that he was 
disqualified from representation, not because there was a conflict 
of interest in representing Taylor.39 
 
 31.  Id. at 1103 (quoting Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I. 2002)) 
(alteration in original). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1103–04. 
 34.  Id. at 1104. 
 35.  Id. at 1104–05. 
 36.  Id. at 1104. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 1105. 
 39.  Id. 
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COMMENTARY 
The court appropriately determined that whether Taylor was 
entitled to a legal defense and indemnification by the State was not 
an arbitrable issue under the RITA CBA.40  The court relied on the 
well-reasoned decision of State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social 
Services, Local 580, SEIU, where the court determined that “an 
arbitrator cannot resolve a labor dispute by issuing a ruling that 
would conflict with or compromise the statutory authority or legal 
obligations of a department of state government.”41  Here, 
arbitration would have conflicted with the Attorney General’s 
vested statutory authority to decline representation in accordance 
with the “disqualifying factors” enumerated in section 9-31-9.42  
Accordingly, given that arbitration of the Attorney General’s 
decision would usurp the “Attorney General’s powers and 
obligations,”43 particularly the exclusive authority granted under 
section 9-31-9 to determine when to provide a state employee with 
a legal defense, the court appropriately determined that arbitration 
was inappropriate.44 
The second question at issue—whether the Governmental Tort 
Liability Act gave the Attorney General sole legal authority to 
determine when the State should provide a defense to a state 
employee in his individual capacity—was appropriately decided by 
the court.45  The court noted that it has “consistently recognized 
and affirmed the Attorney General’s assertion of common law and 
constitutionally derived authority to carry out the important 
functions of the office on behalf of the people of this state.”46  
Understanding the “broad discretion” that has historically been 
afforded to the Attorney General and recognizing that, in addition 
to the Attorney General’s inherent powers, the resolution of the 
issue was also controlled by the language of section 9-31-9, the court 
correctly held that the decision to decline representation of Taylor 
was appropriate.47  Under section 9-31-9, the Attorney General is 
 
 40.  Id. at 1101. 
 41.  Id. at 1099 (quoting State v. R.I. All. of Soc. Servs. Emps., Local 580, 
SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 468 (R.I. 2000)). 
 42.  Id. at 1101. 
 43.  Id. at 1100. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  Id. at 1102. 
 47.  Id. at 1101–04. 
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permitted to decline to defend a state employee where his or her 
actions fall outside of the scope of employment or are the result of 
willful misconduct or actual malice.48  Given that the Attorney 
General based his decision on evidence49 that wholly supported the 
determination that Taylor acted intentionally with actual malice in 
assaulting Monsanto and, therefore, acted beyond the scope of his 
employment, the court appropriately determined that the Attorney 
General’s decision a proper exercise of his authority.50 
Finally, the court properly determined that section 9-31-11, 
which requires the State to pay for the state employee’s reasonable 
attorney’s fees when the State determines that there is a conflict of 
interest in undertaking the state employee’s defense, did not apply 
to Taylor’s federal tort action.51  Because the Attorney General 
based his decision to decline representation on Taylor’s 
disqualification from a state-provided legal defense for acting 
outside of the scope of his employment, and not because there was 
a conflict of interest preventing the representation, section 9-31-11 
did not apply.52  Accordingly, the court correctly concluded that this 
provision of the Governmental Tort Liability Act was inapplicable 
to Taylor.53 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Attorney 
General has the authority to determine whether a state employee 
is entitled to legal representation when sued in his or her individual 
capacity due to an act that occurred outside of the scope of 
employment. The court also determined that the Attorney General’s 
determination of whether to provide a defense to a state employee 
is not an arbitrable issue. 
Crystal Peralta 
 
 
 48.  Id. at 1103. 
 49.  Id. at 1103–04.  The evidence the Attorney General relied upon 
included that “Taylor was indicted by a grand jury and pled nolo contendere to 
misdemeanor assault upon Monsanto” and that “the record include[d] a video 
recording that captured Trooper Taylor’s assault upon Monsanto.”  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1103. 
 51.  Id. at 1105. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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Evidence.  State v. Perry, 182 A.3d 558 (R.I. 2018).  The trial court 
has discretion to allow witness testimony of prior sexual misconduct 
so long as it does not violate Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence.  In ruling on a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, a trial justice does not violate Rule 29(b) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting the motion in part 
and denying the motion in part. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May 2012, the Bristol Police Department was investigating 
a possible child molestation that occurred between the years 1977 
and 1980.1  Through police investigation, Sergeant Steven St. 
Pierre was contacted by Brian, who directed Sergeant St. Pierre to 
Adam, the complaining witness and Brian’s childhood friend.2  As 
a result of Adam’s disclosures to the police, the Defendant, Jesse S. 
Perry, was arrested on January 4, 2013.3  On April 12, 2013, the 
Defendant was charged with nine counts: three counts of first-
degree child molestation sexual assault, two counts of second-
degree child molestation sexual assault, two counts of first-degree 
sexual assault, and two counts of second-degree sexual assault.4 
On May 15, 2013, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to 
admit testimony from multiple witnesses about alleged incidents of 
sexual misconduct by the Defendant that occurred between 1977 
and 1980.5  The State maintained that nearly all the witnesses 
were involved in youth sports in Bristol, had a difficult home life, 
and were offered a sports massage prior to the sexual abuse.6  
Therefore, the State asserted that the Defendant’s prior sexual 
misconduct was “‘probative of [his] modus operandi of preying on 
 
 1.  State v. Perry, 1982 A.3d. 558, 561 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. The court used fictitious names in its Opinion to protect the privacy 
of the complaining witness and the other witnesses.  Id. at 561 n.1. 
 3.  Id. at 562. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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vulnerable young boys[,]’ and tended to prove defendant’s motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, an 
absence of mistake or accident.”7  The Defendant opposed the 
State’s motion in limine and argued that the testimony was 
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence.8  The trial justice granted the State’s motion in 
limine, allowing the State to present testimony from witnesses 
about prior sexual misconduct by the Defendant.9 
A bench trial began on November 18, 2014 in Rhode Island 
Superior Court.10  At the trial, the complaining witness, Adam, 
testified, as well as three other witnesses: Colin, David, and 
Brian.11  Adam, who was thirty-three years old at trial, testified 
that he first met the Defendant when he was eight years old and 
that the Defendant was his youth football coach.12  Adam explained 
to the court how their relationship developed and how he moved in 
with the Defendant when he was twelve years old.13  Adam further 
testified about the Defendant’s sexual abuse, including incidents of 
fellatio.14  Colin, who was forty-seven years old at trial, testified 
next.15  He testified about an incident that occurred when he was 
twelve years old and went to the Defendant’s home for a sports 
massage following an injury during football practice; the Defendant 
removed Colin’s underwear and moved, but did not injure, Colin’s 
penis.16  David, who was forty-six years old at trial, was the third 
witness to testify.17  He testified about two incidents: the first 
involved the Defendant fondling his genitals after David told the 
Defendant he intended to play football and would need a jockstrap 
and cup; the second occurred when the Defendant told David he was 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 563.  In rendering her decision, the trial justice was mindful of 
the time span between the alleged prior sexual misconduct and the charged 
acts. The trial justice considered the similarities between the relationship of 
the parties and the nature and location of the alleged assault when deciding 
on the remoteness of the evidence. Id. 
 10.  Id.  The Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 563–64. 
 15.  Id. at 564. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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falling in love with him.18  Lastly, Brian, who was forty-five years 
old at the trial, testified that he used to live on the same street as 
the Defendant.19  Brian also testified about an incident that 
occurred at the Defendant’s home where the Defendant invited him 
over to show him nunchucks and, while Brian sat on the bed, the 
Defendant touched Brian’s penis for between five and ten 
minutes.20  The State then rested its case against the Defendant 
and dismissed one of the counts of first-degree child molestation 
sexual assault.21 
The Defendant then moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 29(b) 
of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
challenging the legal sufficiency of the State’s trial evidence; 
specifically, he argued that the counts were duplicitous.22  On 
December 16, 2014 the trial justice issued a decision where she first 
noted that one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault 
and one count of second-degree sexual assault had already been 
dismissed.23  The trial justice found Adam to be a credible witness 
and accepted the testimony of the other witnesses as satisfying the 
requirements for admissible character evidence pursuant to Rule 
404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.24  The trial justice 
therefore denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to 
two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and one 
count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, and 
granted the motion with respect to one count of second-degree child 
molestation sexual assault, two counts of first-degree sexual 
assault, and one count second-degree sexual assault.25  In 
summation, the remaining charges after the disposition of the 
motion to dismiss were two counts of first-degree child molestation 
sexual assault and one count of second-degree child molestation 
sexual assault.26 
The Defendant then testified.27  He denied any sexual contact 
 
 18.  Id. at 564–65. 
 19.  Id. at 565. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 566. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
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with Colin, David, or Brian.28  The Defendant called Colin’s and 
David’s allegations “a one upmanship kind of thing.”29  The 
Defendant also denied having a sexual relationship with Adam or 
ever touching him in a sexual manner, and accused Adam of lying 
in his testimony about the Defendant.30  On January 5, 2015, the 
trial justice rendered her decision and, after considering all the 
evidence, found the Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree 
child molestation sexual assault and one count of second-degree 
child molestation sexual assault.31  On May 8, 2015, the trial justice 
sentenced the Defendant to serve concurrent life sentences at the 
Adult Correctional Institutions for the two counts of first-degree 
child molestation sexual assault, and thirty years, to run 
concurrently with the life sentences, for the one count of second-
degree child molestation sexual assault.32  The Defendant appealed 
the trial justice’s decision.33 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Defendant brought this appeal on three separate grounds.  
First, the Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in granting 
the State’s motion in limine and admitting the testimony of Brian, 
Colin, and David because this evidence violated Rhode Island Rule 
of Evidence 404(b).34  Second, the Defendant argued that the 
allegations of prior sexual misconduct should not have been 
admitted because the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed the 
evidence’s probative value pursuant to Rhode Island Rule of 
Evidence 403.35  Lastly, the Defendant argued that the trial justice 
exceeded the dictates of Rule 29(b) of the Superior Court Rules of 
Criminal Procedure when deciding his motion to dismiss.36 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Defendant’s 
first point of appeal under an “abuse of discretion” standard, stating 
that “th[e] Court is disinclined to perceive an abuse of discretion so 
long as the record contains some grounds for supporting the trial 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 567. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 567–68. 
 33.  Id. at 568. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 571. 
 36.  Id. at 572. 
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justice’s decision.”37  In general, evidence offered to prove the 
character of a person and that the person acted in conformity with 
past crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible under Rule 404(b).38  
Rule 404(b) contains an exception for the admission of such 
evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake 
or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm 
and that the fear was reasonable.”39  To present evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct with someone other than the complainant under 
Rule 404(b), the sexual offenses have to be “nonremote” and 
“similar.”40  Sexual offenses are nonremote and similar “if they are 
closely related in time, place, age, family relationship of the victims, 
and the form of the sexual acts.”41  The evidence must also be 
relevant to the crime charged and reasonably necessary.42 
The court first analyzed whether the trial justice balanced the 
relevance of the evidence against its remoteness and potential for 
improper prejudicial impact.43  The court concluded that the trial 
justice remained cognizant of the time between the prior sexual 
misconduct and the charged acts, and ultimately determined that 
the similarities were so strong that any remoteness was 
outweighed.44  The court held that the trial justice did not abuse 
her discretion in finding that the prior acts of sexual misconduct 
were similar to the charged acts because the victims were of similar 
age, were all local boys that participated in the youth sports league, 
and all the incidents occurred at the Defendant’s residence.45  The 
nature of the abuse was also similar.46 
The court then conducted a relevancy analysis under Rule 401, 
which defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency 
 
 37.  Id. at 568. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. (quoting State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 806 (R.I. 2005)). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (quoting State v. Coningford, 901 A.2d 623, 628–29 (R.I. 2006)). 
 43.  Id. at 569. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 570. 
 46.  Id.  The victims were between nine and twelve years old.  Id. at 569–
70.  They were all local boys who participated in youth sports leagues.  Id. at 
570.  The incidents of sexual misconduct all occurred at the Defendant’s 
residence and involved the Defendant touching the victims’ genitals under the 
guise of various situations.  Id. 
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to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.”47  The court held that because the 
Defendant was charged with second-degree child molestation 
sexual assault, evidence that the Defendant engaged in similar acts 
was relevant to demonstrate the Defendant’s intent to self-
gratify.48  In determining whether the evidence about the 
Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was reasonably necessary, the 
court considered the significant lapse of time between the sexual 
assaults and the prosecution, as well as the “credibility contest” 
between the Defendant and Adam, concluding that the testimony 
was reasonably necessary.49  The court held that the trial justice 
did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of the 
Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct under Rule 404(b).50 
Moving to the Defendant’s second issue on appeal, the court 
again applied an abuse of discretion standard.51  Rule 403 states 
that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”52  The Defendant argued that the record did 
not reflect a Rule 403 analysis; however, the court disagreed.53  The 
court explained that a trial justice can disregard prejudicial 
material if and when he or she determines that material to be 
inadmissible.54  Here, the trial justice would have disregarded the 
evidence if it were prejudicial and, therefore, the court rejected the 
Defendant’s argument that the prior sexual misconduct biased the 
trial justice and impaired her impartiality.55  Ultimately, the court 
held that the trial justice properly admitted the testimony 
regarding the Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct.56 
In addressing the Defendant’s final argument on appeal, the 
court applied a deferential standard of review, stating that it will 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 570–71. 
 50.  Id. at 571. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 572. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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uphold the findings of a trial justice “unless it can be shown that 
she overlooked or misconceived relevant and material evidence or 
was otherwise clearly wrong.”57  Rule 29(b) states that “in a case 
tried without a jury, a motion to dismiss may be filed at the close of 
the [s]tate’s case to challenge the legal sufficiency of the [s]tate’s 
trial evidence.”58  The court found that the Defendant’s argument 
was without merit; it reasoned that the trial justice did not exceed 
the dictates of Rule 29(b) because she analyzed all of the witnesses’ 
credibility and acknowledged that her findings were based on the 
record at the time of the motion to dismiss.59  Therefore, based on 
the trial justice’s evaluation of the evidence and her credibility 
determinations, the court found no error in the trial justice’s 
analysis because she adhered to the requirements of Rule 29(b).60 
COMMENTARY 
In this appeal, the Defendant challenged the analysis of several 
rules of evidence that ultimately allowed evidence of prior sexual 
misconduct to be admitted during the trial.  From the outset, the 
Defendant challenged the State’s motion in limine, arguing that the 
testimony of prior sexual misconduct should not be admitted 
pursuant to Rule 404(b).61  The State relied on the exception carved 
out in Rule 404(b) and maintained the position that the witness 
testimony proved the Defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or 
accident.62  The court resolved this issue by applying a “nonremote” 
and “similar” test which allows admission of evidence of a 
defendant’s sexual offenses against a person other than the 
complaining witness if the evidence is “nonremote” and “similar.”63 
As the dissent discussed, the standard requires that the 
evidence be both nonremote and similar to the charged conduct.64  
The dissent persuasively suggested that the majority improperly 
used similar factors to assess both the nonremote requirement and 
the similar requirement, essentially blending the two requirements 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 573. 
 59.  Id. at 573–74. 
 60.  Id. at 574. 
 61.  Id. at 562. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 563. 
 64.  Id. at 574 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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into one and blurring the line between admissible and inadmissible 
evidence.65  As the dissent pointed out, the fact that the prior abuse 
occurred between ten and twenty-two years prior to the charged 
conduct was relevant to the analysis.66  The dissent suggested that 
the majority, by combining the “nonremote” and “similar” factors,  
did not necessarily address that fact.67  The dissent ultimately 
opined that the evidence was too remote and, therefore, did not 
satisfy the test for admissibility.68 
Another persuasive issue that the dissent presented was the 
overall trend of Rhode Island Rule 404(b) cases.69  The dissent 
expressed concern about the resurrection of the “scatter-shot” 
approach: “[T]he trial court should not take a scatter-shot approach 
and list all of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  Rather, it 
shall designate with particularity the specific exceptions to which 
the ‘other crimes’ evidence is relevant and delete from its charge 
the remaining exceptions.”70  As the majority indicated, the trial 
justice mentioned the exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of 
evidence of past crimes, but the trial justice did not pinpoint the 
exception that applied.71  The dissent suggested that a solution 
would be to require the trial justice to state the express purpose for 
which the evidence is offered, rather than a “blanket assertion.”72  
This procedure would provide the court with clearer guidance as to 
why a trial justice admitted certain evidence, which would result in 
a more efficient system.73 
CONCLUSION 
The court concluded that that the trial justice properly allowed 
in the witnesses’ testimony of prior sexual misconduct.  In doing so, 
the trial justice did not violate Rule 404(b) or Rule 403.  
Additionally, the trial justice did not rule in error on the 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss following Rule 29(b).  Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court on all issues. 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 575. 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  Id. (quoting State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d. 526, 533 (R.I. 1978)). 
 71.  See id. at 567 (majority opinion). 
 72.  Id. at 576 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 73.  Id. 
2019] SURVEY SECTION 509 
Brianna Arnold 
 
  
510 
 
Family Law.  Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d 1074 (R.I. 2018).  
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court’s 
decision to deny a motion to relocate children who were under joint 
custody. The court declined to disturb the Family Court’s ruling 
that relocating was not in the best interests of the children, as the 
new location would make visitation with the non-relocating parent 
impracticable given the circumstances. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Plaintiff, Lauren Daley Ainsworth, and the Defendant, 
John Ainsworth, were married in Australia on October 2, 1999.1  
During their marriage, the couple lived in the United States and 
Lauren gave birth to four children, who all have dual citizenship.2  
On March 23, 2011, Lauren filed for divorce,3 and while the divorce 
proceedings were still pending, Lauren filed a motion to relocate the 
children to Australia.4  About one month later, a Rhode Island 
Family Court justice “issued a decision pending entry of final 
judgment,” awarding joint custody of the children to the parties, 
with Lauren being granted “physical possession” of the children and 
John having “all reasonable rights of visitation.”5  More than a year 
later, after conducting a hearing, a different justice of the Family 
 
 1.  Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 2018).  The Plaintiff 
and the Defendant will be referenced by their first names, as the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court did in its Opinion, in order to avoid confusion.  Lauren is an 
Australian citizen with permanent residency status in the United States, while 
John is a citizen of the United States.  Id.  
 2.  Id.  The children’s names are Hope, Sydney, Jenny, and Jack, and they 
were born in 2001, 2003, 2007, and 2009, respectively.  Id. at 1077 n.2. 
 3.  Id. at 1077.  Lauren filed for divorce due to “irreconcilable differences 
between the parties [that] had led to the irremediable breakdown of the 
marriage.”  Id.  
 4.  Id.  Lauren filed the motion to relocate on October 31, 2012.  Id.  
Lauren explained that her purpose for relocating was because she would have 
significantly better economic prospects in Australia, which would provide a 
better quality of life for her and the children, and also because her father, who 
lives in Australia, had been diagnosed with a terminal illness shortly before 
Lauren filed the motion to relocate.  Id. at 1077–78. 
 5.  Id. at 1077. 
2019] SURVEY SECTION 511 
Court issued a bench decision denying Lauren’s motion to relocate.6  
The hearing justice stated that “the ‘seminal question’ in this case 
was ‘the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-
relocating parent and [the] children through suitable visiting 
arrangements considering th[e] logistics and financial 
circumstances of the parties.’”7  Of considerable importance to this 
issue, according to the hearing justice, was the practicability of 
Lauren’s proposed visitation schedule and the indication that 
“[Lauren] would not endeavor to actively foster a close and 
continuous relationship between the children and their father.”8  
Lauren timely appealed the final order to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court.9 
On appeal, Lauren asserted three arguments.  First, she 
contended that “the hearing justice clearly erred in assessing the 
evidence” by giving “too much weight to John’s present appearance 
before the court” and according “too little weight to his past 
misdeeds, while also failing to give adequate consideration to the 
economic benefits [of relocating].”10  Additionally, she contended 
that “the hearing justice overlooked material evidence by failing to 
properly [consider] the fact that the parties’ ‘utter loathing’ for each 
other resulted in a ‘significant detriment’ to the children.”11  
Second, she contended that “the hearing justice overlooked or 
misconceived material evidence” by failing to “acknowledge or 
address the testimony of the school nurse, Christine McGrane.”12  
Third, she contended that “the hearing justice failed to properly 
apply the criteria set forth in the Dupré and Pettinato cases because 
there was no testimony about the children’s reasonable preferences 
with respect to the proposed relocation.”13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the issues on appeal, the court noted that “[i]t is 
a firmly established principle in family law that the paramount 
 
 6.  Id.  The final order was entered on July 22, 2015.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 1081 (quoting Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 258 (R.I. 2004) 
(alterations in original)).   
 8.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 9.  Id. at 1076. 
 10.  Id. at 1083. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. (citing Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 256 (R.I. 2004); Pettinato v. 
Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I. 1990)). 
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consideration in relocation cases is the best interests of the child or 
children.”14  The court explained that a “best interests of the child” 
determination is within the sound discretion of the trial justice.15  
Additionally, “[o]n review, th[e] Court will not disturb the findings 
of fact made by a justice of the Family Court with respect to the 
issue of custody and the best interests of the child[ren] unless the 
hearing justice abused his or her discretion in making such 
findings.”16  The court has “set forth several factors that the 
hearing justice must consider in determining the best interests of 
the child when confronted with a motion to relocate.”17  First, “the 
hearing justice must address the eight factors articulated in [the] 
Court’s opinion in Dupré,” keeping in mind that “[n]o single [Dupré] 
factor is dispositive.”18  Second, “the hearing justice must address 
such of the eight factors articulated in Pettinato [that] are relevant 
to the relocation issue.”19  Finally, the court “will affirm the Family 
 
 14.  Id. at 1081 (quoting DePrete v. DePrete, 44 A.3d 1260, 1271 (R.I. 
2012)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 15.  Id. (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 256). 
 16.  Id. (quoting DePrete, 44 A.3d at 1270). 
 17.  Id. at 1081–82. 
 18.  Id. at 1082 (quoting Valkown v. Frizzle, 973 A.2d 566, 577 (R.I. 2009)) 
(alterations in original).   
In our opinion in Dupré, we identified the following factors that are to 
be considered “whenever a parent seeks to move with his or her 
children:” (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration 
of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and 
with the non-relocating parent.  (2) The reasonable likelihood that the 
relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the child 
and the parent seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, 
economic and emotional benefits, and educational opportunities.  (3) 
The probable impact that the relocation will have on the child’s 
physical, educational, and emotional development.  Any special needs 
of the child should also be taken into account in considering this 
factor.  (4) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 
non-relocating parent and child through suitable visitation 
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances 
of the parties.  (5) The existence of extended family or other support 
systems available to the child in both locations.  (6) Each parent’s 
reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation.  (7) In cases of 
international relocation, the question of whether the country to which 
the child is to be relocated is a signatory to the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction will be an 
important consideration.  (8) To the extent that they may be relevant 
to a relocation inquiry, the Pettinato factors also will be significant. 
Id. at 1082 (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 257–59 (R.I. 2004)). 
 19.  Id. at 1082.   
Our earlier decision in Pettinato had set forth the following factors 
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Court’s ruling ‘unless the trial justice’s factual findings overlooked 
or misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong.’”20 
Regarding Lauren’s first argument, that the hearing justice 
accorded too much weight to John’s present appearance while 
according too little weight to his previous misdeeds, the court held 
that “[i]n [its] view, the hearing justice appropriately weighed the 
Dupré factors and the relevant Pettinato factors and then proceeded 
to render a well-reasoned decision, which properly took into account 
all of the material evidence presented at the hearing.”21  Looking 
at the first Dupré factor,22 the hearing justice found that John’s 
alcohol abuse caused the breakup of the marriage, but at the time 
of the hearing, John was a member of Alcoholics Anonymous and 
had been sober since November 2011.23  The hearing justice also 
found that “John ha[d] done everything that the [Family Court had] 
required to re-establish his relationship with the children after the 
separation,” and that “both parents were engaged in meaningful 
relationships with the children.”24  Similarly, the court was not 
persuaded by Lauren’s argument that the hearing justice 
improperly weighed the evidence or her argument regarding the 
potential economic benefits of relocation.25  The trial justice, 
analyzing the second and third Dupré factors, found that there was 
 
that are to be weighed in the best interests of the child analysis when 
relevant: (1) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents regarding the 
child’s custody.  (2) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court 
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and 
experience to express a preference.  (3) The interaction and 
interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent or parents, the 
child’s siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the 
child’s best interest.  (4) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, 
school, and community.  (5) The mental and physical health of all 
individuals involved.  (6) The stability of the child’s home 
environment.  (7) The moral fitness of the child’s parents.  (8) The 
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate a close and 
continuous parent-child relationship between the child and the other 
parent. 
Id. at 1082–83 (quoting Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913–14 (R.I. 1990)). 
 20.  Id. at 1081 (quoting McDonough v. McDonough, 962 A.2d 47, 52 (R.I. 
2009)). 
 21.  Id. at 1083. 
 22.  The first Dupré factor is “the nature, quality, extent of involvement, 
and duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate 
and with the non-relocating parent.”  Dupré, 857 A.2d at 257. 
 23.  Ainsworth, 186 A.3d at 1084. 
 24.  Id. at 1083–84 (alterations in original). 
 25.  Id.  
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“no doubt that relocation would . . . serve to enhance the economic 
standing and well-being of the mother,” which would also positively 
impact her children.26  However, the hearing justice also noted that 
the children were “bonded to Rhode Island” because they had spent 
their entire lives in Rhode Island, attended school there, and were 
involved in the community.27  Thus, the court found that the trial 
justice properly weighed the evidence concerning the economic 
benefits of relocation.28 
Additionally, the court ruled that the hearing justice properly 
considered the impact of the parties’ “utter loathing” for each other 
on the children and found that relocating, although economically 
beneficial to Lauren and the children, would go against the best 
interests of the children because it was questionable whether the 
parties were actually capable of arranging international visitation 
on a regular basis.29  When considering all of the aforementioned 
factors, the hearing justice found that “the petition for relocation to 
Australia should be denied,” and because “[the Court] shall not 
substitute [its] view of the evidence for [that of the trial justice] 
even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached,” the 
court perceived no reversible error in the conclusions reached by 
the hearing justice.30 
Regarding Lauren’s second argument, that the hearing justice 
overlooked or misconceived material evidence by failing to consider 
the testimony of the school nurse and by failing to consider the 
parties’ relationship with each other, the court stated that “[i]t is 
well established that a hearing justice ‘need not engage in an 
exhaustive review and analysis of all of the evidence and testimony 
presented at trial’ so long as he or she ‘make[s] reference to such 
facts disclosed by the testimony as have motivated his or her 
conclusion.’”31  Although the hearing justice did not mention the 
school nurse by name, “his decision did refer to the only salient 
 
 26.  Id. at 1084. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  The hearing justice did not think Lauren’s proposed visitation 
plan would be feasible because of the complexity inherent in such visitation, 
the high costs involved, the lack of wealth among the parties, the fact that 
Lauren and John only spoke via email, and the fact that Lauren did not want 
anything to do with John.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 1084–85. 
 31.  Id. at 1085 (quoting Bitgood v. Greene, 108 A.3d 1023, 1028 (R.I. 
2015)). 
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aspect of her brief testimony,” which was that “Lauren ha[d] 
historically suffered from financial hardships.”32  The record 
reflected that the hearing justice properly considered this factor 
when determining whether relocation would be in the best interests 
of the children.33  Accordingly, the court found no reversible error 
in the hearing justice’s ruling.34 
Finally, regarding Lauren’s third argument, that the hearing 
justice abused his discretion by failing to hear testimony about the 
children’s reasonable preferences regarding the proposed 
relocation, the court, again, found no error.35  Although the second 
Pettinato factor provides that the hearing justice must consider the 
reasonable preference of the child if the child is competent to claim 
a preference, neither party submitted evidence of the children’s 
preferences and the guardian ad litem was unable to adequately 
represent the children’s interests.36  The failure to submit evidence 
of the children’s preference did not impose an obligation on the 
hearing justice to act sua sponte to seek additional evidence, such 
as the children’s testimony, and it was the hearing justice’s “duty 
to decide Lauren’s motion to relocate even in the absence of 
evidence of the children’s preferences, and he proceeded to do just 
that.”37  Accordingly, the court found no error in the hearing 
justice’s assessment of the evidence with respect to the proposed 
relocation.38 
COMMENTARY 
The court correctly affirmed the hearing justice’s decision to 
deny Lauren’s motion to relocate after carefully analyzing and 
weighing the Dupré and Pettinato factors against the evidence.  
After considering all of the factors, the hearing justice found that 
Lauren’s proposed way to preserve the relationship between John 
and their children was just not feasible when considering the 
logistics of visiting arrangements and the financial circumstances 
 
 32.  Id.  “Specifically, he found that, at the time of the relocation hearing, 
Lauren was unemployed, ‘surviving on food stamps and the generosity of 
friends and church members,’ and that she was ‘in the process of having her 
home foreclosed.’”  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 1085–86. 
 37.  Id. at 1086. 
 38.  Id. 
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of the parties.39  The factors indicated that Lauren would not 
attempt to actively foster a close and continuous relationship 
between the children and their father.40  Because the 
determination of what is in the best interests of the children is 
appropriately placed in the sound discretion of the trial justice, and 
because the court will affirm the Family Court’s ruling unless the 
trial justice’s factual findings overlooked material evidence or was 
clearly wrong, which in this case it was not, the court affirmed the 
order of the Family Court, denying Lauren’s motion to relocate her 
children to Australia. 
The court affords a deferential standard of review to a trial 
justice’s determination of what is in the best interests of the 
children, stating that the decision is “appropriately placed in the 
sound discretion of the trial justice.”41  Although Lauren provided 
some compelling reasons for why relocation would be beneficial, 
such as the economic benefits to Lauren and her children, the 
benefits were clearly outweighed by the harm that would have 
resulted from relocation, including the possibility that the children 
would not see their father again if they left Rhode Island.42 
Lauren might have been able to persuade the hearing justice 
to grant her motion to relocate if she had showed that her 
relationship with John would have remained intact after relocation.  
However, Lauren did not show any consideration for the effect that 
relocation would have had on John, or how he would reasonably be 
able to visit his children, other than the proposed visitation 
schedule, which provided that John would see his children for ten 
weeks out of the year and that he was “welcome to visit the children 
in Australia whenever he liked.”43  Because she failed to show that 
relocation would not impose a substantial burden on John and his 
relationship with the children, the only reasonable conclusion was 
that relocation was not in the best interests of the children and, 
thus, the court correctly affirmed the trial justice’s denial of 
 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1081. 
 42.  Id. at 1081, 1084. 
 43.  Id. at 1078–79.  Although welcoming John to come to Australia to visit 
the children “whenever he liked” seems like it would help John’s relationship 
with the children remain intact, the fact that both Lauren and John are not 
wealthy and instead have relied on receiving various forms of assistance from 
the community over the course of several years makes it highly unlikely that 
a visit to Australia would ever actually happen.  Id. at 1081. 
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Lauren’s motion to relocate. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined 
that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying 
Lauren’s motion to relocate her children to Australia.  The court 
noted that, generally, it will not reverse the Family Court’s findings 
of fact unless the trial justice overlooked material evidence or was 
clearly wrong.  The court determined that the trial justice did not 
overlook material evidence and was not clearly wrong.  Therefore, 
the Family Court’s judgment was affirmed. 
Connor Criswell 
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Family Law.  Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711 (R.I. 2018).  The 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that assets that either party 
gains during a marriage are marital property and, therefore, are 
subject to equitable distribution in the event of a divorce. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Plaintiff, Simeng Wu-Carter, and the Defendant, Thomas 
Carter, met through an online dating service.1  After several 
months of dating, Simeng and Thomas decided to get married on 
October 20, 2012 on Cape Cod.2  Unbeknownst to Simeng, Thomas 
had not yet finalized his divorce from his third wife.3  This was 
problematic for two reasons: first, Simeng’s visa was to expire in 
February 2013 (which threatened her legal status in the United 
States) and, second, Simeng had already “made travel 
arrangements for her parents to travel from China for the 
[wedding].”4  As a result, Simeng and Thomas decided to have the 
planned wedding ceremony, although their marriage would not be 
legal.5 
Simeng and Thomas were officially married on October 7, 2013 
and, by the time she submitted her green card application that 
December, Simeng and Thomas were legally married.6  In order for 
Simeng to obtain a green card, it was required that she be legally 
married to an American citizen.7  However, a second requirement 
stood in the way of Simeng’s ability to obtain her green card: 
Thomas’s income was not “125 percent above the poverty line . . . to 
show that he could support [Simeng] financially.”8  Because 
 
 1.  Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 713 (R.I. 2018).  The parties are 
referred to by their first names, as the court did in its Opinion, to avoid 
confusion. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 714. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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Thomas was unable to prove that he could financially support his 
new wife, Simeng asked her parents to help by “wire-transfer[ring] 
$100,000 to her so that she could effectuate Thomas’s qualifying as 
her sponsor.”9  After adding Simeng’s name to his Bank of America 
account, the funds were transferred, and Thomas could now 
demonstrate, via a bank statement, that he had legally sufficient 
funds to sponsor Simeng.10 
Upon approval of her green card application in April 2014, 
Simeng “began working and immediately opened checking and 
savings accounts with Bank of America in her own name, into which 
she deposited her paychecks.”11  She transferred $38,000 of the 
original $100,000 wire-transferred funds into her personal checking 
and savings accounts and then, with Thomas’s knowledge, “wired 
the remaining $62,000 back to her parents’ Bank of China 
account.”12 
In spring of 2014, the couple’s relationship began to decline.13  
Simeng and Thomas lived in separate parts of Thomas’s house, and 
they kept their finances completely separate, except for times when 
“[Simeng] would give Thomas money if he had run out of funds, 
because he did not have a stable job.”14 
In December 2015, Simeng ultimately filed for divorce in Rhode 
Island Family Court “citing irreconcilable differences . . . that had 
caused the irremediable breakdown of their marriage.”15  Thomas 
counterclaimed for the same reasons.16  Thomas testified that 
Simeng would “have violent outbursts . . . and alleged that Simeng 
demanded he choose between her and his children.”17  Simeng, on 
the other hand, testified that Thomas physically assaulted her and 
that he was an angry and jealous man.18 
In issuing her bench decision, the trial justice first determined 
the relevant dates, including the legal marriage date, October 7, 
2013, and the date Simeng and Thomas separated, November 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 715. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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2015.19  The trial justice wanted to clarify these relevant dates to 
“determine the marital estate.”20  “The ‘most significant’ asset in 
dispute was the $100,000 that Simeng’s parents had wire-
transferred into Thomas’s and her joint Bank of America account 
during the marriage.”21  The trial justice traced the money from the 
wire-transfer to the couple, to when the couple transferred it into a 
money-market account, to when Simeng transferred $38,000 of it 
into her own accounts, and finally to when she wire-transferred the 
remaining $62,000 back to her parents.22  The trial justice 
determined that the money was a loan to Simeng from her parents 
and not a wedding gift, as Thomas had asserted.23  “[T]he trial 
justice concluded that ‘at all times . . . the $100,000 gift to [Simeng] 
[for immigration purposes] during the marriage [was] never 
intended to be [a] joint gift . . . nor at any point during the marriage 
did [Simeng] transmute these assets to become marital.’”24  The 
trial justice awarded Simeng her personal bank accounts and 
awarded Thomas the joint bank accounts that remained.25  Finally, 
the trial justice found that two boats, valued at $3,000, were the 
only marital assets subject to equitable distribution and ultimately 
awarded them to Thomas because Simeng made no claim to the 
boats.26 
Thomas appealed the trial justice’s decision, arguing that she 
misinterpreted the marital assets, did not use the factors of 
equitable distribution under Rhode Island General Laws section 15-
5-16.1, and did not consider his claim to be entitled to an award of 
counsel fees.27 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews divorce actions with 
deference, however, “[n]otwithstanding such deference, when th[e] 
Court reviews questions of law in an appeal from Family Court, [it] 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 716. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 716–17. 
 27.  Id. at 718. 
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must apply a de novo review.”28  Additionally, when the equitable 
distribution of assets is contested, the “[C]ourt will not disturb the 
trial justice’s findings where he or she has scrupulously considered 
all of the elements set forth in [Rhode Island General Laws section 
15-5-16.1],” entitled “Assignment of property.”29  The court noted 
that “equitable distribution is a three-step process”30 and that it 
would defer to the trial justice’s findings regarding the equitable 
distribution of Simeng and Thomas’s marital assets unless “the 
trial justice overlook[ed] salient uncontradicted evidence in 
determining the amount of assets to be distributed.”31 
Here, the court found that Simeng and Thomas had previously 
agreed to a fifty percent division of marital assets32 and, because of 
this stipulation, held that the trial justice properly awarded 
Thomas the two boats valued at $3,000, which she found to be the 
only marital assets between Simeng and Thomas.33  The court 
made this determination after reviewing other assets, including the 
2008 BMW Simeng purchased with money gifted from her parents, 
which she subsequently registered under her name before she 
married Thomas.34  The court found this was “not marital property 
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.”35  The court then 
used the doctrine of transmutation36 to discuss the parties’ intent 
 
 28.  Id. at 717. 
 29.  Id. (alteration in original).  See 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1956).  
This statute contains ten factors that determine the assignment of property 
upon divorce in the state of Rhode Island.  Id.  Several relevant factors include: 
“[t]he length of marriage”; “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage”; 
“[t]he amount of sources of income of each of the parties”; and “[t]he occupation 
and employability of each of the parties.”  Id. 
 30.  Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 718.  The three-step process requires the trial 
justice to determine the marital and nonmarital property, consider the factors 
listed within section 15-5-16.1(a), and then distribute the marital property.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.1(b) describes three 
categories of property exempt from marital asset classification: (1) “property 
held by the party prior to marriage”; (2) “property or an interest in property 
which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance before, during, 
or after the marriage”; and (3) “property or an interest in property which has 
been transferred to one of the parties by gift from a third party before, during, 
or after the marriage.”  § 15-5-16.1(b). 
 34.  Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 719. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 1142–43 (R.I. 2002).  
The doctrine of transmutation dictates that “property can be converted from 
nonmarital property into marital property if changed in form and put into joint 
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regarding the $100,000 gift from Simeng’s parents and whether it 
was to be considered marital property because it was deposited into 
a Bank of America account in both Simeng’s and Thomas’s names.37  
The court held that the trial justice correctly found, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the doctrine of transmutation did not 
apply to the $100,000 because “there was no intent for [the money] 
to be a marital asset.”38 
The court found that the trial justice erred in determining the 
classification of the remaining funds from Simeng’s income totaling 
$19,500.39  The court noted that, “in accordance with the 
partnership theory of marriage, assets that one spouse acquires 
while married are subject to equitable distribution upon divorce” 
unless specifically excluded by section 15-5-6.1.40  Thus, the court 
found the $19,500 in Simeng’s individual bank account to be a 
marital asset that should have been distributed according to the 
parties’ agreed upon fifty percent division of the marital assets.41  
This fifty percent stipulation applied to the money within the joint 
bank accounts, as well.42 
Finally, the court deferred to the trial justice’s decision that 
Thomas was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.43  It held 
that the trial justice correctly applied the factors in section 15-5-
16.1 and also noted that Thomas incurred avoidable legal expenses 
by “unnecessar[ily] delay[ing] the case for nearly a year,” plus he 
had no expenses because he lived in his mother’s house, rent-free.44 
COMMENTARY 
The court relied upon section 15-5-16.1 when it held that the 
remaining funds ($19,500) in Simeng’s individual bank accounts 
were part of the marital estate.45  Moreover, the court relied on its 
holding in D’Agostino v. D’Agostino when applying section 15-5-16.1 
 
names.”  Id. (quoting Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1132 (R.I. 1989)). 
 37.  Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 721. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 722. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 723.  Thomas’s claim pursuant to section 15-5-16(b) indicated 
“the Family Court has the authority to order one spouse to pay the counsel fees 
of the other spouse.”  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 723 n.10. 
 45.  See id. at 722. 
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to show that assets acquired during marriage are subject to 
equitable distribution upon divorce unless those assets are 
specifically excluded by section 15-5-16.1(b).46  In this case, Simeng 
and Thomas agreed to an equal split of the marital assets, but that 
is not the case in all divorce actions.47 
The court’s opinion seems to suggest that, regardless of a 
party’s intent with respect to his or her acquired assets throughout 
the marriage, unless the asset is excluded by section 15-5-16.1, the 
asset will be subject to equitable distribution in the event of a 
divorce.48  This conclusion stems mainly from the doctrine of 
transmutation in that property can change from a nonmarital 
classification to a marital classification when the parties show an 
“actual intention objectively manifested.”49  This decision turned 
away from the trial justice’s conclusion that the bank accounts 
“were technically marital assets, [and] the money held in those 
accounts was meant to remain nonmarital property.”50  The trial 
justice made this conclusion because Simeng and Thomas kept 
their finances separate by maintaining separate bank accounts and 
paying bills separately, thus “evincing a clear intent to keep the 
accounts separate and distinguished.”51  The court clarified its 
application of the doctrine of transmutation here by explaining that 
the intent of the parties can change the classification from 
nonmarital to marital, but the parties’ intent to keep property 
separate, which was acquired during the marriage, has no bearing 
on its ultimate classification.52  To put it simply, a party’s intent 
cannot change the property’s classification from marital to 
 
 46.  Id. 
It is true that property that one spouse alone receives from a third 
party via gift or inheritance during the marriage, unless somehow 
transmuted, is properly classified as nonmarital property under § 15-
5-16.1(b). Otherwise, in accordance with the partnership theory of 
marriage, assets that one spouse acquires while married are subject 
to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
Id.  (quoting D’Agostino v. D’Agostino, 463 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1983)). 
 47.  Id. at 722; see Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d at 1138, 1143 (R.I. 
2002) (holding that marital assets are to be divided equitably, though not 
necessarily equally). 
 48.  See Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 722. 
 49.  Id. at 721. 
 50.  Id. at 722 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 721. 
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nonmarital.53 
The court primarily focused on the $19,500 in Simeng’s bank 
account because of the fifty percent stipulation of marital assets the 
couple had previously agreed upon.54  It is unclear whether Thomas 
would be entitled to any of Simeng’s earnings had they not already 
stipulated to an even split of marital assets.  This particular divorce 
proceeding seemed to be a unique and delicate situation because 
the couple knew each other only for several months before getting 
married and, as a result of the marriage, Simeng was able to receive 
her green card for citizenship.55  Based upon these unusual facts, 
it would make sense for the court to defer to the trial justice’s 
conclusion that Simeng was entitled to the full amount because the 
marriage did not last long enough for Simeng and Thomas to hold 
themselves out as a married couple.56  Perhaps the trial justice felt 
some sympathy for Simeng (as she was a non-citizen and the fourth 
wife of Thomas) but, ultimately, the court determined that the trial 
justice misapplied the law. 
Finally, it seems inconsistent that the court accounted for the 
parties’ intent to never make the $100,000 wire-transfer marital 
property while, at the same time, the court found that Simeng’s 
personal bank accounts into which she deposited her paychecks was 
marital property, although she never intended it to be.57  The court 
determined that intent was only material to a marital property case 
when determining if property had transmuted into marital 
property by operation of law.58  The distinguishing component here 
was that the $100,000 was a gift to Simeng alone, albeit during the 
marriage, whereas the money Simeng earned during the marriage 
was classified as marital property “in accordance with the 
partnership theory of marriage” and not excluded specifically by 
section 15-5-16.1(b).59 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme court held that assets acquired 
during marriage, and not excluded by section 15-5-16.1(b), are 
 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See id. at 718. 
 55.  See id. at 713–14. 
 56.  See id. at 716. 
 57.  See id. at 720–21. 
 58.  Id. at 721. 
 59.  See id. at 722; see also 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(b). 
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subject to equitable distribution in the event of a divorce.60  Here, 
the court mainly focused on the trial justice’s finding that the 
income was “technically [a] marital asset” but was not part of the 
marital property because the couple intended to keep their finances 
separate.61  The court found the trial justice’s holding erroneous 
and reiterated that a party’s intent does not have any effect on an 
asset’s classification. 
Rebecca Rochelle 
 
 60.  See Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d. at 721–22. 
 61.  Id. at 722. 
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Family Law.  Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497 (R.I. 2018).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court reviews questions of law that are presented 
in an appeal from the Family Court de novo.1  The required 
showings for a common law marriage are “that (1) the parties had 
the capacity to marry; (2) the parties seriously intended to enter 
into a mutual husband-wife relationship; and (3) the parties’ 
conduct was of such a character as to lead to a belief in the 
community that they were married.”2  Further, to establish a 
common-law marriage, the clear and convincing standard of proof 
is applied.3 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May of 2013, the relationship between Angela Luis, the 
Plaintiff, and Kevin Gaugler, the Defendant, “imploded.”4  Prior to 
this incident, the two had lived together with the Plaintiff’s son, 
Zach, since they began dating in 1990.5  After seeing the Defendant 
kiss another woman, the Plaintiff kicked him out of their home and, 
on July 9, 2013, she filed a complaint for divorce.6  In her complaint, 
the Plaintiff asserted that she and the Defendant were married at 
common law since September 6, 1995.7  A month after she filed the 
complaint, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, “asserting that he and [the Plaintiff] 
were never married.”8  The trial justice reserved her ruling on the 
Defendant’s motion, and “the trial began on January 29, 2014.”9  
The trial lasted eleven days, “during which numerous witnesses 
 
 1.  Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497, 502 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.  Id. at 503 (citing Zharkova v. Gaudreau 45 A.3d 1282, 1290–91 (R.I. 
1982)). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 498. 
 5.  Id. at 499. 
 6.  Id. at 498. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 498–99. 
 9.  Id. at 499. 
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testified,” including the Plaintiff and the Defendant.10 
During her testimony, the Plaintiff described her relationship 
with the Defendant, along with her relationship to his family 
members and the relationship between him and her son.11  The two 
lived together for over twenty years and, according to the Plaintiff, 
had “agreed to commit as husband and wife out in public.”12  Her 
son referred to the Defendant as “dad” and had a close relationship 
with him.13  The Defendant’s family referred to her as “‘daughter-
in-law’ or ‘sister-in-law.’”14  The Defendant introduced the Plaintiff 
as his wife at youth football, and she introduced him as her husband 
at her son’s school.15   
Although the two lived in a shared home, only the Defendant’s 
name appeared on the deed and the mortgage.16  “He paid the 
mortgage, taxes, insurance and utilities, while she paid for the 
groceries and [her son’s] expenses.”17  The two briefly shared a bank 
account between 1995 and 1998, but had not used the account 
since.18  The Plaintiff stated that, in 1998, the Defendant began 
providing health insurance for her and her son and that the form 
referred to her as his common law spouse.19  The Defendant also 
“named [the Plaintiff] as the sole beneficiary and heir in his will, 
and in 2003, the sole beneficiary on his life insurance plan” but “did 
not name her as his wife.”20  She was also the primary beneficiary 
of his 401(k) plan, but was listed as his “fiancée.”21  The two never 
filed joint tax returns and when the Plaintiff filed her taxes she 
“always filed as ‘single’ or ‘head of household.’”22  The Plaintiff also 
testified that when filling out a FAFSA form for her son’s college 
tuition, she listed herself as single.23 
In his testimony, the Defendant reiterated much of what the 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 500. 
 19.  Id. at 499–500. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 500. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
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Plaintiff said, but deviated from her testimony on a few facts.24  “He 
[ ] testified that he gave [the Plaintiff] an engagement ring and 
asked her to marry him, and that she agreed.”25  The Defendant 
also bought a ring for himself and wore it on and off until the couple 
split up.26  Despite these gestures, the Defendant stated that “he 
did not consent to be [the Plaintiff’s] husband” and that he “never 
referred to her as his wife.”27  He also stated “while he did plan to 
marry [her] at some point in the future, he never considered himself 
to be married to her.”28 
Eleven other witnesses also testified as to their perception of 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s relationship.29  Nine of those 
witnesses stated that they believed the couple to be married, 
crediting that belief to an introduction or a reference in which one 
of the two described the other as “wife” or “husband.”30  The other 
three witnesses said that they did not believe the couple to be 
married because of statements made by the Defendant in which he 
plainly said that the Plaintiff was not his wife, or because he never 
mentioned her at all.31 
Relying on the testimony, “the trial justice found by clear and 
convincing evidence” that the Plaintiff and the Defendant “were 
married at common law since September 1995, concluding that [the 
Defendant’s] testimony was not credible and that the [Plaintiff’s] 
was mostly credible.”32  The Defendant filed a timely appeal to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the trial justice had 
misconceived the evidence.33 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the Family Court order, the court sought to 
determine whether the Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that she was married to the Defendant at common law.34  
Though it did note that the common law doctrine is “arguably 
 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 501–02. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 502. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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outmoded,” the court first defined common law marriage as “a 
marriage which does not depend for its validity upon any religious 
or civil ceremony but is created by the consent of the parties as any 
other contract.”35  Conducting a de novo review, the court examined 
the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to 
determine whether it satisfied each of the following categories of 
common law marriage: “that (1) the parties had the capacity to 
marry; (2) the parties seriously intended to enter into a mutual 
husband-wife relationship; and (3) the parties’ conduct was of such 
a character as to lead to a belief in the community that they were 
married.”36 
When addressing the first qualification, the capacity to marry, 
the court quickly deemed this prong satisfied because neither party 
contested their capacity to marry.37  Turning to the second prong, 
the court noted “the parties must mutually and presently intend to 
be husband and wife rather than merely become engaged to be 
husband and wife at some point in the future.”38  In its analysis, 
the court distinguished this case from Fravala v. City of Cranston, 
where it determined that the couple was married at common law.39  
The court highlighted that the couple in Fravala “pooled their 
finances, owned joint shares in a credit union, and were joint 
borrowers on a loan.”40  The court also pointed to Zharkova v. 
Gaudreau, where there was no clear and convincing evidence of a 
common law marriage despite having “jointly-filed taxes, on which 
they identified themselves as being married, and a property deed 
referring to them as ‘husband and wife as tenants in the 
entirety.’”41  In Zharkova, the court “upheld the trial justice’s 
decision, because he believed the defendant’s testimony that the 
couple filed their tax return as ‘married’ in the interest of the 
economy alone.”42  The court declined to address the third 
 
 35.  Id. at 502–03 (quoting OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND 
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1922)). 
 36.  Id. at 503 (citing Zharkova v. Gaudreau 45 A.3d 1282, 1290–91 (R.I. 
1982)). 
 37.  Id. at 503–04. 
 38.  Id. at 505 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 966 A.2d 109, 114 (R.I. 2009)) 
(emphasis in original). 
 39.  Id. at 504 (citing Fravala v. City of Cranston, ex rel. Baron, 996 A.2d 
696, 706 (R.I. 2010)). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
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qualification.43 
In this case, the court found the evidence presented to be 
conflicting “at best.”44  Despite the Plaintiff’s claim that the couple 
was married, she continued to list herself to be “‘single’ or ‘head of 
household’ under penalty of perjury, on her tax forms.”45  
Additionally, the Defendant labeled her as his “fiancée” on his 
401(k) plan and in his will.46  In light of these details, the court 
found that the evidence “strongly weighed against any serious 
intent to be husband and wife.”47  Upon reviewing the trial justice’s 
findings, the court found that the Plaintiff and the Defendant only 
“labeled themselves as married” when it was beneficial to them.48  
The trial justice determined that the couple had “‘cherry picked’ 
where, when and how they would portray themselves as married, 
single or other.”49  The court agreed with the trial justice on this 
point, but came to a different conclusion, determining that the 
sporadic representation of their relationship was not enough to 
express a serious intent to be husband and wife and, therefore, their 
relationship did not meet the “clear and convincing standard of 
proof.”50  The court held that “the trial justice’s factual findings 
[did] not represent ‘a firm belief or conviction’” that the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant “intended to enter into a mutual husband and 
wife relationship” and that the trial justice misconceived the 
evidence.51  Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the 
Family Court and remanded the case.52 
COMMENTARY 
The court clearly established that inconsistent evidence of a 
common law marriage is insufficient to meet the heightened 
standard of proof.53  The court also made clear that it will not 
tolerate a couple’s clear intent to gain an advantage by selectively 
 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 504–05. 
 48.  Id. at 505. 
 49.  Id. at 506. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 505. 
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deciding when they are married or not.54  From the outset of its 
Opinion, the court made its attitude about common law marriage 
known, as it subtly nudged the General Assembly to consider the 
“modern fluidity of family units . . . to determine [the] doctrine’s 
place in Rhode Island jurisprudence.”55  A wide range of factors 
makes each personal relationship unique, now more than ever.  
This, in turn, makes the court’s job of distinguishing which 
relationships reach the point to warrant recognition of marriage at 
common law exceedingly difficult.  While the majority opinion was 
not persuaded that the trial justice’s conclusion amounted to clear 
and convincing evidence, in his dissent, Justice Robinson found that 
the findings “more than sufficiently consitut[ed] a basis for [the 
trial justice’s] finding that there was clear and convincing 
evidence.”56  Justice Robinson emphasized the deference that the 
court owed to those findings and all but scolded his colleagues for 
second-guessing the trial justice.57  He stated that the trial justice 
conducted “meticulous and voluminous fact-finding” and made a 
conscientious effort in determining the witnesses’ credibility, which 
were “the product of what she observed from her front row seat . . . 
.”58  Because the court did not personally observe the testimony, 
Justice Robinson was highly critical of the deviation from the trial 
justice’s ruling.59  However, the majority opinion in this case 
grounded its ruling in strict comparisons of fact from previous cases 
dealing with the issue of common law marriage.60  The issue at 
hand is complex by nature and is far from black and white.  Because 
of the complexity of common law marriage, it is vital that the court 
apply a strict standard of clear and convincing evidence and 
demonstrate consistency in an already grey area of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The court held that an inconsistent showing of serious intent 
to enter into a husband and wife relationship is not adequate to 
qualify as common law marriage.  Giving the trial justice’s factual 
findings due deference, the court was not persuaded that “her 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 503. 
 56.  Id. at 507 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 57.  Id. at 509. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 504–06 (majority opinion). 
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findings amount[ed] to ‘clear and convincing’ evidence.”61  The 
court came to this conclusion by meticulously analyzing the facts of 
the case against previous cases regarding common law marriage. 
Zoë M. Sperber 
 
 
 
 
 61.  Id. 
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.  Millette v. State, 183 A.3d 
1124 (R.I. 2018).  A defendant is not entitled to relief from his 
conviction by application of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel 
rule when his attorney is not licensed to practice law in Rhode 
Island but is so licensed in another state.  A defendant may be 
entitled to such relief when he is represented by a layperson or one 
who is not a licensed attorney in any state. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Sometime between 2002 and 2003, Kevin Millette obtained 
representation in a real estate transaction from a Massachusetts 
based law firm.1  The law firm represented Millette again in 2004, 
this time in defense to claims of “obtaining money under false 
pretenses.”2  Millette hired the law firm for a third time in 2012 
after being arrested in January of that year; this ended his three-
year evasion of an arrest warrant issued in 2009 when he failed to 
appear in court after being charged with “obtaining money from 
[the victim] under false pretenses with the intent to cheat or 
defraud [the victim] and intentionally appropriating [the victim’s] 
money.”3  After his arrest in 2012, Millette was charged with nearly 
identical con-man type allegations with respect to a second victim.4 
Before his arraignment on these charges, Millette met with an 
associate from the firm who would handle the arraignment in 
Rhode Island, while a partner at the firm—who was not licensed to 
practice law in Rhode Island at that time—was in Massachusetts 
 
 1.   Millette v. State, 183 A.3d 1124, 1127 (R.I. 2018). 
 2.   Id. 
 3.   Id. at 1126.  See Tim White, Prolific RI Con Artist Looking to Toss 
Rekindled Charges, WPRI EYEWITNESS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016), 
https://www.wpri.com/news/local-news/blackstone-valley/prolific-r-i-con-
artist-looking-to-toss-rekindled-charges/1044521914.  An investigation in 2011 
revealed that Millette was living “on the run for years . . . in New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Florida” and was ultimately located in New Jersey, 
assuming the alias Howard Ethan.  Id. 
 4.   Millette, 183 A.3d at 1126. 
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for an unrelated case.5  The day before his arraignment, Millette 
met with both the partner and the associate, at which point the 
partner advised him to take a plea deal that was ultimately agreed 
upon after continuing negotiations between the associate and the 
State.6  Accordingly, on July 31, 2012, accompanied by the 
associate, Millette pled nolo contendere to intentionally 
appropriating the money and property of his victims.7  Notably, he 
did so after confirming to the trial justice that “he had signed the 
plea affidavits . . . [that] he had read them and understood them . . . 
[that] he had the opportunity to discuss them with [the associate] 
before signing them . . . [and] that he was giving up various rights 
by entering his pleas.”8  The trial justice sentenced Millette to serve 
at least twelve years in prison with probation upon release.9 
On December 16, 2013, Millette appealed his conviction, filing 
a pro se application for post-conviction relief in the Superior Court 
of Rhode Island.10  Millette asserted that his conviction should be 
overturned because the partner, whom Millette referred to as “his 
lawyer,” was not licensed to practice law in Rhode Island at the time 
of his nolo contendere  pleas.11  Millette alleged that the partner’s 
inability to practice in Rhode Island amounted to per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel, despite the fact that the partner was not 
present at the 2012 arraignment.12  On August 3, 2015, the trial 
justice held a hearing on Millette’s application for post-conviction 
relief, in which the facts outlined above were painstakingly elicited 
from Millette and the associate and presented to, as fate would have 
it, the same justice who heard Millette’s 2012 nolo contendere 
pleas.13 
At the 2015 hearing, the associate testified that he knew the 
partner was not licensed in Rhode Island, but Millette “knew [the 
associate] was the Rhode Island attorney” for the Massachusetts-
 
 5.   Id. at 1127. 
 6.   Id. 
 7.   Id. at 1126. 
 8.   Id.  “The trial justice was satisfied that Millette entered his nolo 
contendere pleas ‘knowingly and voluntarily with a full understanding of the 
nature and consequences of his plea and corresponding waiver of his 
constitutional rights.’”  Id. 
 9.   Id. 
 10.   Id. at 1127. 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id. at 1128. 
 13.   Id. at 1127. 
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based firm.14  Millette’s testimony further established that, not 
only did the associate appear in court with Millette on the day of 
his nolo contendere plea and advise him about the State’s offer, but 
the associate also informed Millette of the rights he was waiving in 
his plea and signed as a witness to Millette’s plea form, which was 
entered into evidence.15  The trial justice determined that Millette’s 
nolo contendere pleas “were not invalidated” by the partner’s 
inability to practice in Rhode Island and found that it was indeed 
the associate, not the partner, who represented Millette during the 
pleadings.16  The trial justice stated that there was “nothing 
whatsoever irregular about the proceedings” in question.17  
Accordingly, judgment was entered for the State and, on October 
23, 2015, Millette timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court.18 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In conducting a de novo review of the trial justice’s decision in 
Millette’s claim for post-conviction relief, the court made clear that 
it recognizes a strong presumption that an attorney performed 
within the accepted variation of professional advice and strategy 
when representing a client.19  In addition to his per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim,  Millette alleged that there was a 
conflict of interest inherent in his defense because, as he put it, 
“[the associate] . . . needed to dispose of these matters quickly and 
quietly in order to maintain the status quo and avoid” scrutiny of 
“[the partner]’s scheme and [the associate]’s cover up” of the 
partner’s unauthorized practice of law in Rhode Island.20 
The court began by explaining that the test ordinarily 
employed for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
need not be undertaken at all.21  The Strickland v. Washington 
 
 14.   Id. at 1127–28. 
 15.   Id. 
 16.   Id. at 1128. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Id. at 1129. 
 21.   Id.  “It is well established that, in this jurisdiction, ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims are assessed under the familiar two-pronged test 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).”  Id. (quoting Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 654 (R.I. 
2016)). 
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effectiveness of counsel test ordinarily requires the claimant to 
show that his or her legal representation was “constitutionally 
deficient,” and that he or she was so prejudiced by the performance 
that there existed a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome 
without the deficient representation.22  The court reasoned that 
such an analysis was unnecessary because Millette never alleged 
that his representation was deficient—constitutionally or 
otherwise—and, to the contrary, had actually conceded that there 
was “no question of competency here.”23 
The court explained that in the absence of an allegation of 
deficient representation, Millette was actually seeking application 
of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule which would apply, 
as alleged here, when a person is represented by an attorney (such 
as the partner) who is not licensed in Rhode Island.24  The court 
made clear, however, that such an application would be improper 
because, as discussed above, the trial justice determined that it was 
the associate, not the partner, who represented Millette at the time 
of his nolo contendere plea, and the associate was licensed in Rhode 
Island.25  Therefore, unless the trial justice was “clearly erroneous” 
in determining who actually represented Millette, the states in 
which the partner was licensed to practice law were irrelevant to 
the effectiveness of the associate as Millette’s counsel.26  As it 
happened, the court agreed with the assessment that the associate’s 
actions of appearing in court on behalf of Millette in 2012, 
negotiating with the State as to the terms of the plea deal, and 
discussing with Millette the rights he would be waiving all clearly 
indicate that it was indeed the associate who represented 
Millette.27 
Furthermore, the court noted that even if the partner had in 
fact been Millette’s attorney, his per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel argument still would not hold water.28  The court proceeded 
to outline the approach of several other jurisdictions, by which 
application of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule is 
limited to representation by a layperson or one who is not licensed 
 
 22.   Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Id. 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Id. 
 27.   Id. at 1129–30. 
 28.   Id. at 1130. 
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to the bar of any state.29  One case in particular from the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals helpfully explained that 
representation by an attorney who is licensed in another state is 
“not of a character that by itself requires relieving the defendant of 
an otherwise just conviction” and, thus, does not “requir[e] 
automatic vacating of the conviction.”30  The court stated that it 
was “guided by [this] . . . jurisprudence” in ultimately declining to 
apply a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule when counsel is 
not licensed in Rhode Island but is licensed in another state.31 
With respect to the alleged conflicts of interest, Millette 
claimed “a myriad of reasons” existed for which his conviction 
should be overturned.32  The court, however, considered these 
issues waived because they were not raised in 2015 at the trial level 
and also for lack of development.33  In the interest of due diligence, 
the court nonetheless continued, considering any distinction 
between Millette’s per se ineffective assistance of counsel argument 
and his argument that the partner’s “lack of licensure in Rhode 
Island” created a conflict of interest to be illusory.34  The court 
repeated that, although representation by an unlicensed attorney 
may concededly create a conflict of interest, Millette was in fact 
represented by the associate, to whom “this concern is 
inapplicable.”35  Millette’s additional assertion that the partner 
was conflicted by way of a personal relationship with one of 
Millette’s victims was likewise invalidated by this fact.36  Millette’s 
allegation that the associate also possessed a conflict of interest 
because he was somehow involved in a cover-up of the partner’s 
unauthorized practice of law was, according to the court, not 
supported by “any evidence demonstrating that the associate had 
an actual conflict of interest,” and was merely a conclusory 
assertion for which he had no proof.37  The court accordingly 
 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Id. at 1130–31 (quoting Commonwealth v. Melo, 851 N.E.2d 1124, 
1129 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)). 
 31.   Id. at 1131. 
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id. at 1132. 
 35.   Id. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id.  “Millette has utterly failed to present evidence that demonstrated 
that [the associate] . . . jeopardize[d] his own law license and reputation to 
protect [the partner].”  Id. 
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affirmed the matter on all issues, thus denying Millette’s attempt 
to overturn his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel or conflict of interest.38 
COMMENTARY 
The court declined to depart from the jurisprudence of other 
courts in its refusal to apply a per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel rule when a defendant is represented by an attorney who is 
licensed to practice law in at least one state.39  This was clearly the 
correct and prudent decision in this case.  Even the most cursory 
glance at the facts of the 2012 arraignment indicates that the 
associate represented Millette at the time of his nolo contendere 
plea, and was licensed to practice law in Rhode Island.40  As such, 
any assertion that Millette was entitled to per se relief on the 
grounds that he was not represented by an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Rhode Island is—at best—misplaced, and more 
likely amounts to a transparently frivolous use of the court’s 
attention. 
Indeed, Millette’s arguments appear to be entirely 
disingenuous.  The sum of his allegations relied entirely on the 
premise that Millette was represented by the partner during his 
arraignment, which he clearly was not.41  His one claim that was 
not dependent on such a premise—that the associate had a conflict 
of interest—was accompanied by Millette’s having “utterly failed to 
present” supporting evidence.42  To the extent that Millette was not 
already condemned by this very truth from the start, the court was 
courteous enough to doubly analyze each issue through the 
hypothetical lens of “even if” Millette had actually been represented 
by the partner.43  In that regard, the court seized its opportunity to 
make absolutely clear that only the completely unlicensed 
representation of a defendant is per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Rhode Island.44 
 
 38.   Id. 
 39.   See id. at 1131. 
 40.   Id. at 1129–30. 
 41.   See id. 
 42.   Id. at 1132. 
 43.   Id. at 1130. 
 44.   Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se 
rule of ineffective assistance of counsel when a defendant’s attorney 
is not licensed to practice law in Rhode Island but is licensed to 
practice in another state.  Such a per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel rule may apply where a defendant is represented by a 
person who is not licensed to practice law in any state.  The court 
affirmed that Millette was, in fact, represented by a duly licensed 
Rhode Island attorney and thereby reached its holding in spite of 
its inapplicability to the claimant before the court. 
James Kovach 
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Labor Law.  Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2018).  A 
firefighter who received accidental disability benefits pursuant to 
section 17-189(8)(a) of the Providence Code of Ordinances due to a 
work-related shoulder injury was not entitled to ongoing accidental 
benefits when the work-related injury was no longer the 
debilitating ailment preventing him from returning to work.1 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff John Sauro worked as a firefighter from 1991 until 
1998, when he injured his right shoulder during the course of his 
 
 1.  Section 17-189(8)(a) provides: 
Re-examination of members retired on account of disability: Once 
each year the director of personnel may require all pensioners to 
undergo a medical examination, by a physician or physicians engaged 
by the director of personnel. In accordance with this section, each 
pensioner shall annually provide certification from a physician of 
their disability. Should any such pensioner refuse to submit to such 
examination his or her pension shall be discontinued until his or her 
withdrawal of such refusal, and should his or her refusal continue for 
a year, all his or her rights in and to such pension shall be revoked by 
the retirement board. If the said examination indicates that the 
disability of the pensioner has been removed and said pensioner has 
attained the age of service retirement said pension will be converted 
to the normal retirement benefit as if he or she had not been disabled. 
If the examination indicates that the disability of the pensioner has 
been removed and said pensioner is under the age of service 
retirement, his or her name shall be placed on such appropriate lists 
of candidates as are prepared for appointment to a position in his 
department for which he is stated to be qualified in a salary grade 
comparable to that from which he or she was last retired. Upon 
reinstatement to active service at a salary grade comparable to that 
from which he or she was last retired, he or she shall be reinstated as 
a member and participate in the benefits of the retirement system 
with credit for service rendered prior to disability retirement, and for 
the period during which he received the disability retirement 
allowance, provided that he or she did not refuse to accept such 
reinstatement when it was first offered to him or her; in the event of 
such refusal, the pension shall be discontinued and any rights to 
further benefits under the retirement system shall be based solely on 
his or her service rendered prior to his or her disability retirement. 
PROVIDENCE, R.I. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189(8)(a) (1950). 
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employment.2  In 2000, the Retirement Board of the Employees 
Retirement System of the City of Providence (the Board) granted 
Plaintiff an “accidental disability pension” because his injury 
prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job.3 
The Board ordered Plaintiff to undergo an independent medical 
examination (IME) in 2011 after a local television program depicted 
Plaintiff lifting “substantial weights.”4  Plaintiff complied, and it 
was determined that his shoulder remained injured.5  In 2013, the 
Board ordered that Plaintiff submit to another IME.6  This time, 
however, Plaintiff refused on account of his alleged “bedridden” 
state.7  The City of Providence subsequently commissioned a 
private investigator to surveil Plaintiff, and the investigator 
observed Plaintiff performing ordinary errands, absent of any 
apparent limitation.8  The Board then voted to suspend Plaintiff’s 
disability pension.9 
Plaintiff filed an action in Rhode Island Superior Court on July 
8, 2014, seeking to overturn the Board’s decision.10  Plaintiff 
subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction to restore his 
disability pension.11  Plaintiff’s motion was denied, and, in light of 
this decision, Plaintiff agreed to undergo another IME, which 
resulted in the immediate reinstatement of his disability pension.12  
The examining physician opined that Plaintiff had no disability 
with regard to his right shoulder, but was disabled due to 
psychological and colorectal illnesses that were unrelated to work, 
yet rendered him unfit to serve as a firefighter.13 
In April 2015, the Board voted to discontinue Plaintiff’s 
disability pension, and the Board did not place Plaintiff on a “list 
for appointment to duty.”14  Neither Plaintiff nor his attorney 
 
 2.  Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297, 299 (R.I. 2018). 
 3.  Id.  The City of Providence and the Board are collectively referred to 
as “Defendants.” 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 300. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  The Board’s decision was “pursuant to medical documentation 
received by the [B]oard confirming that [Plaintiff was] no longer disabled as a 
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attended the proceeding, despite receiving notice.15 
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 13, 2015, in 
which he alleged that—pursuant to section 17-189(8)(a) of the 
pension ordinance—the city was required to provide Plaintiff with 
accidental disability pension benefits until his appointment to 
another position in the fire department.16  “Before the trial 
justice—in a remarkable turn of events—[P]laintiff argued that he 
had fully recovered from his shoulder injury and all other maladies, 
was no longer disabled, and was ready to return to work . . . .”17  
The trial justice granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 
and ordered Defendants to provide Plaintiff with all accidental 
disability benefits until the conclusion of a formal determination 
after a hearing “as to whether or not [Plaintiff] can, in fact, return 
to work.”18 
Defendants appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and 
argued that “§ 17-189(8)(a) does not provide for the situation in 
which a pensioner has recovered from the work-related injury but 
continues to suffer from non-work-related injuries that prevent him 
from returning to service” and, therefore, section 17-189(8)(a) did 
not require the Board to place Plaintiff on a list for a position in the 
fire department in light of the IME’s findings in 2013.19 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The narrow issue before the court was “whether § 17-189(8)(a) 
require[d] the [B]oard to place [P]laintiff on a waiting list to be 
reinstated with the Providence Fire Department, when [P]laintiff 
had demonstrated he [was] otherwise disabled and [could not] 
function as a firefighter.”20  The court answered in the negative.21 
The court began its analysis by noting that the same rules of 
construction that govern statutory interpretation apply when 
interpreting an ordinance.22  The court found section 17-189(8)(a) 
 
result of [his] July 17, 1998 job-related injury.”  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 300–01. 
 17.  Id. at 302. 
 18.  Id. at 303. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 303–04. 
 21.  Id. at 304. 
 22.  Id.  As such, the Court construes ordinances in accordance with the 
“plain and ordinary meaning,” of its text, so long as it is unambiguous.  In the 
event the Court renders an ordinance’s language “unclear and ambiguous,” it 
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“clear and unambiguous on its face,” in particular, the language 
that “a candidate must be ‘prepared for appointment’ and be ‘stated 
to be qualified’ for a position in the department from which he or 
she was last qualified.”23  Given that Plaintiff “vigorously” 
maintained his inability to return to work—alleging that he was 
bedridden and could not “withstand” a medical examination—the 
court found that, “based on his clearly established disability, 
[P]laintiff was neither prepared for appointment, nor was he 
qualified to resume service in the fire department.”24  The court 
plainly rejected the trial justice’s conclusion that there must be “a 
formal determination after a hearing as to whether or not [Plaintiff] 
can, in fact, return to work,” finding that the Board did conduct a 
hearing on this question, but Plaintiff “abandoned the arena” by 
electing not to attend.25 
The fact that Plaintiff later asserted that he was no longer 
disabled and was able to return to work was of no consequence to 
the court’s decision because he did not “reconcil[e] his current state 
of well-being with his own grievous assertions . . . a mere ten 
months earlier.”26  Though the court refused to entertain sua 
sponte whether or not Plaintiff was, in fact, fit to return to work, it 
found that the Board acted within its authority based on the 
“undisputed evidence” before it—that Plaintiff was unable to return 
to work with the fire department based on unrelated disabilities 
and that it would have been senseless for the Board to place a 
disabled firefighter “on a list for a position that he [was] unqualified 
to perform.”27 
Returning to the principles of statutory construction, the court 
concluded that, had it found otherwise, section 17-189(8)(a) would 
have required the city to “pay indefinite accidental disability 
pension benefits to a person who [was] no longer accidentally 
disabled,” which would have amounted to an “absurd result” in 
contravention of its objective: “to compensate work-injury-related 
disabilities and encourage qualified persons who are relieved of 
 
must consult the legislature’s intent in enacting the ordinance.  Notably, under 
no circumstances will the Court construe a statute in a way that produces an 
“absurd result.”  Id. 
 23.  Id. (quoting § 17-189(8)(a)). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 305. 
 27.  Id. at 305–06. 
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those disabilities to return to work.”28 
COMMENTARY 
In its decision, the court plainly reaffirmed longstanding 
principles of statutory construction.29  Having concluded that 
section 17-189(8)(a) was unambiguous on its face, the court soundly 
deferred to the judgment of the Board, who reasonably terminated 
Plaintiff’s accidental disability benefits once the accidental 
disability giving rise to such benefits was removed.30 
In contrast, the dissent would have decided this case principled 
on a narrow understanding of the rules of statutory construction, 
finding that the Board is only permitted to suspend Plaintiff’s 
disability benefits under two scenarios, both of which were not 
present in this case.31  “Clear and unambiguous” language does not, 
however, license a court to “blindly” construe a statute divorced 
from the facts of a particular case; a court’s construction must be 
premised on a forward-looking analysis that accounts for the 
realities of adjudication in light of the legislature’s purpose and 
intent for enacting the particular piece of legislation.32  As the 
dissent recognized, section 17-189(8)(a) “does not specifically set 
forth the responsibility of the [B]oard in a situation such as this.”33  
Neither the dissent nor Plaintiff contended that the legislature’s 
intent in enacting section 17-189-(8)(a) was to compensate non-
work-injury-related disabilities.  A decision that forces the Board to 
pay indefinite accidental disability pension benefits to Plaintiff, 
who is no longer accidentally disabled, would be an absurd result in 
light of the legislature’s clear intent to the contrary.34 
The dissent’s argument is flawed in another respect: it 
concluded that the case should be decided on a precise application 
of section 17-189(8)(a)’s “clear and unambiguous” language, yet, its 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See id. at 304. 
 30.  See id. at 304–05. 
 31.  See id. at 306–07 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  According to the dissent, 
the only two scenarios that empower the Board to suspend or revoke a 
pensioner’s disability benefits under section 17-189(8)(a) are: “one, when a 
pensioner refuses to undergo an IME; and, two, when a pensioner whose 
disability has been removed and who is under the age of service retirement 
refuses reinstatement.”  Id. at 307. 
 32.  See id. at 304 (majority opinion). 
 33.  See id. at 306 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 34.  Id. at 305–06 (majority opinion). 
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argument only supports the inference that the language is 
ambiguous.  Consider the dissent’s departure from the majority’s 
interpretation of the words “prepared” and “qualified,” as they 
appear in 17-189(8)(a): “First, I am of the firm opinion that the word 
‘prepared’ modifies the word ‘lists,’ not the word ‘candidates.’  The 
term ‘candidates’ is part of a prepositional phrase . . . that the term 
‘prepared’ modifies in its entirety . . . the word ‘qualified’ carries 
with it no connotation of physical readiness.”35  The dissent 
recognized that the interpretation of these two words were the 
“fulcrum of the majority’s interpretation.”36  While the dissent 
opined that section 17-189(8)(a) is unambiguous, the fact that a 
panel of appellate justices were divided over its semantic 
implications suggests that the language is not nearly as plain as 
either the majority or the dissent contend.37 
Irrespective how one may interpret the words “qualified” or 
“privileged” in isolation, the majority demonstrates how statutory 
interpretation necessarily demands inquiry into the legislature’s 
intention in passing a particular piece of legislation to ascribe 
proper meaning to its terms.38  Here, the court’s inquiry suggests 
that its decision would not have been affected had it determined 
that section 17-189(8)(a) was ambiguous.39  The decision rests not, 
as the dissent suggested, on “an unattractive fact pattern,” but, 
rather, on the conclusion that Plaintiff was not fit to return to work 
despite having recovered from his accidental work-related injury 
and, therefore, forcing the Board to indefinitely provide Petitioner 
with accidental disability benefits would be contrary to the 
intention of the legislature.40 
CONCLUSION 
The court held that section 17-189(8)(a) does not require the 
Board to provide accidental disability benefits to a firefighter who 
is no longer disabled but is otherwise unfit to return to work due to 
unrelated debilitating illnesses.  The court reached its decision by 
interpreting section 17-189(8)(a) in accordance with its plain 
 
 35.  Id. at 308–09 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 36.  Id. at 308. 
 37.  See id. at 308–09. 
 38.  See id. at 305–06 (majority opinion). 
 39.  See id. at 305. 
 40.  See id. at 307 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
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meaning, which rendered a conclusion that conforms with the 
legislature’s intention in enacting it. 
Andrew G. Howayeck 
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Medical Malpractice.  Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722 (R.I. 
2017).  On a motion for a new trial, a trial justice should not disturb 
the jury’s verdict when the parties’ expert witness testimony is 
evenly balanced or reasonable minds could differ on the verdict.  As 
for evidentiary matters, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will not 
overrule a trial justice’s decision as to admissibility unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is apparent. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On March 15, 2006, the Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode 
Island (Women & Infants) admitted the Plaintiff, Sevan 
Cappuccilli, who was in labor with her fifth child.1  The Defendant, 
Dr. David A. Carcieri, a gynecologist and obstetrician, was working 
at the hospital that day.2  The Plaintiff’s labor was without issue 
until the baby started showing signs of distress with a rapidly 
dropping heartbeat.3  Because the Plaintiff’s attending physician 
was unavailable, the Defendant was called in to perform an 
emergency cesarean section (C-section).4  The Defendant delivered 
the Plaintiff’s “very healthy baby,” but thereafter noticed that the 
Plaintiff’s uterus had an “odd coloration” and showed signs of a 
“Couvelaire uterus.”5 
Consequently, the Defendant removed the uterus through an 
incision in the abdominal wall, a process known as exteriorizing the 
uterus,6 and found that the uterine incision where the baby had 
been removed was extended two-centimeters.7  Although the 
 
 1.  Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722, 725 (R.I. 2017). 
 2.  Id.  Originally, Dr. Tawfik “Fred” Hawwa cared for the Plaintiff upon 
her admittance.  Id.  The Plaintiff’s primary obstetrician was out due to a 
family emergency.  Id. at 725 n.3. 
 3.  Id. at 725. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  “[A] Couvelaire uterus occurs when there is a ‘vascular issue’ with 
the uterus, and the uterus usually has blood and purple blotching.”  Id. at 725 
n.5. 
 6.  Id. at 725.  Exteriorizing is used to get a better view of the uterus.  Id. 
at 725 n.6. 
 7.  Id. at 725.  An extension of the uterine incision means that the incision 
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Defendant stitched up the entire incision and returned the uterus, 
the bleeding continued.8  Dr. Hawwa joined the Defendant to 
attempt to stop the bleeding.9  Eventually, the doctors discovered 
that the bleeding was coming from the retroperitoneum, a thin 
layer of tissue that protects the vital organs where the ovarian vein 
is located.10  According to the doctors, the bleeding was clotted and 
irregular.11  At trial, Dr. Hawwa testified that the blood looked as 
if it “had been there for a while,” approximately, “45, 30 minutes to 
an hour.”12 
Moreover, the doctors testified that they discovered the ovarian 
vein separated into two pieces, which the medical records referred 
to as an “ovarian vein laceration.”13 According to the doctors’ 
observations, the vein had a “very odd” consistency, “almost like 
tissue paper”; it kept breaking away and crumbling both times they 
attempted to tie it off to stop the bleeding.14  After the doctors’ 
efforts at tying off the vein failed, Dr. Richard Moore was called in 
to assist.15  Eventually, Dr. Moore was able to stop the bleeding.16  
However, at that point the Plaintiff had already lost “between 5,000 
and 8,000 cubic centimeters of blood—more than she had in her 
body.”17 
After the C-section, the Plaintiff required two more surgeries 
and remained in a medically-induced coma for a short time in the 
Trauma Intensive Care Unit at Rhode Island Hospital.18  After 
leaving the hospital, the Plaintiff received “treatments for what she 
testified was diagnosed as lymphedema” and also began seeing a 
psychiatrist for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression.19  
According to the Plaintiff, in August of 2006, the Women & Infants 
 
has torn longer than the length of the initial opening.  Id. at 725 n.7.  This is 
not an uncommon occurrence.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 725.  
 9.  Id. at 726. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  Lymphedema is a condition that causes swelling in the abdomen, 
legs, and upper body.  Id. 
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risk-management team paid for her Zoloft prescription.20  The 
Plaintiff’s baby had also received a “two-to-three centimeter wound 
to his right temple,” which was listed in a medical record as a 
“laceration from scalpel” during delivery.21 
One of the major issues contested at trial related to the timing 
when the Plaintiff’s ovarian vein was lacerated.22  The Defendant 
testified that the vein ruptured prior to the C-section and the 
bleeding from the ruptured vein caused the fetal distress.23  
Moreover, all three doctors involved in the surgery testified that the 
Plaintiff’s ovarian vein was abnormal, due to the fact that it was so 
difficult to tie off.24  Furthermore, Dr. Moore testified that he could 
not see how a scalpel would even reach the ovarian vein in the span 
of performing a C-section.25  The Plaintiff, however, argued that the 
Defendant lacerated her ovarian vein during the C-section.26  She 
underscored her argument with the fact that the Defendant never 
told her about the abnormal vein and neglected to make note of it 
in any of her medical records.27  The Defendant pointed out that 
the medical records are usually written by an intern or medical 
assistant who is not involved in the surgery and “there are many 
records made in the medical records that are not fact.”28 
At trial, there were eleven expert witnesses who testified on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, and four for the Defendant.29  One of the 
Plaintiff’s expert witnesses presented two theories in an attempt to 
prove the Defendant’s guilt.30  First, he opined that the lacerated 
vein could have occurred during the exteriorization of the uterus.31  
Alternatively, he testified that it could have occurred during the C-
section while the retroperitoneum was dissected.32  The Plaintiff’s 
expert witness rejected the Defendant’s theory that the laceration 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 726–27. 
 22.  See id. at 727. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 728. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id.  This is contrary to the Defendant’s argument that the scalpel does 
not reach that area during a C-section.  Id. at 727. 
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occurred before the C-section and pointed to the fact that the 
Plaintiff’s medical condition would have “destabilized more than it 
had” if the vein ruptured prior to the C-section.33  He also testified 
that the “tissue-paper-like quality [of the vein] is ‘to be expected.’”34  
Conversely, the Defendant presented expert testimony explaining 
that, based on the amount of blood, changes in the anesthesia 
records, and the Couvelaire uterus, the Plaintiff’s vein ruptured at 
approximately 12:15 p.m., which was before the baby exhibited 
signs of distress.35  The Defendant’s expert witness also rejected 
the theory that exteriorizing the uterus could cause injury to the 
vein, stating it “‘anatomically and physically doesn’t make 
sense.’”36 
The trial justice instructed the jury on two theories of 
negligence: “(1) a traditional departure from the standard of care; 
and (2) res ipsa loquitur.”37  The jury ultimately rendered a verdict 
for the Defendant, and the Plaintiff moved for a new trial.38  At the 
motion hearing, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s “theory 
that the vein ruptured spontaneously was ‘manufactured’ and 
stemmed solely from” the three doctors involved in the C-section 
and the jury “‘bought’ the story . . . despite overwhelming 
circumstantial evidence that the injury occurred during the C-
section . . . .”39  The Plaintiff believed that this “story” was not 
credible due to the contradicting evidence and urged the trial court 
to “‘make a finding that those three doctors are not worthy of 
belief.’”40  The trial justice denied the Plaintiff’s motion and 
explained that, based on his review of the evidence, “‘reasonable 
minds could differ on this critical issue.’”41  He described “the battle 
of the experts . . . as a draw,” and that one of the expert witnesses 
was not “‘substantially better qualified or more credible and more 
worthy of belief than the others.’”42  In the trial justice’s opinion, 
the evidence pertaining to the Defendant’s negligence was 
 
 33.  Id. at 728. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 728–29. 
 42.  Id. at 729. 
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“equivocal.”43  Consequently, the Plaintiff appealed to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal: (1) the trial justice 
“overlooked or misconceived material evidence” by not addressing 
the credibility of the Defendant’s theory about the laceration of the 
ovarian vein when deciding the motion for a new trial; (2) the trial 
justice “abused his discretion” when excluding evidence of the 
Plaintiff’s son’s “laceration” on his face; and (3) the trial justice  
“abused his discretion” by excluding the document referring to 
Women & Infants’ risk-management team paying for the Plaintiff’s 
prescription.44  The court applied a different standard for the 
credibility and evidentiary issues.45  As to the denial of the motion 
for new trial, the court stated that if a trial justice decides that the 
evidence is evenly balanced, then it will not disturb his decision.46  
Furthermore, the court noted that the trial justice does not need to 
“engage in an exhaustive review . . . of the evidence . . . [but] need 
only make reference to such facts” that motivated his decision.47  As 
for the evidentiary issues, the court stated that it would not reverse 
the trial justice’s ruling unless there was a clear abuse of 
discretion.48 
The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the 
Plaintiff’s first issue on appeal, noting it was “careful not to stray 
from the applicable standard.”49  The Plaintiff argued that the trial 
justice failed to “resolve the credibility gap” between the medical 
records and the Defendant’s testimony.50  Although the court noted 
that the trial justice did not expand on his decision that “reasonable 
minds could differ” on the issue of the Defendant’s negligence,51 it 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 729–30. 
 45.  Id. at 729 (quoting Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d 
1137, 1143 (R.I. 2017)). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. (quoting Hough v. McKiernan, 101 A.3d 853, 856 (R.I. 2014) 
(emphasis in original). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 730. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. (“Based on the extent of evidence presented in this case, it is 
certainly conceivable that the trial justice could have articulated the basis for 
his decision that reasonable minds could differ as to Dr. Carcieri’s negligence 
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concluded that the trial justice did not need to perform an 
“exhaustive review” of the evidence.52  Ultimately, the court was 
“satisfied that his concise overview of the evidence that motivated 
his decision was sufficient.”53 
The court also addressed the Plaintiff’s argument regarding 
the credibility of the testimony that centered around the cause and 
timing of the lacerated ovarian vein.54  The court stated that the 
Defendant refuted all of the Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence on 
this issue with his own evidence and testimony.55  The Plaintiff 
pointed specifically to the medical records that described the injury 
as a “lacerated ovarian vein” and argued that the trial justice “failed 
to reconcile the ‘wealth of documentary evidence . . . .’”56  The court 
considered Dr. Moore’s testimony that the word “laceration” can 
differ in medical terminology and “‘could also mean blunt[ ] trauma, 
or physiologic changes causing the vein to bleed rather than refer 
to a cut made by a sharp instrument.’”57  The court ultimately 
agreed with the trial justice that the evidence presented by both 
parties’ witnesses was “evenly balanced,” concluding that the trial 
justice made the correct decision after conducting his own analysis 
of the evidence.58 
Next, the court discussed the Plaintiff’s challenge to the trial 
justice’s evidentiary ruling excluding the Plaintiff’s son’s 
photograph and medical records.59  In her argument, the Plaintiff 
gave two reasons why the photograph of the cut on her son’s face 
was “highly probative and should survive a Rule 403 analysis.”60  
The Plaintiff first contended that the photograph would help the 
jury understand the meaning of the word “laceration” because a 
sharp surgical instrument caused the “laceration” in the 
 
more expansively.”). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id 
 56.  Id. at 730–31. 
 57.  Id. at 731. 
 58.  Id. (“In our opinion, the trial justice did not ‘overlook[] . . .  significant 
credibility issues;’ rather he found each side equally credible, hence ‘mak[ing] 
an independent appraisal of the evidence[,] and assessing the credibility of the 
witness.’”). 
 59.  Id. at 732. 
 60.  Id.  The standard for a Rule 403 analysis is: “[R]elevant evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.”  Id. 
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photograph, and this definition of “laceration” should be used to 
define the term in the Plaintiff’s medical records relating to the C-
section.61  In response to this argument, the court held the issue 
was waived pursuant to Rhode Island’s long-standing “raise-or-
waive” rule;62 however, it did “pause to consider its merit.”63  To 
refute the Plaintiff’s argument, the court referred to Dr. Moore’s 
testimony that, medically, the word “laceration” can have more 
than one meaning, and concluded that “[t]he photograph would not 
be meaningfully probative of Women & Infants’ interpretation of 
‘laceration,’ but rather, would only be minimally probative of one of 
many possible interpretations.”64  Alternatively, the Plaintiff 
posited that the photograph should not have been excluded from 
evidence because it would demonstrate the Defendant’s skill (or 
lack thereof) during the C-section.65  The court reasoned that a 
photograph of the son’s cut was not relevant to the issue of the 
Defendant failing to meet the standard owed to the Plaintiff (and 
not her son) during the C-section.66  Accordingly, the court ruled 
that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this 
evidence because “[t]his indeed [was] a situation where the 
evidence was marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial.”67 
In addition to the photograph, the Plaintiff argued that her 
son’s medical records should be included in the evidence.68  The 
Plaintiff sought to introduce the medical records once during the 
hearing on the Defendant’s motion in limine and twice during the 
trial.69  Each time, the trial justice reserved his ruling because he 
wanted to hear more about how a typical C-section and the 
documentation of it works.70  Despite the fact that the trial justice 
never gave a definitive ruling on this issue, the court concluded that 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 733.  Under this rule, the court will only hear issues that are 
“raised and properly preserved in the court” and then are addressed in the 
appellate briefs.  DAVID A. WOLLIN, RHODE ISLAND APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
§ 16:6 (2017–2018 ed.).  The rule explicitly states: “Errors not claimed, 
questions not raised and points not made ordinarily will be treated as waived 
and not be considered by the Court.”  Id. 
 63.  Cappuccilli, 127 A.3d at 733. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. (quoting State v. Husband, 162 A.3d 646, 658 (R.I. 2017)). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 733, 734. 
 70.  Id. at 734. 
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the Plaintiff’s use of the evidence was inappropriate.71  The court 
also stated that the Plaintiff did not preserve the issue for the trial 
justice to rule on and that she abandoned the argument because it 
was never brought up again at trial.72  The court declined to discuss 
the issue further because it can only rule on definitive decisions 
made by a trial justice and, here, the trial justice did not rule on the 
son’s medical records.73 
The Plaintiff’s final issue on appeal was whether the trial 
justice erred in excluding evidence of a record that showed that the 
hospital’s risk-management team paid for the Plaintiff’s Zoloft 
prescription after the C-section.74  The trial justice ruled, and the 
court agreed, that this evidence was inadmissible under Rhode 
Island General Laws section 9-19-35, and it was unfairly prejudicial 
to the Defendant under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 403.75  
Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments that she intended to use this 
evidence to show that the doctors may have been influenced by the 
risk-management during the C-section, the trial justice ruled it 
inadmissible under section 9-19-35, explaining that it could be 
construed as “‘acceptance of responsibility.’”76  The court agreed 
with the trial justice’s decision because of his explanation “that the 
jury might misconstrue it as an admission [of liability].”77  
Alternatively, the trial justice ruled that the evidence was 
inadmissible under Rule 403 because it “mimicked inadmissible 
liability insurance evidence prohibited under Rule 411 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence.”78  The Plaintiff argued that this evidence 
was probative because it showed the Defendant’s bias, evidence of 
her psychological injuries, and that the doctors were influenced by 
risk-management to say that the vein ruptured spontaneously.79  
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. (“Where the applicable standard confines us to consider only the 
trial justice’s decision, absent a definitive ruling it is improper for this Court 
to consider plaintiff’s argument.”). 
 74.  Id. at 735. 
 75.  Id.  The court refers to section 9-19-35 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws, which is a law that “excludes evidence of medical provider’s failure to 
bill in medical malpractice cases,” and the evidence of the “services rendered 
shall not be constructed as an admission of liability and shall not be admissible 
in evidence as to liability . . . .”  Id.  at 735 & n.17. 
 76.  Id. at 735. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 736; R.I. R. EVID. 403, 411. 
 79.  Cappuccilli, 127 A.3d at 736. 
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The court ruled that the reasons the Plaintiff provided were of 
“little assistance when weighed against” what the trial justice 
feared: that “there could be ‘an extreme, if not, incurable prejudice 
that would flow from that document’ that would ‘really taint the 
juror’s deliberations.’”80  As such, the court affirmed the trial 
justice’s exclusion of this evidence. 
COMMENTARY 
The court was careful not to disturb the trial justice’s rulings 
on witness testimony and admissibility of evidence absent a finding 
that the trial justice “misconceived or overlooked” important 
evidence. Ultimately, the court held that the trial justice did not do 
so.81  The majority opinion states that the “trial justice could have 
articulated the basis for his decision” with regard to the credibility  
of the witnesses and denying the motion for a new trial.82  There 
were a total of fifteen expert witnesses who testified at trial, and 
the only explanation from the trial justice with respect to witness 
credibility was that it was a “draw.”83  In fact, as Justice Goldberg 
points out in her dissent, after sixteen days of trial, the trial justice 
“explained” his decision for denying the motion for a new trial in 
just two paragraphs.84  Despite the trial justice’s summary 
decision, the court affirmed his ruling because he was not required 
to “engage in an exhaustive review” of the evidence.85 
However, there is a difference between an “exhaustive review” 
and “articulating a basis”—a difference the court did not discuss.  
As the dissent states, “the trial justice overlooked and misconceived 
the critical issue raised by the Plaintiff and failed to pass upon the 
credibility of the witnesses.”86  In order to determine whether a 
trial justice properly denied a motion for a new trial, the court must 
look to the trial justice’s discussion of the evidence.87  In this case, 
the trial justice failed to “reference any facts that motivated the 
ruling . . . .”88  The dissent was dissatisfied because, although the 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 729, 736. 
 82.  Id. at 730. 
 83.  Id. at 729. 
 84.  Id. at 736 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 85.  Id. at 730 (majority opinion). 
 86.  Id. at 736 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 87.  Id. at 738. 
 88.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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trial justice reviewed the witness testimony, he overlooked the 
evidence of the medical records and did not weigh in on the 
credibility of the witnesses in comparison to the contents of the 
medical records.89 
It is important to note, as the dissent did, that the Plaintiff 
made serious accusations about the Defendant’s credibility in that 
the doctors manufactured their story about the vein after the C-
section.90  The trial justice did not comment on the weight of this 
argument or the value of the medical records that contradicted the 
Defendant’s expert testimony.  The problem lies in that the trial 
justice “limited his analysis to ‘the testimony of the expert 
physicians offered to establish the standard of care applicable to 
plaintiff’s surgical procedure.’”91  The trial justice overlooked the 
critical issue in the case—the timing of the lacerated vein—and 
erred by not assessing more probative value to the medical records 
the Plaintiff presented at trial.92 
The dissenting opinion agreed with the trial justice with 
respect to the exclusion of the Plaintiff’s son’s photograph and 
medical records and the record of the hospital’s risk-management 
team paying for the Plaintiff’s prescription.93  The fact that the 
doctor who performed the C-section also injured the baby during 
the process should not go unnoticed.  Even if the photograph itself 
was too unfairly prejudicial to the Defendant to show the jury, as 
the trial justice and the court were concerned,94 the son’s medical 
records should have been admitted into evidence so this fact could 
have been used at trial to determine the Defendant’s negligence.  If 
evidence of the son’s injury was admitted into evidence, there is a 
possibility both parties could have presented expert testimony 
regarding the frequency of these injuries during a C-section.  The 
trial justice “reserve[d] his ruling” on this issue, and because the 
Plaintiff did not bring it up again, the court held that the Plaintiff 
abandoned this issue altogether.95  This evidence should have been 
discussed further at the trial level and a definitive ruling should 
have been given. 
 
 89.  Id. at 739. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. (quoting Hefner v. Distel, 813 A.2d 66, 80 (R.I. 2003)). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 736. 
 94.  Id. at 732 (majority opinion). 
 95.  Id. at 734. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s 
denial of the Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and his evidentiary 
rulings to exclude certain documentary evidence.  The court held 
that it would not interfere with the trial justice’s decision on the 
motion for a new trial because the trial justice concluded, after his 
analysis of the expert witness testimony, that reasonable minds 
could differ on the verdict.  The court also determined that, because 
there was no clear abuse of discretion by the trial justice, it would 
not disturb his evidentiary rulings to exclude certain physical 
evidence. 
Carla Centanni 
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Tax Law.  Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576 
(R.I. 2018).  Statutory ambiguity will be resolved in favor of 
taxpayers to permit tax appeals based on the fair market value of 
property each year, rather than the last year of tax revaluation. 
Taxpayers are not “locked into” the assessed value of their 
properties on the date of the last revaluation when challenging tax 
valuations. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
A group of Portsmouth, Rhode Island taxpayers, who owned 
real property in the same condominium complex, initiated this 
action against the Defendant tax assessor; their cases were 
consolidated over the course of litigation.1  On December 31, 2007, 
consistent with statutory obligations, the Defendant, in his capacity 
as tax assessor for Portsmouth, conducted a full-scale revaluation 
of all real estate in the town, including the Plaintiffs’ properties.2  
Both parties agreed that the tax assessor’s valuations, at this time, 
were correct.3  Then, in 2008, the United States endured the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression, and Rhode Island 
was not immune from its effects.4  As a result, real estate 
throughout the country and Rhode Island depreciated.5  Despite 
this economic downturn, in 2008 and 2009, the Defendant assessed 
the Plaintiffs’ property taxes based on the fair market value of the 
properties as of the last year of tax revaluation, which was 2007.6  
Both parties agreed that the Plaintiffs’ property value had 
decreased in both 2008 and 2009 and that the Plaintiffs’ 2008 
 
 1.  Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576, 578, 579 (R.I. 
2018). 
 2.  Id. at 578–79 (“The defendant determined that, as of December 31, 
2007, the full and fair cash value of plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the 
Balmuth Property, $4,430,200; the Qua Property, $5,320,800; and the Antle 
Property, $4,076,500.”). 
 3.  Id. at 578 n.3. 
 4.  Id. at 579. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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valuations of their properties were correct.7 
Pursuant to the statutory procedure, the Plaintiffs sought 
review of the tax assessor’s 2009 and 2010 assessments, arguing 
that their tax rates were too high and improperly based on the 2007 
fair market value of their properties.8  The Defendant denied their 
appeal.9  The Plaintiffs then appealed to the Portsmouth Tax 
Assessment Board of Review; the Board also denied their appeal.10  
The Plaintiffs then petitioned for relief in Rhode Island Superior 
Court, seeking to challenge the 2009 and 2010 tax assessments on 
grounds that the tax assessor should have relied on the fair market 
values of their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 
31, 2009, respectively, rather than December 31, 2007.11 
A trial justice of the Superior Court granted relief in favor of 
the Plaintiffs, concluding that the Plaintiffs were not confined to 
the December 31, 2007 property valuations.12  The trial justice held 
that the Plaintiffs could challenge the Defendant’s tax assessments 
for the tax years of 2009 and 2010 using the fair market value of 
their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009, 
respectively, reasoning that the Plaintiffs satisfied the 
preconditions necessary to prevail on their tax appeals.13  The trial 
justice entered judgment for the Plaintiffs, citing Rhode Island 
General Laws section 44-5-30, which provides, in pertinent part: 
If the taxpayer has given in an account, and if on the trial 
of the petition, either with or without a jury, it appears 
that the taxpayer’s real estate * * * has been assessed * * 
* at a value in excess of its full and fair cash value, * * * 
the court shall give judgment that the sum by which the 
taxpayer has been so overtaxed, * * * with his or her costs, 
 
 7.  Id. 
As of December 31, 2008, the parties stipulate that the fair market 
values of plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the Balmuth Property, 
$4,107,333; the Qua Property, $4,788,720; and the Antle Property, 
$3,668,850. As of December 31, 2009, the fair market values of 
plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the Qua Property, $4,256,640; 
and the Antle Property, $3,261,200. 
Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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be deducted from his or her tax * * *”14 
The trial justice, focusing on the use of the term “shall” in the 
statute, entered judgement in the Plaintiffs’ favor.15 The Defendant 
filed a timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.16 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the court sought to 
determine whether, pursuant to chapter 5 of title 44, the Plaintiffs 
were “locked into” the fair market valuations of their properties as 
of December 31, 2007, the year of the last revaluation, when they 
appealed the Defendant’s assessments for the tax years 2009 and 
2010.17  Conducting de novo review of the relevant statutory 
language, the court first inquired into any potential ambiguity in 
the statutory language.18  If the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, the court must “interpret the statute literally and 
must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary 
meanings.”19  However, if the language of the statue is ambiguous 
or “one that contains a word or phrase susceptible to more than one 
reasonable meaning” the court will then “employ [its] well-
established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean 
the intent of the Legislature.”20 
The court looked to section 44-5-1, which vests the power to tax 
in cities and towns, and states that “the tax is apportioned upon 
assessed valuations as determined by the assessors of the city or 
town as of December 31 in each year at 12:00 A.M. midnight, the 
date being known as the date of assessment of city or town 
valuations.”21  The court then looked to section 44-5-26(b) which 
 
 14.  Id. at 579–580. 
 15.  Id. at 580.  The court noted that the trial court found in favor of the 
Plaintiffs because it determined that the Plaintiffs had “(1) given an account; 
(2) been assessed taxes in excess of their properties’ full and fair cash value for 
tax years 2009 and 2010; and (3) timely paid their taxes for tax years 2009 and 
2010.”  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016)). 
 20.  Id. (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health 
Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011); In re Proposed Town of New 
Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 505 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 21.  Id. (quoting 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-1 (1956)). 
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provides that “appeals to the local office of tax assessment are to be 
on an application and that the application shall be in a particular 
form.”22  The court noted that the form accompanying section 44-5-
26(b) makes two mentions of fair market value being assessed “as 
of December 31 in the year of the last update or revaluation for real 
estate.”23  The Defendant relied on the pertinent language in 
section 44-5-26(b) and the language of section 44-5-15, which 
requires “the annual filing of an account stating the value of real 
estate as of December 31 in the year of the latest update or 
revaluation.”24  The Defendant argued that the language of those 
two statutes, when read together, indicates a mandate that the 
Plaintiffs must base their tax appeal on the date of Portsmouth’s 
last revaluation: December 31, 2007.25 
The Plaintiffs disagreed.26  They contended that the law 
permitted them to challenge the Defendant’s tax assessments using 
annual valuations, not just when the town conducted its last 
valuation.27  To support this argument, the Plaintiffs cited Wickes 
Assessment Management, Inc. v. Dupuis.28  In Wickes, the court 
held that “a property owner disputing an assessment carried over 
from a prior year is not precluded from challenging the assessment 
and is therefore not necessarily ‘locked into’ the value until the next 
decennial valuation.”29  However, the court distinguished this case, 
noting that Wickes was decided under a statutory scheme where 
revaluations were conducted every ten years, which the General 
Assembly had since amended.30  In 1997, one year after the Wickes 
decision, the General Assembly overhauled the revaluation process 
by mandating that “each city and town shall conduct a revaluation 
within nine (9) years of the date of the prior revaluation and shall 
conduct an update of real property every three (3) years from the 
last revaluation” in an effort to address issues of inequitable results 
 
 22.  Id. at 581–82 (quoting § 44-5-26(b)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 23.  Id. at 582 (quoting § 44-5-26(b)) (emphasis added). 
 24.  Id. (quoting § 44-5-15) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. (quoting Wickes Assessment Mgmt., Inc. v. Dupuis, 679 A.2d 314, 
320 (R.I. 1996)). 
 30.  Id. at 583. 
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for taxpayers.31  Furthermore, the court noted that the relevant 
language in sections 44-5-26(b) and 44-5-15 were added by an 
amendment to earlier language in 2001, four years after the Wickes 
decision.32  The court acknowledged that the General Assembly’s 
actions in the wake of Wickes lessened the case’s persuasive effect 
and did not settle the inquiry of whether or not the Plaintiffs were 
“locked into” the values of their properties as of December 31, 
2007.33 
The court stated that a plain reading of section 44-5-1 would 
seem to support the Plaintiffs’ argument that they may challenge 
the assessments of their properties using annual valuations, 
finding that section 44-5-1 provides, in pertinent part, “as of 
December 31 in each year.”34  However, the court acknowledged 
that this language directly contradicts the language of section 44-
5-15 and the form accompanying section 44-5-26(b), which state, in 
pertinent part, “as of December 31 in the year of the last update or 
revaluation.”35  A plain reading of these provisions, when read 
together, supported the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiffs 
were only able to challenge their tax assessments using the fair 
market value of their properties as of December 31, 2007, and not 
the annual valuations conducted in tax years 2008 and 2009.36 
The court then concluded “the only thing that appears clear to 
us now is just how unclear the conflicting statutory language is,” 
finding that there was “no shortage of doubt about whether the 
General Assembly intended to” lock the Plaintiffs in to the 
December 31, 2007 valuation.37  The court found that it was readily 
 
 31.  Id. (quoting §§ 44-5-11.6(a)(2)(i)–(ii)). 
 32.  Id. at 584. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. (quoting § 44-5-1) (emphasis added). 
 35.  Id. (quoting § 44-5-15; § 44-5-26(b)) (emphasis added). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 584–85. 
Unfortunately, the conflict between the language of § 44-5-1 and that 
of § 44-5-15 and the statutory form required by § 44-5-26(b) is only 
the most glaring, but not the sole, ambiguity lurking in chapter 5 of 
title 44.  To cloud matters further, there is also the language of § 44-
5-12(a), which states that “[a]ll real property subject to taxation shall 
be assessed at its full and fair cash value, * * * to be determined by 
the assessors in each town or city[.]” And, lest we forget, the language 
of § 44-5-13—that “[t]he assessors shall assess all valuation and 
apportion any tax levy on the inhabitants of the city or town and the 
ratable property in the city or town according to law, and the assessed 
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apparent that chapter 5 of title 44 is littered with ambiguous 
statutory language, or language “that contains a word or phrase 
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.”38  To resolve 
this statutory ambiguity, the court looked to its own maxims of 
statutory construction with the most relevant being, “taxing statues 
are to be strictly construed with doubts in favor of the taxpayer.”39 
By applying this maxim, the court affirmed the decision of the 
trial justice, concluding that the “[P]laintiffs had the right to appeal 
the yearly tax assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010 based on 
the fair market valuations of their properties as of December 31, 
2008 and December 31, 2009.”40  Stated differently, the Plaintiffs 
were not locked into the December 31, 2007 valuation when they 
appealed the Defendant’s 2009 and 2010 tax assessments.41  The 
court reached this holding “because [it was] confronted with a tax 
statute so plainly afflicted with significant ambiguity, [the court 
was] firm in [its] view that [it is] best guided by the maxim which 
directs that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed with doubts 
resolved in favor of the taxpayer.”42  The court further noted that, 
given the presumption “that the General Assembly knows the state 
of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute . . . it 
could have repealed or amended any statute that was contradictory 
or conflicting” when it amended the relevant language of sections 
44-5-26(b) and 44-5-15, but “[i]t chose not to do so.”43 
 
valuation of the ratable property is made as of the date of assessment 
provided in § 44-5-1”—and the language of § 44-5-30—which instructs 
that “the court shall give judgment” in favor of the taxpayer “[i]f the 
taxpayer has given in an account, and if on the trial of the petition 
[filed pursuant to § 44-5-26], * * * it appears that the taxpayer’s real 
estate * * * has been assessed, if assessment has been made at full 
and fair cash value, at a value in excess of its full and fair cash value 
* * *.” Those provisions add further uncertainty to the resolution of 
the issue at hand; that is, whether the General Assembly intended 
that plaintiffs be locked in to the December 31, 2007 valuations per 
chapter 5 of title. 
Id. 
 38.  Id. at 585. 
 39.  Id. (quoting Maggiacomo v. DiVincenzo, 410 A.2d 1332, 1333 (R.I. 
1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40.  Id. at 586. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (citing Maggiacomo, 410 A.2d at 1333) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 587 (quoting Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit, 134 A.3d 
1213, 1222 (R.I. 2016)). 
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COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was clearly faced with 
abundantly ambiguous statutory language.44  The majority applied 
a reasonably straightforward maxim of interpretation that 
compelled the court to strictly construe taxing statutes in favor of 
the taxpayer, giving less weight to two other potentially applicable 
maxims.45  The majority was unpersuaded by the fact that, in 2001, 
the General Assembly added the relevant language to sections 44-
5-15 and 44-5-26(b), after the language found in section 44-5-1, and, 
thus, rejected the Defendant’s suggestion that the later provision 
should govern here.46  The majority also gave little weight to the 
canon that would call for the specific provisions of sections 44-5-15 
and 44-5-26(b) to govern over the more general provision of section 
44-5-1.47 
This was a point of contention pointed out by the dissent.48 The 
dissent and majority both acknowledged three applicable rules of 
statutory construction for ambiguous statutes: “(1) taxing statutes 
should be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer; (2) specific 
statutes should control over general statutes if they cannot be 
construed harmoniously together; and (3) legislation enacted later 
in time should prevail over earlier inconsistent language.”49  
However, while the majority relied upon only the first maxim, the 
dissent deemed the last two maxims more appropriate to glean the 
intent of the General Assembly.50  The dissent maintained that the 
more specific and subsequent provisions of sections 44-5-15 and 44-
5-26(b) should control over the more general and earlier language 
found in section 44-5-1.51  Therefore, the dissent opined that the 
General Assembly intended for taxpayers to be “locked into” the 
valuations of the last update or revaluation when appealing.52  The 
dissent further noted: 
We gain comfort in this view when considering the possible 
ramifications of the majority’s interpretation.  Some 
 
 44.  See id. at 585. 
 45.  See id. (quoting Maggiacomo, 410 A.2d at 1333). 
 46.  Id. at 586. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. at 587–89 (Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 588. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See id. at 588–89. 
 52.  Id. at 589. 
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taxpayers could seek a revaluation every year, requiring 
municipalities, such as defendant, to expend funds in 
justifying them. Interpreting the statute in that manner 
would unnecessarily burden already strained municipal 
budgets, ultimately passing the costs on to taxpayers.  
Likewise, the loss of revenue, which occurred in this case, 
would leave cities and towns attempting to recoup their 
losses by, again, looking to remaining property owners.  In 
these times when most owners do not have expendable 
income, we cannot fathom the General Assembly wanting 
to do that.53 
I sympathize with the dissent’s position that the majority 
should have considered all three maxims of construction in-depth 
and with the policy argument regarding the potential undue burden 
placed on the cities and towns of Rhode Island under the majority’s 
view.54  Ultimately, however, I think that the majority was correct 
in its reliance on the principle that “taxing statues are to be strictly 
construed with doubts in favor of the taxpayer.”55  The 
considerations pointed out in the dissent, while important, are 
outweighed by the importance of viewing these statutes in the light 
most favorable to the taxpayer.56  The Plaintiffs in this case were 
paying taxes based on valuations of their properties that were 
hundreds of thousands of dollars more than the current worth of 
the property.57  That would not be a just outcome.  The court 
correctly sided in favor of the taxpayers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that taxpayers can 
appeal the tax assessments of cities and towns with the valuations 
of their properties for that tax year and not the last year of an 
update or revaluation.  Taxpayers are not “locked into” the value of 
their property from the last revaluation when appealing but, 
rather, can challenge the assessment using the fair market value of 
the property from that tax year.  When taxing statutes are 
 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See id. at 588–89. 
 55.  See id. at 585 (majority opinion) (quoting Maggiacomo v. DiVincenzo, 
410 A.2d 1332, 1333 (R.I. 1980)). 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  Id. at 588–89 (Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
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ambiguous, more weight is given to the maxim of construction 
stating that “taxing statues are to be strictly construed with doubts 
in favor of the taxpayer.” 
Zachary Carlson 
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Tort Law.  Dent v. PRRC, Inc., 184 A.3d 649 (R.I. 2018).  In a slip-
and-fall case, a plaintiff must present evidence of an unsafe 
condition on the premises of which the defendant was aware or 
should have been aware, and that the condition existed for a long 
enough time that the owner of the premises should have taken steps 
to correct it.  To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a 
plaintiff can present direct or circumstantial evidence to show 
notice as a genuine issue of material fact. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 22, 2012, Karen Dent (Plaintiff) was shopping with 
her husband at PRRC, Inc. (Defendant or Price Rite).1  In aisle six, 
Plaintiff’s husband placed two bottles of Sunny Delight (SunnyD) 
into their shopping cart, and then Plaintiff went to locate a 
restroom.2  Upon her return to aisle six, Plaintiff slipped and fell 
on a “‘brownish oily substance’ and was immobilized.”3  Video 
evidence from the store’s security camera showed that when 
Plaintiff fell, a porter4 was mopping up liquid in the adjacent aisle.5  
Additionally, Plaintiff’s husband observed a bottle of SunnyD 
leaking from his cart while he shopped.6 
On November 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint 
in Superior Court, and in February 2016, Plaintiff amended the 
complaint to consist of five counts: negligence; breach of contract; 
“mode of operation”; failure to warn; and breach of the implied 
warranties of merchantability, fitness for use, and fitness for a 
particular purpose.7 
During their depositions, David Walmsley, the store manager, 
 
 1.  Dent v. PRRC, Inc., 184 A.3d 649, 651 (R.I. 2018).  The store was 
located at 325 Valley Street in Providence.  Id. 
 2.  Id. at 651. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  “A porter is an employee of Price Rite whose duty it is to maintain the 
floors and restrooms of the store.”  Id. at 651 n.2. 
 5.  Id. at 651 n.3. 
 6.  Id. at 651. 
 7.  Id. 
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and Jeffrey Sparfven, the former manager, testified to how the 
SunnyD bottles arrive at the store, how they are inspected by 
employees for defects, how they are stored, and how they are put 
out on display to be sold.8  Walmsley also testified that the store’s 
protocol for a spill was: “If [an employee] see[s] something on the 
floor, the protocol is for them to stand at that spot until they can 
get [the] attention of a porter, and they stay there until the porter 
arrives.”9 
Prior to the filing of the amended complaint, Defendant moved 
for summary judgment on the negligence claim, and the trial justice 
granted Defendant’s motion.10  After Plaintiff was granted leave to 
amend, Defendant moved to dismiss the remaining counts under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure.11  Plaintiff responded by filing a motion for 
reconsideration on the order granting summary judgment.12  
Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under a strict products 
liability theory.13  At a motion hearing in March 2016, the trial 
justice granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the remaining 
counts, and denied Plaintiff’s two motions.14  Plaintiff timely 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Summary Judgment 
The court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant 
summary judgment on the negligence claim in favor of Defendant 
de novo.16  The court focused its review on how to prevail on a slip-
and-fall claim of negligence.17  The court explained that a plaintiff 
 
 8.  Id. at 651–52. 
 9.  Id. at 652. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  “While there is no procedural vehicle for a motion for 
“reconsideration,” th[e] Court considers such motions under Rule 60 of the 
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled “Relief from Judgment or 
Order.”  Id. at 652 n.5. 
 13.  Id. at 652. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 653. 
 17.  Id.  “[A] plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a 
defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between 
the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.”  Id. 
2019] SURVEY SECTION 569 
“must present evidence of an unsafe condition on the premises of 
which the defendant was aware or should have been aware, and 
that the condition existed for a long enough time so the owner of the 
premises should have taken steps to correct [it].”18  Price Rite, a 
business, clearly owed a legally cognizable duty to Plaintiff, a 
customer, due to the nature of the relationship between the two 
parties.19  Under common law premises liability, a property owner 
has an affirmative duty “to exercise reasonable care for the safety 
of persons reasonably expected to be on the premises.”20 
Having determined that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff, 
the court then looked to whether Defendant had notice of the 
dangerous condition on its premises, which was a question of 
material fact.21  In a premises liability case, a plaintiff establishes 
a prima facie case of negligence if it shows that the defendant had 
actual or constructive notice of the spill, and the jury ultimately 
determines whether the defendant was negligent.22  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that whether Defendant had actual or 
constructive notice of the spill was not a question for the trial justice 
at the summary judgment stage because “issues of negligence are 
ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be 
resolved by trial in the ordinary matter.”23 
Additionally, the court noted that it was “not the function of 
the trial justice . . . to comment on the probative value of the 
evidence” where a genuine issue of material fact exists.24  The court 
concluded that Plaintiff met her burden of producing competent 
evidence to show an issue of material fact by providing the security 
camera footage from Defendant’s store and the deposition 
testimony from Defendant’s employees.25  The video raised a 
question of fact with respect to how long the dangerous condition 
existed before Plaintiff slipped and fell.26  The testimony of Price 
 
(quoting Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2016)). 
 18.  Id. (quoting Habershaw, 42 A.3d at 1276). 
 19.  Id. at 654. 
 20.  Id. (quoting Cooley v. Kelly, 160 A.3d 300, 304 (R.I. 2017)). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. (quoting Gliottone v. Either, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I. 2005)). 
 24.  Id. at 655. 
 25.  Id. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Id. 
 26.  Id.  The court found significance in the video because the recording is 
only triggered by movement in the store and does not provide timestamps. Id. 
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Rite’s employees presented an issue of fact regarding the store’s 
safety protocols.27  Lastly, in addressing Defendant’s argument 
that Plaintiff failed to establish the element of notice,28 the court 
concluded that direct evidence of notice is not required at the 
summary judgment stage; circumstantial evidence of how long the 
spill existed on the floor is sufficient.29  Accordingly, the court held 
that the trial justice erred in granting Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment and vacated the judgment.30 
B. Motion to Dismiss 
In deciding Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court applied 
“the same standard as the trial justice,” conducting a de novo 
review.31  The court stated that it was “confined to the four corners 
of the complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving 
any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.”32  Ultimately, the court was unable 
to find in Plaintiff’s favor because the remaining claims lacked 
merit and were mischaracterized; the court therefore affirmed the 
dismissal of the remaining counts in Plaintiff’s amended 
complaint.33 
In response to Plaintiff’s argument that she entered Price Rite 
as a business invitee and Price Rite breached its contract by failing 
to safely maintain the property, the court stated, “It appears that 
[P]laintiff is attempting to shoehorn a straightforward premises-
liability claim into a breach of contract claim.”34  Similarly, the 
court found that Plaintiff mischaracterized her failure-to-warn 
claim, stating that it was “simply another inaccurately articulated 
negligence claim,” and was therefore duplicitous.35  Additionally, 
the court found no merit in either Plaintiff’s breach of implied 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to “produce evidence with 
respect to the length of time the liquid substance was on [the] floor.” Id. at 655–
56. 
 29.  Id. at 656. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 653 (quoting Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 
278 (R.I. 2011)). 
 32.  Id. “Additionally, ‘[a] motion to dismiss may be granted only if it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any conceivable set of facts[.]’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 33.  Id. at 657–58. 
 34.  Id. at 656. 
 35.  Id. 
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warranty for merchantability claim or her breach of implied 
warranty for a particular purpose claim because, under the facts, 
there was no sale of goods, and thus no contract was formed.36  As 
for the last claim in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the court found 
that “mode of operation” is not a separate and distinct cause of 
action, as Plaintiff had argued it to be.37  The court described “mode 
of operation” as a theory that alters the burden of proving notice in 
a premises liability case, and requires a plaintiff to request the trial 
justice to instruct the jury accordingly.38  Consequently, the court 
affirmed the dismissals of each count other than the negligence 
claim.39 
COMMENTARY 
In deciding whether to vacate the summary judgment, the 
court emphasized the burden that a plaintiff faces at the summary 
judgment stage in a premises liability case.40  Although a 
defendant, as a store owner, has an affirmative duty to exercise 
reasonable care, it is the plaintiff who must produce evidence of the 
dangerous condition and the owner’s actual or constructive notice 
of that condition, if he or she wishes to succeed on a negligence 
claim.41  At the summary judgment stage, however, a plaintiff must 
only present evidence to show “the existence of a disputed issue of 
material fact.”42  The majority determined that the video recording 
and deposition testimony presented a disputed issue of material 
fact, prompting the court to reverse the trial justice’s judgment.43  
Moreover, this case hinged upon whether Plaintiff needed to 
produce direct evidence of notice in order to establish a disputed 
issue of fact.44  The majority made clear that notice can be shown 
by circumstantial evidence.45 
However, Justice Robinson, in his dissenting opinion, argued 
 
 36.  Id. at 656–57. 
 37.  Id. at 657. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 657–58. 
 40.  See id. at 656. 
 41.  Id. at 654. 
 42.  Id. at 655 (quoting Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, 78 A.3d 747, 750 (R.I. 
2013)). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See id. at 656. 
 45.  Id. 
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that the trial justice’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor 
of Price Rite was proper.46  In his view, this was a case where no 
reasonable jury could have found for Plaintiff.47  He stated, “In 
Rhode Island the general rule is that negligence is a question for 
the jury unless the facts warrant only one conclusion.”48  Although 
he acknowledged that “disposition of civil cases by summary 
judgment is a procedural tool that should be engaged in with 
particular caution and circumspection,” there can be instances 
where summary judgment is appropriate even for a case involving 
alleged negligence.49  Here, the dissent concluded that there was 
no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that proved Defendant “had 
actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition that 
purportedly caused [Plaintiff] to fall.”50  Because the security 
camera did not record continuously, Justice Robinson  found issue 
with the video footage, stating that “it does not in any way support 
an inference that the spill existed for a long enough time to amount 
to constructive notice; and, for that matter, it does not establish a 
genuine issue of material fact.”51 
Although the dissent pointed to possible flaws in the evidence, 
the majority highlighted the importance of not weighing the value 
of the evidence at the summary judgment stage, and therefore made 
a more persuasive argument.52 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, at the summary 
judgment stage of this premises liability case, Plaintiff proved that 
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant 
 
 46.  Id. at 658 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. (quoting DeNardo v. Fairmont Foundries Cranston, Inc., 399 A.2d 
1229, 1234 (R.I. 1979)). 
 49.  Id. at 658 n.1.  Justice Robinson states that there are “exceptional 
perhaps, but nonetheless real” cases where summary judgment is appropriate 
for cases of alleged negligence.  Id. at 658. 
 50.  Id. at 659. 
 51.  Id. at 660. 
 52.  See id. at 655 (majority opinion).   
It is the function of the jury to determine the significance and weight 
of the evidence that relates the claim of negligence, and a trial justice 
should not “arrogate to [himself] the function of determining such 
facts under the guise of deciding what legal duty is owed to the 
plaintiff.”   
Id. (quoting Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I 2003)). 
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had actual or constructive notice of the spill.53  Additionally, the 
court held that direct evidence of the disputed issue was not 
required to establish notice; rather, circumstantial evidence was 
sufficient.54  Accordingly, the court vacated the trial justice’s grant 
of summary judgment.55 Concerning the motion to dismiss, 
however, the court affirmed the trial justice’s decision to dismiss 
the remaining counts in Plaintiff’s amended complaint because they 
were meritless and mischaracterized.56 
Danielle Beauvais 
 
 
 53.  Id. at 649. 
 54.  Id. at 656. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 656–57. 
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Tort Law.  Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center, 177 A.3d 468 
(R.I. 2018).  A community center whose van was stolen by a juvenile 
does not owe a duty of care to the general public and, thus, cannot 
be liable in negligence for damages that resulted from a third party 
who crashed the stolen van into Plaintiffs.  In a negligence case, the 
analysis of whether a duty existed hinges on either a special 
relationship or an analysis of the facts as they apply to the five-
factors identified in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 
1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987). 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 25, 2010, a fourteen-year-old boy stole a van 
from Nickerson Community Center (Nickerson).1  He took the van 
for a joyride, struck another vehicle, and fled the scene.2  
Providence police pursued the boy, and he sped up as he attempted 
to evade police.3  The boy struck a black Honda, causing the van to 
cross over into the opposite lane of traffic.4  The van collided with 
Stephanie Flynn and her two minor daughters, Nevaeha and Alexis 
(collectively, Plaintiffs).5  Alexis sustained fatal injuries, and Flynn 
and Nevaeha suffered severe injuries.6 
Later that day, Nickerson reported a breaking and entering.7  
The building was closed for the weekend when the break-in 
occurred.8  A Nickerson employee, Kingray Rojas, told police that a 
rear window was broken and he believed that an individual had 
 
 1.  Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468, 471 (R.I. 2018).  
Nickerson Community Center is a nonprofit organization located in the 
Olneyville section of Providence.  It offers social services to residents in the 
area, such as daycare and after-school programs.  Nickerson also provides 
services for veterans and houses a food pantry and a clothing donation center.  
Id. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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entered the building.9  Rojas explained that the intruder had gone 
through a cabinet that was left open.10  He stated that the keys to 
the van were stored in that cabinet, and both the keys and the van 
had been taken.11  Nickerson’s stolen van was later identified as 
the same van driven by the boy who collided with Plaintiffs.12 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Providence Superior Court on 
September 18, 2013, alleging negligence against Nickerson and 
Aetna Bridge Company.13  Plaintiffs claimed Nickerson owed them 
a duty of care and breached that duty when Nickerson failed to 
secure the van’s keys.14  Nickerson filed a third-party complaint 
against the boy for indemnity.15 
On July 9, 2015, Nickerson filed a motion for summary 
judgment, asserting that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs 
because it did not have a special relationship with Plaintiffs or the 
boy who stole the van.16  Nickerson submitted an affidavit from the 
Executive Director and then-President of Nickerson’s Board of 
Directors, explaining that the boy broke into Nickerson’s building 
when it was closed and “ransacked” certain areas.17  She also stated 
that the van keys were always kept in the reception area when not 
being used and no vehicle owned by Nickerson had ever been stolen 
in the past.18 
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion, arguing 
three supporting assertions.19  First, Plaintiffs presented two 
conflicting statements from the boy.20  In his statement to police, 
the boy said that a Nickerson employee informed him where the 
keys were located.21  In a later statement to a social worker, the boy 
contended the keys to the van were in the ignition.22  Plaintiffs 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  Aetna Bridge Company was originally a named defendant in this 
action, but Plaintiffs dismissed all claims against it on May 28, 2014.  Id. at 
471 n.3. 
 14.  Id. at 471. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 472. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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asserted that the keys were in the ignition.23  Second, Plaintiffs 
attached numerous police reports and an affidavit from a Nickerson 
employee detailing unrelated criminal activity at Nickerson.24  The 
police reports and affidavit documented break-ins, vandalism, and 
reports of vehicles broken into and stolen from Nickerson.25  
Plaintiffs argued that this put Nickerson on notice that the theft of 
the van and subsequent auto accident were possible.26  Finally, 
Plaintiffs provided Nickerson’s security policies and argued, had 
the policies been followed, the boy would not have been able to gain 
access to the keys.27 
The hearing justice granted Nickerson’s motion for summary 
judgment on February 23, 2016.28  The hearing justice determined 
that Nickerson did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs because no special 
relationship existed between Nickerson and the Plaintiffs or 
Nickerson and the boy who caused the accident.29  Additionally, the 
hearing justice found there was no evidence that the keys were 
made available to the boy.30  Even if the boy found the keys in the 
ignition, the hearing justice stated that he declined to expand the 
current duty vehicle owners owe to the public and ruled the theft 
was “an unforeseeable independent cause of [p]laintiff[s’] harm.”31  
Plaintiffs timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.32 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the boy’s 
conflicting statements to the police and the social worker were not 
“competent evidence” because the Plaintiffs did not document the 
statements “in any way that [was] sufficient at a hearing on 
summary judgment.”33  As such, the court concluded the hearing 
justice’s declination to consider those statements was proper.34  The 
remaining issue for the court to consider was whether Nickerson 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 473. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. (alterations in original). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 476 
 34.  Id. 
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was negligent in failing to follow security protocols which would 
have made the van keys less easily accessible to the boy.35  The 
court reviewed this issue de novo.36 
In a negligence action, a plaintiff must show that he or she is 
owed a duty before the trial court will consider breach, proximate 
causation, and damages.37  Whether a defendant owes a duty is a 
matter of law.38  The court first examined whether Nickerson owed 
a duty stemming from a special relationship between Nickerson 
and the boy.39  Because the boy was trespassing and there was no 
evidence to show that the boy was known to Nickerson, the court 
found no special relationship based upon Nickerson’s status as a 
landowner alone.40  Further, the court reasoned that the 
recognition of a duty based on a premises liability theory would 
amount to “imposing a duty of care on victims of illegal entries to 
unknown plaintiffs.”41  The court was unwilling to recognize this 
duty.42 
With no special relationship found, the court then analyzed the 
facts as they applied to the five “Banks Factors.”43  None of the five 
factors leaned in favor of finding a duty.44  The court first found 
that, while it may have been foreseeable that Nickerson could 
become a victim of crime as a result of its employee violating 
security procedures, the boy’s break-in, theft of keys and van, and 
resulting auto accident that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries were not 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 478. 
 40.  Id. at 479. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id.  There is no set formula for determining a duty, therefore duty 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  See id. at 477.  The factors 
considered in the ad hoc approach adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987) are: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the closeness of connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy 
of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and the consequences to the community for imposing a duty 
to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. 
See id. (quoting Banks, 522 A.2d at 1255). 
 44.  Id. 480–81. 
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foreseeable.45  Further, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that 
Nickerson’s location in a high-crime area was a determinative 
factor in considering foreseeability.46 
Next, the court looked to the closeness of the connection 
between Nickerson’s purported violation of security protocol and 
Plaintiffs’ injuries.47  The theft of the van was a voluntary decision 
on the part of the boy, and the voluntariness of the act distanced 
the closeness of connection to the failure to follow security 
protocol.48  Also, the court explained that because the boy hit two 
cars, fled the scene while being pursued by the police, and drove 
across the median into Plaintiffs’ car, the accident was not close in 
time or distance to the theft of the van.49 
The court then explored policy considerations, specifically the 
extent of the burden to Nickerson and the consequences to the 
community for imposing a duty.50  The court found the potential 
burden to impose here was unreasonable.51  The court agreed with 
Nickerson that the recognition of a duty here would open victims of 
theft up to civil liability for a perpetrator’s misuse of their stolen 
goods.52  The court was reluctant to impose this duty because it 
would require sufficiently adequate security on buildings and 
locking vehicle keys inside of a building.53  This was considered too 
high a burden, and the court declined to impose this duty as it 
would be an impermissible step outside judicial bounds.54 
“Dire consequences,” as the court said, could result from an 
imposition of a duty under these facts that was based solely on the 
high-crime location in which Nickerson is located.55  Resulting 
policy implications included: businesses may react by relocating 
from poorer areas with crime, or businesses may stay and engage 
in “elaborate security precautions” (the cost of which they would 
 
 45.  Id. at 480. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 480. 
 50.  Id. at 481. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.  The Court expressly stated, “it is not the function of this Court to 
act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted 
by the General Assembly” and “it is not our role to “creat[e] * * * new causes of 
action.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 55.  Id. 
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pass on to low income customers).56  Both of these options, 
according to the court, were even more concerning because 
Nickerson is a nonprofit.57  The court found that if it were to impose 
a duty on Nickerson, the individuals who benefit from Nickerson’s 
services would suffer if Nickerson were forced to relocate, pass on 
added costs to its customers, or terminate its current programs.58 
For the foregoing reasons, the court held that Nickerson owed 
no duty of care in this case, and Plaintiffs’ negligence claims failed 
as a matter of law.59 
COMMENTARY 
While the court was thorough in its review of the extent of the 
burden and public policy concerns of imposing a duty, the court 
relied very heavily on Nickerson’s status as a nonprofit 
institution.60  Under the facts of this case, Nickerson may not have 
owed a duty; however, it seems as though a business entity or 
landowner’s status as a nonprofit institution should not impact a 
plaintiff’s right to recover from a culpable defendant.61  Perhaps an 
entity’s status as a nonprofit should not entitle it to special 
consideration when determining if a duty exists.  The court could 
have considered low-cost solutions to the burden of maintaining 
adequate security, such as employee training and engaging local 
police to make security suggestions.  Further, many nonprofits have 
insurance policies.  This negates much of the financial burden on a 
nonprofit to pay any judgment rendered against it. 
The court was “of the opinion that the burden on the defendant 
in such cases would be unreasonable because it would require both 
adequate security on buildings and locking of vehicle keys within a 
building.”62  Locking vehicle keys inside a secure building does not, 
on its face, appear to be too burdensome and, in most cases, is likely 
a best practice for any business.  The court was right not to base a 
duty solely on location in a high-crime neighborhood. However, the 
court may have missed an opportunity to opine on the positive 
public policy implications of implementing adequate security 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 482. 
 60.  See id. at 481. 
 61.  See id. at 482. 
 62.  Id. at 481. 
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measures which consider location and crime rate.63 
CONCLUSION 
Citing the absence of a special relationship, the lack of 
foreseeability of the harm, and policy reasons against finding that 
Nickerson owed a duty, the court declined to extend a duty on the 
owner of vehicles to prevent vehicular theft by third parties. 
Colleen P. Giles 
 
 
 63.  See id. 
